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PREFACE. 
The data base upon which this thesis is built was commenced 
shortly after I moved to Arnhem Land in mid 1964. Throughout the next 
thirteen years I shared in an exchange process wherein I worked to 
provide education, at first for Yolnu children and then for the last 
eight years for adults, while the adults gave un·stintingly of their 
time in attempting to educate me. 
While most of the adult men have had some input and it would not 
be possible to thank them all here, there are some who have made 
important contributions. At Yirrkala for three and a half years, 
Mathaman, Narritjin and Larrtja.n:ta laid the initial framework of my 
training. After a transfer to Elcho Island,Dj~al, Djorrpum, Ba.£.altja, 
and Galpagalpa, together with Dji!!_iyini, Rrurrambu, Daygumbu and 
Wanymuli invested endless patience in explanation and re-explanation of 
things that I was slow to grasp. Some of them have long since entered 
into the Dreaming which formed the core of their being. To their 
families I acknowledge my thanks for what their fathers did. 
In early 1981, I was able to spend a further three months at Elcho 
while I completed the research, and in particular the work on the 
different colour charts. During this time I again received valuable help 
from many people. In particular I need to acknowledge Stephen Bunbatjun, 
Ba.£ikupa, and the linguist, Dianne Buchanan. 
At the Australian National University, I am indebted first and 
foremost to Anthony Forge and John Mulvaney who have been a continuous 
encouragement to me. My supervisor, Howard Morphy has shown great 
patience, making many helpful suggestions, particularly where I needed 
to search for greater simplicity and precision in description and 
analysis. 
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carrying the rest of the financial burden and for much other valuable 
support. 
Finally I am indebted to Garry Bow, whose voluntarily assumed 
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.ABSTRACT. 
This thesis is an analysis of the classificatory and evaluative 
systems used by the Yolnu people of Elcho Island in North-east Arnhem 
Land. In the process of examining these systems, I attempt to demonstrate 
how the Yolnu qualitative approach effects the meanings of the 
evaluations and classifications made. 
In Chapter One, I introduce the relationship between my thesis 
and current literature. I also give a brief outline of the physical 
and cultural environment from within which the Yolnu approach the 
world. Chapters Two to Five contain the discussion of systems of 
classification in each of four domains. These domains are normally 
considered as measurement, nl.llD.ber, colour and ethno-biology. In each of 
these, I analyse the systems used, drawing out the structures upon 
which those systems are established. 
The structures established in those four chapters are drawn 
together in the Conclusion. I demonstrate that the harmonious relation 
between the structures used in different domains indicates the 
existence of deeper common structures which, I argue, function at a 
cognitive level. 
My aim is thus to demonstrate the existence of these cognitive 
structures, and the effect on them of a qualitative mode of evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The Yolnu, 1 the Aboriginal people occupying the north-eastern 
quarter of Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory, are a loosely linked 
group of between three and four thotisand people, speaking a number of 
related dialects. 2 Outside interest in the Yolnu language and culture 
dates from the first known European contact with them. Robert Brown, 
who was with Matthew Flinders when he visited Arnhem Bay near Elcho 
Island, recorded in his diary for February 5th, 1803, lists of Yolnu 
names for people, botanical specimens and body parts. The first 
missionary to Elcho, J.C.Jennison, made serious attempts to record 
and learn language material between 1921 and 1923. He produced an 
English - Elcho Island Language dictionary of almost a thousand 
entries (1927:177-192), which included terms for all the colours 
generally named. Since that time a number of missionary linguists 
have done extensive work on Yolnu languages, in particular,B.M.Lowe 3 
and J.Ross. 
Anthropologists who have worked amongst the Arnhem Land Yolnu 
include C.H. and R.M.Berndt, I.Keen, H.Morphy, N.Peterson, D.Thomson, 
W.Shapiro, W.L.Warner and N.Williams. These have carried out a wide 
spectrum of research into social, economic, political,ecological, 
material and synbolic aspects of the Yolnu society. In addition a 
number of linguists, psychologists, prehistorians and educationalists 
have considered aspects relevant to their own disciplines. While I 
am indebted to each of these researchers in different ways, there 
has been an almost complete absence of any in depth study of the 
cognitive aspects of the culture from an anthropological perspective. 
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Spradley (1972:6) says that the cognitive definition of culture 
"excludes behavior and restricts the culture concept to ideas, beliefs 
and knowledge", then quotes Goodenough' s 1957 definition in support 
of his own; "Culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not 
consist of things, people, behavior, or emotions. It is the form of 
things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, 
relating, and otherwise interpreting them" ( 1957 :167). My own approach 
is closely in line with these two definitions, focussing on the 
structures used by the Yolnu in classifying and evaluating 
a number of aspects of their environment. For the inspiration to 
attempt structural analysis, I owe a debt of gratitude to the examples 
set by W.E.H.Stanner and C.Levi-Strauss. Their own structural 
analyses in fields different from the one I have chosen provoked me 
into serious consideration of applying a structural analysis to the 
problems I was concerned with in the cognitive area. 
Levi-Strauss (1963:33), taking up the work of N.Troubetzkoy, 
suggests that the methods of structural linguists suggest four basic 
operations which can be taken up in applying structural analysis to 
the social sciences. These are; first a shi~ from the study of 
conscious phenomena to their unconscious infrastructure; second, 
taking as a basis for analysis, not terms, but the relations between 
terms; third, it focusses on the notion of system; and finally, aims 
at discovering the general laws by induction or deduction in order 
to reveal that which gives the structures an absolute character. 
Earlier he had suggested similar notions (1963:16,17) asserting 
that the ethnographer's task is to recognise the variations in 
perspective maintained by individuals and to generalise from them to 
produce an indication of the wider aspects within which the 
individual's experience occurs. I have attempted to take up these 
notions in the discussions and analyses which follow throughout this 
thesis. I do move from the conscious surface structures of particular 
domains to their unconscious infrastructure. I use the relations 
between terms as a basis for analysis, however it is not possible 
to understand the relations without an extensive examination of the 
terms themselves. Thirdly it is the systems with which I am concerned 
though I have had to go through the application of them in order to 
find them. Finally, my ultimate goal is to reach the underlying 
cognitive structures which it appears are on somewhat the same level 
of analysis as Troubetzkoy's "general laws". 
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A nlllD.ber of anthropologists have carried out analyses of 
classifications in single cultural domains, notably those of colour 
and various aspects of ethno-science, in an attempt to reveal the 
classificatory structures used in them. However the practice in each 
case appears to have been to restrict analysis to these single domains. 
There does not appear to have been any attempt to compare the 
structures of different domains. The implication of this is that, 
when the structures in a particular domain are analysed, there is 
no way that the external observer can verify his results, for he has 
no way of cross-examining them in relation to the rest of the 
culture. His recourse is then to compare them with the structures 
of similar domains in other cultures, and this will not guarantee the 
validity of his work in relation to the culture being studied. 
The single domain studies have been carried further by others 
who have engaged in the cross cultural ~omparison of terms and 
taxonomies, in particular Berlin and Kay (1969) and Witkowski and 
Brown (1977 and 1978), in their search for cultural universals. The 
domains selected are of varying significance t o the cultures from 
4 
which they are extracted, and it has been adequately argued that, 
in any culture, complexity is relevant to the significance of the 
domain within the culture. (e.g. Tyler 1969:3,4, and Beals and Hoijer 
1977:528-30). Because of the selective choice of domains and the 
apparent inability to control the variable of relative significance, 
attempts to compare them cross-culturally on the grounds of complexity 
have led to some invalid assumptions concerning cultural evolution. 
As Beals andHoijer (ibid:596) suggest, "one of the major 
problems in cognitive anthropology has to do with the creation of 
theoretical models that would explain exactly how it is that human 
beings in general or human beings in different cultures actually 
process information". It is my contention that the examination of a 
single domain of a culture, irrespective of the depth at which it is 
considered, cannot reveal more of the cognitive structures or processes 
of a culture than are applicable to that single domain. If the 
cognitive structures or processes of a culture are to be disclosed 
then a number of domains within that culture must be analysed and 
the deeper structures within each compared. This is the thesis for 
which I argue. In doing so I have restricted the analysis to the 
structures not attempting to consider the processes except in passing. 
I attempt to establish that, in line with Troubetzkoy via Levi-Strauss, 
the structures used in the classification and evaluation of items or 
qualities in different domains can be compared; that these give 
indication of a deeper level structure to which the structures of 
separate domains are related. These deeper level structures, that 
I call cognitive structures can be argued to form a basis for 
perceptual interpretation of things seen with the eye. It is my 
contention that the cognitive structures are integrated with and must 
be understood in relation to a number of basic assumptions about the 
nature of existence. 
This is similar to the argument raised by Witherspoon in 
his analysis of Navajo culture. He maintains that the "conception 
of the nature of reality, its operatio.n and cons ti tut ion, shapes 
their value orientations, behavioral codes, and classificatory 
structures" ( 1977: 4). It appears in this that he is implying direct 
'links between the conception of reality and the shape of individual 
classificatory structures in separate domains. In doing so he is 
differing slightly from my own approach, for I am arguing for the 
existence of a deeper level structure related to the conceptions of 
reality but at a cognitive level, which serves as a foundation for 
perception and as a foundation for the structures perceived to exist 
in the separate domains. 
This concept of a deeper level cognitive structure appropriate 
to a particular culture is also similar to, though also somewhat 
different from concepts discussed by Spradley and Wallace. Spradley, 
(1972:4) writes of people using rules, cognitive maps and plans in 
order to organise and interpret behaviour, while Wallace (1965:310), 
speaks of a "mazewey" of which he says, "I mean the sum of all the 
cognitive maps which at any moment a person maintains, of self, of 
behavioral environment, and of those valued experiences or states 
of experiences which attract or repel him". In the relevant contexts 
both authors are referring to arrangements used in guiding behavior. 
The cognitive maps referred to are concerned with patterns of 
behavioural responses appropriate to a single context, and the 
"mazeway" is the broader scheme to which all of an indi vidu·a1' s 
cognitive maps are related and of which all the cognitive maps are 
a part. Thus the concepts of "cognitive maps" and "mazeway" are 
concerned with cognitive processes associated with behaviour patterns 
at different levels. In this regard the relation between them is 
similar to the relation I am suggesting exists between classificatory 
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structures of separate domains and the cognitive structures which 
establish their form. The cognitive structures differ from "mazeways" 
in that the latter a.re the total of which "cognitive maps" are a 
pa.rt, whereas classificatory structures are an application of the 
cognitive structures within a particular domain and the latter do 
not include the former. 
One other notion that I have not found discussed anywhere 
except in the psychology literature is the notion of a contrast 
between quantitative and qualitative modes of evaluation. I have 
found an understanding of this to be highly relevant to an 
understanding of the Yolnu classificatory and evaluative structures. 
The Oxford dictionary defines "quantitative" as "measured or 
measureable by, or concerned with, quantity". In these terms, 
quantitative evaluation is concerned with the assessing of things 
in relation to one another in terms of size, magnitude, amount, 
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duration or extension, all or any of these being attributes of quantity. 
In contrast to this, "qualitative" is defined as "concerned with or 
depending on quality". Thus a qualitative evaluation is concerned 
with the attributes, properties, special features, characteristics 
or nature of things. In contrasting the two, a quantitative assessment 
of anything is concerned with the dimensions of the attribute for 
which the thing is being assessed, whereas a qualitative assessment 
of that same thing is concerned with the nature of the expression 
of that attribute. 
A simple example of the differences between these two modes of 
evaluation, one which is met with throughout this thesis, is the 
meaning of the "negative" evaluation of any attribute. From the 
perspective of quantitative evaluation, the Yolnu word b~ynu (usually 
translated as "nothing") means the "non-existence of an attribute", 
but from the perspective of qualitative understanding and evaluation, 
bliynu means "the non-expression of the particular attribute" not the 
cessation of its existence. 
Jean Piaget asserted that "if we quantify a quality we have 
to measure it sooner or later" ( 1974:viii) and it appears from his 
writings that he assumed that ·quantifying or quantitative evaluation 
was a human uni versaL It is my assertion that the Yolnu do not use 
any form of quantification or measurement, but that all their 
evaluations are qualitative~ I am not suggesting that stages of 
progressively more logical thought, which Piaget has so conclusively 
Shown to exist in Western society, do not exist in Yolnu society. 
The implications of the above assertion are that linking those stages 
to the development of quantification is an incorrect practice. 5 
The argument in favour of strictly qualitative evaluation is 
supported clearly by Sea.grim and Lendon (1980) in their work testing 
Piaget's hypotheses in Aranda communities. They demonstrated an 
apparent lack of quantitative concern, making the observation 
that even material "exchanges that occur ••. involve qualitative not 
quantitative equivalences" (p 201). Thus it would appear possible 
that for traditional Aboriginal society in general, and not just 
Yolnu in particular, the focus of evaluation is qualitative in 
contrast to the basically quantitative evaluations made in Western 
societies. 6 One of the prime functions of this thesis will be to 
demonstrate the effect of this contrasting mode of evaluation on 
Yolnu classificatory, evaluative and cognitive structures. 
Originally hunter-gatherers, the Yolnu are gradually 
adopting a more settled lifestyle in a number of small towns 
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along the coastal fringe, and at small homeland centres scattered 
throughout the whole area, These latter, of'ten little more than an 
airstrip and a few shelters, are on land traditionally associated with 
particular small groups. The people living at the centres use their 
traditional knowledge and skills for obtaining a proportion of their 
requirements, but supplement these with supplies from the nearest 
town such as; flour, sugar, milk, tea, tobacco, clothing and a.mm.uni ti on 
brought in regularly by small plane. For the town dwellers, hunting and 
gathering is a regular weekend activity. 
Living in an area with a monsoonal climate, the Yolnu experience 
a distinct wet season from December to April, and a distinct dry 
season from May to November. The coastline, largely mangrove flats 
interspersed with sandy beaches and periodic rocky promontories, is 
broken by tidal rivers lined with mangroves. These rivers are fed 
during the wet season by vast freshwater swamps which fill and drain 
annually. The swamps are backed by rough hills or higher ground 
covered with open Eucalyptus forests. Scattered throughout the country, 
generally on sandy or lateritic soils, are areas of rainforest locally 
called "jungle". The sea is shallow, and with the rise and fall of the 
tides very wide expanses of mudflats and mangroves, sandy bays and 
reefs are exposed twice daily. Thus they have a wide range of 
ecological zones from which to extract their requirements. From their 
perspective, there is an absolute regularity in the cycles of presence 
or absence of rains, the filling and the draining of the swamps and 
the ebb and flow of tides. As a result they see a regular cycle in 
the availability and location of resources. From the Yolnu 
perspective, this environment is unchanging and the resources to meet 
t heir needs are always available wh ether t hese be basic f oods, 
pigments for painting, or raw materials for pragmatic or ceremonial use. 
The small patrilineal descent groups which together are the 
Yolnu, can be separated into two broad divisions on the basis of the 
geographical section of the country that they occupy. Some of these 
groups are almost entirely associated with the coastal areas, having 
a predominantly marine hunting environment, while others are almost 
entirely associated with inland areas and have a hunting environment 
associated with freshwater swamps and streams. The Yolnu clearly 
distinguish these two broad divisions, terming one of them monukpuy 
(associated with I belonging to the salt water), and the other 
.Q.iltjipuy (associated with/ belonging to the back country). In 
relation to the classification/identification of elements of the 
physical environment each person has a generalised knowledge of the 
whole region but each also has a more specialised knowledge of the 
items in his own broad geographic division. Thus coastal people have 
a far more comprehensive knowledge of the natural species of marine 
and coastal areas, while inland people have more knowledge of the 
species of freshwater and hill country habitats. While access to 
secular knowledge appears to be unrestricted there is in this way 
considerable variation in that which is known by different 
individuals. 
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In asimilar manner,the differences in secular knowledge held 
by the different sexes is one associated with the degree of 
specialisation rather than with exclusion. Thus the men with their 
specialisation in the provision of fish and the larger land and 
marine game, tend to have a more intense knowledge and a larger 
vocabulary associated with their specialisation. The women with their 
concentration on gathering vegetable foods, crustaceans, and 
shellfish, tend towards a complementary specialisation of knowledge 
in those areas. Small game, being collected by both sexes, appears to 
be equally well known by both. 
10 
I did not discover any restrictions associated with rights to 
secular knowledge. From earliest childhood, learning is both by 
imitation of those older than themselves, and by trial and error. 
(Harris,S. 1977). By the age of puberty, girls used to have knowledge 
and skill adequate to provide the basic needs of a family. A change 
in this has occurred in that the children are now in school until 
they are fi~een or sixteen years of age and while they tend to gain 
a head knowledge of the natural world, most do not have the practical 
experience. For example, one sixteen year old who was working for me 
was familiar with over ninety percent of the plant names, but 
admitted to being able to identify no more than ten percent of them. 
This was apparently due to the fact that she had only been hunting 
with her mother on occassional weekends. There is every indication 
that many of the young people on leaving school are beginning then 
to learn much that they have missed because of isolation from their 
homes at an early age. There is indication too that the schools are 
beginning to find ways of overcoming this loss. Older people are 
valued, among other things, for their immense knowledge of the 
territory and its resources; knowledge gained through a lifetime of 
learning and experience. 
In my search for classificatory systems and their underlying 
structures, I have chosen for analysis four semantic domains. These 
are normally considered to be; the evaluation of properties of 
physical matter, the evaluation of quantities of discrete items, the 
classification, naming and evaluation of colour, and the classification 
of the physical environment. My primary reason for choosing these four 
domains is that they all concern elements of the physical world in 
which the Yolnu live. That is, these concern the fundamental substance 
on which they depend. Secondly, two chapters, those concerned with 
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colour and the classification of the physical environment concern 
domains much discussed in anthropological literature. I considered it 
important, to balance my own focus on the structures applied to the 
two domains, with the need to place the discussion of them in the 
context of the literature. It was also important to describe Yolnu 
perceptions in a way that makes it possible to compare them with that 
which has been recorded concerning other peoples. Chapters Two and 
Three deal with domains normally considered to be focussed on 
measurement and quantification. It was essential for me to 
satisfactorily deal with these two domains if I was to demonstrate 
clearly the application of qualitative assessment. 
In each of the four ethnographic chapters, I draw out the 
structures of the evaluation or classification systems relevant to 
the particular domain. I also make a distinction between two bases 
for classification and evaluation. The first of these, being bases on 
the material properties of items being considered, I have termed 
pragmatic or physical. The second, based on spiritual or supernatural 
attributes, I have described as metaphysical. In chapter six, I draw 
together the abstract forms of the structures of each of the 
systems used. There I discuss the relations between the forms of the 
structures used in different domains and demonstrate that structures 
can be shown to exist at a deeper or cognitive level, structures 
which I suggest are formed in relation to certain cosmological 
assumptions. 
I am indebted to Mary Douglas (1966 and 1968) for notions 
associated with the defence of boundary. As I did the analysis, these 
helped me to interpret the ways in which Yolnu classifications are 
strengthened by their perceptions of the boundaries of classifications. 
I argue that, at the boundaries of classes, a dimensional shift occurs 
such that while items do not necessarily become taboo or dangerous, 
they do enter into new states of existence, changing the outward 
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expression of their existence but continuing their essential existence 
in a new form. 
In carrying out the analyses, and in the collection of the data 
I have been conscious of wide variations. AB Roy Ellen says (1979:357) 
"diversity is part of the system". Some aspects of this I have already 
mentioned. The Yolnu appear to consider that there is within the 
system, absolute truth, and an absolute classification for every item. 
Some of the people working with me took considerable pains to check 
information with the old men or old women8 before identifying 
particular specimens or items. While this was a common occurrence 
with the unusual, the normal practice appeared to be to make very 
positive identifications. Tactful cross-checking whenever this 
was possible revealed many variations. In particular to take one 
example from the research associated with chapter five, the 
identifications of owls, hawks and small shore birds seemed to vary 
from person to person and from occasion to occasion. The best that I 
was ever able to achieve with these birds was something like a 
calculated guess at the "most likely to be correct" term? 
In the chapters which follow, the meanings of terms, the 
classifications, the evaluations and the systems are all discussed 
in detail. This is necessary but they are not the central issue. My 
aim is to demonstrate the existence of the cognitive structures, the 
relation between them and the classificatory systems, and the effect 
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on the whole of a qualitative mode of evaluation. 
NaI'ES. 
1: The word Yolnu, literally "person", is used by the North-east 
Arnhem Landers to refer to themselves in contrast to other 
Aboriginal groups or in contrast to non-Aboriginals. It appears 
to have now gained general acceptance in Anthropological writings 
as a name for the people. Warner (1958) called them the Murngin, 
Berndt (1952) the Wulamba, and Shapiro (1969) the Miwuyt. 
2: It appears that there has been no generally accepted solution 
reached by linguists, to the problem of the distinctions between 
the various small language groups. The Yolnu distinguish at 
least six major groups, and well over twenty sub-groups. 
3: The spelling used throughout for vernacular words follows the 
practical orthography established by B.M.Lowe. (1975) 
4: This includes their evaluations of domains discussed in 
chapters two and three, normally considered to be domains of 
measurement and numerical quantity. 
5: Piaget mentions other aspects than quantification in association 
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with the progressive stages of development. The focus of investigations 
to this point in time appears to have been almost inevitably linked 
to testing of the development of the associated stages of 
quantification, with the assumption that this was testing the 
stages of development of logical thought. I hope that one of the 
outcomes of this thesis will be to demonstrate that they are not 
indivisibly linked. There is a vast field of research open to 
cross-cultural psychologists and educationalists in determining 
what are the indications of the developmental stages of 
logical thought in non-quantifying, and indeed in non-western 
societies. 
6: Thomson (1949: 51-53 and 77-94) indicates clearly from his 
observations of ceremonial exchange, that the Yolnu focus their 
interest on quality of social value rather than on quantitative 
or economic equivalence in exchange. 
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7: Three major centres were established in the Yolnu area by the 
Methodist church; Milingimbi (1923), Yirrkala (1934), and Elcho 
Island (1942). These are now small towns managed by Yolnu councils. 
The material discussed in this thesis was gathered primarily at 
Galiwinku, the town on Elcho Island. 
8: The terms "old man" and "old woman" are terms of very real respect. 
9: See Rudder 1977:Section 2:4.3.2. 
10: Hall pike ( 1979: 489) claims that, "It is far more fruitful to 
regard primitive thought as based on an incomplete logic rather 
than on a different logic from that which we know and indeed, as 
far as I am aware the possibility of a wholly different logic has 
never even been demonstrated". It is my purpose in this thesis to 
examine the possibilities of "qualitative thinking" as a different 
logic, complete, and structurally sound, while being contrastive 
with the "qualitative thinking" of much of "non-primitive" society. 
CHAPTER 2. 
CONCEPI'UAL STRUCTURES REVEALED IN THE EVALUATION OF PROPERTIES OF 
PHYSICAL MATTER. 
15 
In this chapter I consider the ways in which Yolnu evaluate the 
the properties of physical thing. In the sense I use "physical" it 
could include;materials known in the past such as wood, fibre, water, 
stone and clay; new materials such as steel and plastics; and various 
elements of the living and physical environments such as animals, 
humans and their artifacts, plants and their products, and features 
of the landscape. These are assessed in accordance with the quality of 
the distinguishing features which are the basis of their identity. 
The Yolnu structure their evaluations as if physical 
matter had two general forms. In one form, items are seen as having a 
discrete structure. For example, items such as trees, fish, implements 
or humans can be distinguished as separate entities. The other form is 
an amorphous one. However in some circumstances items which would 
normally be considered as having a discrete structure are treated as 
though they were amorphous substances. That is as if they were 
enclosed within a container or a boundary. In that situation, their 
discrete structures then become irrelevant and one can speak of a 
canoe full of fish, a basket full of lily roots or a camp full of 
people. Separate evaluative processes are applied to the two forms. 
I have chosen for discussion, the evaluations of materials in 
relation to a limited number of properties. Length, girth, size, 
structural strength and density are evaluations applied only to items 
with discrete structure. Temperature evaluation can be applied to 
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items of either form. Volume is an evaluation applied to either 
amorphous substances or to discrete items when they are perceived 
to be enclosed in a container or within a boundary. 
In the discussions which follow I attempt to demonstrate that 
Yolnu evaluations of these qualities are not measurement. In doing 
this I show how these evaluations are carried out, and I examine the 
evaluative system to show how the structures make it possible to 
evaluate without measurement. 
LENGTH. 
Any examination of the Yolnu evaluative system raises a number 
of issues. I make an introductory examination of a number of these in 
relation to a number of examples of evaluations of length. The issues 
discussed are; the question as to whether the evaluations are based 
on absolute standards or not; the nature of the relations between 
opposed qualities; the structure of the evaluative system; problems 
associated with the evaluations made in relation to ideals, and the 
question as to whether comparison can be equated with measurement. 
i: Concerning the standards used in evaluation. 
Mandjuwi had a team of men organised to chop out a dugout canoe 
1 (plate 2:1) from the fairly substantial log of a gulu tree. It had 
been cut in the jungle and dragged in by tractor to a position near 
the era~ room. There it could be worked on easily. Manydjarri, the 
only man I ever saw do any work on it , 2 was st anding examining the 
axe prior to commencing the day's work. In our conversation I asked 
him about its size. 
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Q: Nhathinya djaka3 dhuwal? 
What quality(of) linearity (is) this? 
A: Yow? ... Marr ga~ga weyin. 
Who knows? Moderately long. 
Q: Yakana dhumbul? ' 
(It is) not short (one) ? 
A: Yow. Weyin marr ga~ga. 4 
Yes (it isn't short). (It's) long ... (well) .. moderately. 
Later I asked one of the other men the same question. his very 
emphatic answer was, 
Mirithirr weyin dhuwal .... weyin mirithirr. 
(Its))very long this (one) .. long very. 
In this discussion of Mandjuwi's canoe are indications that 
there are no units or standards of measurement used by the Yolnu. In 
the situation, no reference is made to a quantity of length, and the 
two evaluations made are quite different. Weyin (long) is not a 
measurement unit but an attripute or quality of the canoe. Its meaning 
can be effected by different variables. Each of the men has a definite 
idea of the normal or average length of a canoe and one aspect of _ 
the meaning of the evaluations is related to that. However beyond 
the actual evaluations made there are fUrther implications. Manydjarri's 
evaluation of "moderately long" carries with it implications of his 
experiences in the bush, living traditionally, and the notion 
that, compared with the canoes he has been associated with, this one 
is not particularly noteworthy as regards its length. While 
calculatedly not boasting about his present involvement, he is yet, 
in making the evaluation, making a subtle statement about himself and 
and his skills as a craftsman. By comparison, Liwukan' s evaluation 
of "very long" has quite different implications. There are at least 
two of them. It appears firstly that he is intent on conveying 
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Plate 2:1. Dugout canoe, filled by wet season rains and still incomplete 
at the time I left Elcho, three months after it had been 
commenced. During that time I noted only one day of work 
spent on it. 
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impressions associated with the very real value of the operation being 
carried out. In the evaluation he gave he is indicating that the 
canoe's construction is a noteworthy effort, an example of the 
achievements that Yolnu can make. Additionally he is communicating 
that the finished product will be of high quality and the workers 
worthy of high remuneration. 
So weyin means "long" but an evaluation of weyin means many 
things. Some of these can be communicated by adding ~ither of the 
modifications of "very" or "moderately" in particular contexts, others 
by voice inflections and gestures which are not readily recordable. 
In no way can weyin be considered as a standard or absolute of 
measurement. Nevertheless it is the generally accepted meaning of 
the word as a classification which enables its use to express meanings 
other than this "basic" one. So the meaning conveyed is relative to 
the context of its use, but relative also to that generally accepted 
meaning. 
ii: Concerning the nature of the relations between opposed qualities . 
• 
The question to be considered is, "What is the nature of the 
relations between oppositions, and how are these effected by the Yolnu 
qualitative approach to evaluation?" 
G alpagalpa was narrating the story of the spinning of the first 
turtle harpoon rope. As he did so he described the progressive stages 
in the increase of its length, relating the length of the rope to 
the distance between where we were sitting and the position of 
particular trees. At first as the creators were making the rope it 
was gurriri (short), it was also raki (normally translated as string, 
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cord or rope). "They passed the shuttles from hand to hand and as it 
ga weyinthirra (was becoming longer) they coiled it up. It was still 
raki. They continued on and on. 'Let's check it out'. One of them 
piched up the end and pulled it out. Do you see that yawuny, (a 
Grevillea tree about BO metres away). It was that djaka (quality of 
linearity). At first it was raki like that.(pointing to a tree about 
10 metres away), but now it is rawu (the turtle rope) •5 It is good 
and complete." 
That the turtle rope is expected to have certain attributes is 
shown in the narrative. From a Western perspective, using a 
quantitative evaluation, the rope can be measured and described as 
having a length of something like eighty metres. From Galpagalpa's 
perspective, the rope had a linear quality of a particular type 
which could be compared to the spatial relationship between himself 
and the grevillea tree. It was not a measured length, but he had 
a notion of a particular attribute of the quality of linearity. 
There are for Galpagalpa, and for the Yolnu in general, two ways 
in which the quality of linearity is expressed. One of these is 
gurriri (short) and the other is weyin (long). Each of these, 
while remaining distinct from the other is differently expressing 
the attributes of djaka (linearity). Rronan, while he was 
attempting a definition of djaka emphasised both the separateness of 
the oppositions and the overall nature of the category "linearity". 
He did so as follows, 11 Djaka mean is ... doesn't matter whether he's 
skinny or yindi (big) or yindi mirithirr (very big) long as he's 
weyin (long). Djaka is both weyin (long) ga dhLJTibul (and short), but 
long one is weyin and short one is dhtanbul". 
I 
\ 
\ 
• 
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From a quantitative approach, the two qualities~long''and 
"short" are perceived as particular measureable lengths along a graded 
continuum of ~engths from zero to infinity, all of which are different 
expressions of the measure able quality of linearity. According to 
Sapir (1949:122) this process of grading is a pre-requisite for 
measurement and counting. "Long" as a quantitative evaluation is relative 
to the expected normal length of an object. For example, a "long" snake 
is different from a "long" rope. In each of these evaluations 11long'tis 
perceived to be relative to a continuum of various lengths which 
express varied experiences of different length snakes or ropes. 6 
From this perspective "long" and "short" are quantitative opposites 
deviating from the expected average in opposite directions. It is 
the particular deviation from the average which indicates whether an item 
is to be classed as long or short. An average rope is simply average. 
The Yolnu approach the same objects differently. The two aspects 
of linearity, "shortness" and 'longness'~ are seen not as a part of a graded 
continuum, but as two discontinuous, separate entities. There is a 
mid-point between them but it is not an average expression of linearity. 
Rather it is place where the attributes "long" and "short" are both 
partially expressed and neither is fully expressed. Any item which 
is an average length for its kind (when considered from a quantitative 
perspective) is perceived to express both "moderate longness" and 
"moderate shortness" (when considered from the Yolnu perspective). 
An item such as the rope in the narrative can go through a process of 
change such that it begins to express the opposite quality, but that 
new quality is not fully expressed until the original attribute has 
ceased to exist. Thus the true opposite of "short'' is "not short", 
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It is then possible to suggest that for the Yolnu, one quality is the 
form taken by the "non-expression" of its opposite. This suggestion 
will be supported by further evidence in this and successive chapters. 
The separateness of the two qualities and the process of change 
from one to the other are exemplified in Galpagalpa's narration. The 
Original narrative is quite extensive, with the duration of the 
narrative expressing the duration of the process, including the 
stops for meal breaks and for sleeping. In the condensed version 
above, that which is is initially begun cannot express the nature of 
the turtle rope because turtle rope is long. That which is begun is 
short and not turtle rope though it will be one. It will express the 
nature of turtle rope, its potential to do so is there (Rudder 1980) 
even in the fibres before they are collected from the bush, but at 
its commencement it does not do so. 
This perception of "not long" being "not turtle . rope", is 
emphasised by the change in vocabulary. That which is commenced is 
raki, the general term for string or cord, and it remains raki while 
it goes through the process of "becoming long". Eventually, at the 
end of the process it has not only "become long", but is rawu, the 
turtle rope, fully expressing the right attributes. It is not a 
"long raki" when it is completed, but it is long and it is then rawu. 
This narrative then, in using the contrasting vocabulary to express 
the contrasting nature of the two qualities, emphasises the 
discontinuity that is perceived in the nature of the opposition 
between them. Lexical changes are frequently used in this way expressing 
the discontinuity between opposite expressions of a particular quality, 
this also will be further demonstrated in later sections of this and 
later chapters. 
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The attributes by which an i tern is identified frequently 
include particular physical aspects, and as I have shown in relation 
to the linear quality of rope, there is not infrequently a lexical 
change which correlates with an opposition in the expression of those 
physical attributes. Another example of this can be drawn from 
perceptions associated with the paperbark tree (Melaleuca cajuputi). 
An immature specimen of the tree is named munuymunuy, and one of its 
attributes is that it is "not weyin" (not tall). 7 A mature specimen, 
one with a copious supply of the papery bark is called badarr, being 
perceived also to be weyin (tall). Munuymunuy is considered to be 
"not baQ.arr" though it is recognised as an immature :?pecimen. It 
cannot be badarr until it is mature, because of the non-expression 
of the attributes of badarr. 
S o the nature of the relation between a pair of opposed 
qualities from a Yolnu qualitative perspective appears to be first 
one of discontinuity, and secondly one in which each quality can be 
seen as the negative expression of, or the form ta.ken by the 
"non-expression" of, the other. 
iii: The structure of the evaluative system. 
In the two preceding sections I discussed terms for "short", 
"long" and "linearity", and the relation between them. It is essential, 
before proceeding further, to consider the structure of the evaluative 
system in which they are used, and the moderations of the terms used. 
First, djaka is not an evaluative term, but is used to identify 
one of the sections of the evaluative system, referring in so doing 
to the attribute which is characteristic of that particular section, 
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that is "lines:r-i ty". Secondly, I have argued that the terms for 
"long" and "short" are relative to the context of their use. However, 
their application in a variety of situations can only have meaning if 
there is some ideal of meaning to which their varied applications 
can be related and from which they can therefore gain meaning. 
In an attempt to discover some absolute of meaning I carried 
out a number of experiments with different very patient Yolnu men 
and women. Using different groups of items I asked them to tell me 
how long each item was. Once a set of evaluations was made I would 
add items, either outside the extreme limits of the set, or in an 
intermediate position. In each case the original evaluation was 
happily altered. I tried it with cultural items, non-cultural items, 
and mixtures of both, then with groups of things that obviously did 
not go together in a single category such as knives, men and roads. 
The evaluations were always made in relation to the context of tlLe set 
under construction. The length of knives was relative to the set which 
could be called, "all imaginable knives". The "length" of men was 
relative to the known range of men's heights. It was even possible to 
make evaluations in terms of a set which included in its consideration 
the lengths of all the things normally found in the natural 
environment. The range of terms used in making all of these 
evaluations is shown in figure 2:1. 
The normal approach taken by the Yolnu, even when unaware that 
I was about to ask what to them must have often appeared to be a set 
of irrational questions, was to give an item a classification of 
"moderately long" or "moderately short". This meant that no matter 
what followed, their first classification was alwa:ys right, even if 
they changed it. That is, if the first item was classed as"moderately 
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General Classifications Specific Classifications 
mirithirr gurri ri 
. 
... ,.. 
very short ,.. 
... 
... ,.. 
... 
... 
, 
t gurri ri ,.. ... gurri ri ... ... - - - - - - - - - - -- --short ... ... short ... .. ... .... 
... 
.... 
.. 
...... 
'' 
.. 
.. marr g urri ri 
..... 
moderately short 
marr weyin 
... 
... moderately long 
' I 
,.. 
... 
... 
... ,.. 
... ,.. 
t weyin 
,. 
,.. 
weyin 
... 
,. 
-;..------ - - - - -
long ... .. long 
... 
.... 
.. 
.. 
.. 
... 
.. 
.. mirithirr weyin .. 
... 
.. 
... 
very long 
Figure 2:1. Terms used in evaluating djaka (linearity). 
long"the classifications above it and below it in the above figure 
were also being made. If an item was "moderately long", it was 
automatically also "moderately short", either classification being 
not a denial of the other but a matter of focus. Similarly by being 
"moderately long" on the level of specific classification it was 
also expressing the evaluation of "long" on the level of general 
classification. It was usually only after the expected set had been 
established that the "very short" and "very long" terms were used. 
If then additional extreme items were introduced, either the previous 
"very ..• " classification could be shifted to the general class and 
the new item given its place, or the "very ... " evaluation could be 
given to the new one in such a way that the first syllable of 
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mirithirr (very) was emphasised. That would indicate that the new 
item was "extremely, very .•. ", linking it to the previous extreme 
like a sub-classification of it at an even more specific level, 
without needing to suggest that the previously made one was wrong in 
any wey. 
In this wey the system is flexible, allowing for alterations , 
to be made to given classifications without needing to consider the 
previous ones as faulty. The classifications if they can be said to 
have an abstract reference, are related to the contexts which set 
the limits to the set being evaluated. That is, the generally 
expected length of any item functions as a standard or ideal to 
which other items of the same category can be related. 
iv: Classification in relation to ideals of length. 
In the era~ room8 over a period of time, there accumulate quite 
large collections of spears of various kinds; assorted hunting and 
fishing spears, decorated spears and spearheads. Ostensibly these were 
made for the tourist industry, but on various occasions different 
Yolnu men would come to buy spears for themselves, their sons or 
their friends. Whether the occasion was a weekend hunting or fishing 
trip, a ceremonial event or a coming long weekend sporting carnival 
with its spear throwing competition, the Yolnu customers alweys had 
a particular purpose in mind for their purchase. They also had a 
notion of the ideal spear to suit the purpose being considered. On 
occasion, choices were made very seriously, but at other time 
light-hearted banter flew quite freely. It was not abnormal for a 
very long spear to be offered to a very short man or a very short one 
to a tall man. 
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The ideal spear has a number of qualities by which it is assessed 
such as straightness, balance and length, all of which vary according 
to personal preference. A tall man finds a longer spear more 
comfortable to use and a short man by comparison prefers a short one. 
Thus the ideal varies from man to man.The spear with a length which 
approximates the ideal is manymak (good or just right). One which is 
considered to be the perfect example of the ideal is mirithirr · · 
manymak (very good or excellent). A spear which is at the limits of 
acceptability whether that is because it is too long or too short 
but still useable is m~rr manymak (moderately good) . It could also 
be classed as m~rr y~tjkurru (moderately bad), m~rr weyin (moderately 
long) or m~rr gurriri (moderately short), because the deviation from 
the ideal is a deviation in terms of length. 
In this way, when length is evaluated in relation to an ideal, 
a second set of oppositions, "good" and "bad" is superimposed over 
those associated with linearity. Both systems are equally flexible 
and the relations between the two systems are also flexible. For 
example, in the evaluation of spears, "good" is not usually equated 
with either "long" or "short", but at some mid-point between them. 
There are however exceptions to this as I demonstrated in the earlier 
narrative of the turtle rope , where "good" was equated with "long". 
In the practical applications of these systems it is normal when an 
item does not meet the ideal for it to be evaluated by the qualities 
which cause it to fall short of the ideal rather than to classify it 
as y~tjkurru (bad). This is so in relation to the creation of turtle 
rope where less than the ideal is classified as"short". "Long" was 
II d11 b t 11 h t 11 t 11b 11 • goo u s or was no ad . For the Yolnu 1 t appears that only 
the item which is not use able at all is "bad" and often items 
evaluated as far less than the ideal will be used, hence the tendency 
towards a more descriptive evaluation. Judging from the wey in 
which yatjkurru together with its modifications is used, it would 
appear more frequently a registration of the user's displeasure with 
the item than an objective evaluation of its qualities. 
' 
mirithirr yatjkurru 
,' very bad 
------1• 
yatjkurru .. yatjkurru 
bad bad 
' 
' 
,___ ___ __, 
\ marr yatjkurru 
moderately bad 
marr manymak 
, moderately good 
I 
I~-----. 
manymak 
' good ' , I , 
________ ,,' ........._ __ _ 
,_........,.......,..-..,-..,..--------~ 
manymak ' mi ri thi rr manymak 
good -- -- very good ' ,___ _______________ __ 
-------,, 
\ ', 
\ manymak 
good \ 
\ 
\ ------------...... \ marr manymak 
moderately good 
marr yatjkurru 
/ IOC)derately bad ,' ,__ _____________ _, 
______ __, 
yatjkurru ___ yatjkurru 
bad bad 
' \ mi ri thi rr yatj kurru 
very bad 
mirithirr weyin 
very long 
... ~_:_~-~-· "__, ---t---~:: . ....._~-~-~-~_"___, 
, 
-----------------.' 
marr weyin 
moderately long 
marr gurri ri 
moderately short 
' 
\ 
._g_~_:_:_:_:_i ..... _ -t- ___ -~.__g_~_:_:_~_r_i_, 
----------------...' 
mirithirr gurriri 
very short 
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Figure 2:2. Potential relations between value judgement and length terms. 
In figure 2:2, I have attempted to indicate the flexible 
relationships between the two systems. For example, when the "ideal" 
is related to a personal evaluation, then "good" will be neither 
"short" nor "long", as both these qualities are equated with the 
category "bad". However, if "very good" equates with "very long", 
then "very short" and "very bad" can be equated. Thus while the 
relations between terms within each separate system remain fixed, 
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the relations between the two systems alter according to the contexts 
of their use. 
v: The relationship between qualitative comparison and quantitative 
measurement. 
The last question to consider in relation to length is concerned 
with the Yolnu use of comparison in evaluating it, and the 
relationship between that and the process of measurement. 
In narrating the turtle rope creation story, Galpagalpa._compared 
the completed rope with the distance between ourselves and a grevillea 
tree. In comparing them he is not concerned with measuring 
one against the other, but he does have a perception of the lineal 
quality of the rope which he equates with the lineal quality of the 
space between the tree and us. I quoted Piaget earlier as asserting 
that ,"if we quantify a quality we have to measure it sooner or later': 
(194l:viii). In the above examples the two items are compared and 
found to both express the quality of longness. However it is the 
quality of the items, and not the quantity of their lengths which 
is being compared in Yolnu evaluations. 
From the perspective of quantitative evaluation, the English 
translations of the "not good" categories of linearity would be 
"too long", "too short", "very much too long" and "very much too 
short". These do not however form correct translations of the 
meanings of the Yolnu terms, as the Yolnu terms are not categories 
comparable to one another along a quantified continuum. They are 
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separate classifications in a finite set of classes with each class 
expressing specific attributes. The classes are compared as relative 
expressions of the quality. In this approach, the focus is on the 
quality of particular qualities, and it is this that I call qualitative 
evaluation. Using it 1 it is possible to make comparisons that are 
non-quantitative and hence not measurement. 
WEIGHT, TEMPERATURE, SURFACE TEXTURE AND STRUCTURAL STRENGTH. 
Inthe discussion of these four physical properties, I consider 
further aspects of the evaluative system not considered in relation 
to length. These demonstrate various amplifications of the basic 
evaluative system. One major contrast between the evaluation of length 
and of these four domains, is that in none of these is there a term 
which is used to identify the section of the evaluative system, 
i: Terms used in evaluation. 
There are three terms for weight. first there is a pair of terms 
in opposition, 9onu9 (heavy) and damba (light), which are modified by 
the same words "very" and "moderately" as were used to modify length 
terms. These are shown in figure 2:3 above. ~onu~ refers to all heavy 
things including small items of high density.Qamba includes both 
large and small things which are light. It was defined by one man as 
"like cuttlefish bone or small dry wood". The third term rurrwal a 
defined by the same man as, "very light like polystyrene foam, or as a 
leaf in the wind . . . requiring no energy to move it". In this wey 
rurrwala functions as a special classification of a quality of weight 
which is "beyond the expected limits of very light". 
mi ri thi rr oonu~ 
very heavy 
, 
,, 
t §~-- nonun vy heavy ' 
' 
' ~ 
mMrr nonu~ 
moderately heavy 
------------
._ ___________ 
mMrr damba 
-
moderately light 
•II ,, 
,, 
t 
,, 
damba damba 
-
-- -
-light light 
' ' 
' • 
mirithirr damba 
-
very light 
, 
... 
... , 
,, 
,, 
, 
... 
... 
rurrwa 1 a 
weightless 
Figure 2:3. Relation between 
terms used in evaluating weight 
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mirithirr gornnur 
very hot 
, 
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moderately hot 1-------------
--- - - -- ------
mMrr guyinarr 
moderately cold 
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' ' 
mirithirr guyi oarr 
very cold cold 
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,. 
, I 
, 
, I 
.... 
,. I ,., 
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.... I 
-
.... I 
dMtimirr ~ayamunuo 
--brittle/cold deathly cold 
Figure 2:4. Relation between terms 
used in evaluating temperature. 
Gorrmur (hot) and guyi~arr (cold) are the pair of opposed terms 
used in assessing temperature. In figure 2:4 I have shown the 
relations between these terms and there modifications. There are also 
two additional terms for particular q_uali ties of cold beyond "very 
cold". These are .Q.M1_imirr (brittle cold - so cold that it may break 
with a snap) a term used sometimes by a man to describe how cold he 
feels when coming in frozen from fishing, and ~ayamunu~ (unnaturally 
cold to the touch, as a corpse). 
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Both weight and temperature are relative to many factors such 
as the expected quality of an item, its relation to other items in 
a set being evaluated, and to the emotional feelings of the person 
making the assessment. The"basic" meaning of the terms appears to be 
established in relation to the human body, temperature evaluations 
being relative to body temperature, and weight to the amount of effort 
required to lift or move an item. 
The surface texture of objects or of large areas is evaluated in 
terms of "roughness" and "smoothness". It appears that while there is a 
connnonly used pair of opposed terms which characterise these general 
qualities,the o~position is between two sets of terms, One 
of these sets of terms refers to a particular attribute of 
"smoothness", and the other to the attributes of "roughness". 
These are shown in figure 2:5. The smoothness terms are laparra, 
(smooth and flat like a cement floor or still water), buyuwuyu, 
(smooth,flat,glossy surface), 9ayak9ayak (slippery) ,and rirriwiya 
(smooth and hard) . .Any of these can be opposed to any of the following 
roughness terms; dhirrkthirrk (rough), lulnyin'.l_ulnyin (a pitted or 
potholey surface), and dunutunumirr (a lumpy surface). These last two 
buyuwuyu 
gayakDayak .. __ smooth(glossy ~ --------. 
smooth/slippery . . , -
..___ ____ ___, ',:j 1 aparra I ...,.. >- .dhi rrkthi rrk I 
. . ,' smooth rough .. firrlWlya I 
smooth/hard )ulnyin'lulnyin dunutunlJllirr 
-r-;ugh/potholey ~ rough/lumpy 
Figure 2:5. Relations between terms used in assessing surface texture. 
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terms are considered as opposite kind of roughness and hence as forming 
a supplementary opposition to each other as well as being opposed to 
the smoothness terms. Modifications "very" and "moderately" while they 
can be, are not commonly applied to these terms. 
The relationships between terms associated with structural 
strength are shown in figure 2 :6. There is a commonly used pair of 
opposed terms, yal~gi(weak) and d3.l (strong) which are used with the 
modifications. Supplementary to this is a second pair of opposed terms 
which classifies material in accordance with the wa-:y it breaks. Thus 
yolu'mirr (soft and weak) describes wood which breaks easily without 
a "snap", or a person who is weak and flabby with no strength. Its 
opposite quality, E!_l!!_imirr (hard and brittle) describes wood which 
breaks with a "snap". Each of this pair together with three other 
terms identify precise qualities of weakness or strength. These are 
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Figure 2:6. Relations between terms used in evaluating structural 
strength. 
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rirrikingin (crumbly with a granular texture), gakan9an (crumbly with 
a powdery texture) and belpil (pliable). In addition to these terms 
which describe precise qualities there is the word wunda~arr (very 
hard/very strong, of exceptional strength). This appears to describe 
a qualitative increase in strength beyond the intensity of "very 
strong" to the extreme where it classifies a quality which is beyond 
the limits of normal expectations. 
ii. Further considerations related to the structure of the 
evaluative system. 
In the assessments of each of the four properties of matter 
being discussed, a pair of opposed terms forms the basis of the 
evaluative system. These, operating on a general level, are then 
potentially added to by a set of modifications, which function at 
a more specific level. It is this pattern of classifications which 
forms the basis for the evaluative system shown in outline in 
figure 2:7, which can be used to evaluate any property of matter. 
In this diagram, there appears to be a problem in the inclusion of 
the categories "quality A" and "quality B" in both the general and 
specific levels of classification. They do however operate on both 
levels. On the general level, a classification of "not quality A" 
is the same as a classification of "quality B". When the focus is 
on this general level of the system, any of the specific level 
classifications can be seen to be included within the general 
category. For example, "very A" and "moderately A" are both 
"quality A" though on the specific level they are in opposition 
to each other. When evaluation is focussed on the specific level, 
the "very quality A" and "moderate quality A" classifications are 
seen in contrast to that of "quality A" on the same level. 
3.5 
General Classifications. Specific Classifications 
very /intense 
I 
I quality A 
I 
I quality Al I not \~ --1 quality B quality A 
\ 
\ 
\ moderate 
quality A 
------
------
moderate 
, quality B 
/ I quality Bl / not A :,--1 quality quality B 
\ 
\ 
very /intense \ 
quality B 
Figure 2:7. Outline of structure of basic evaluative system. 
Further to the problem of the use of "category A" classifications, 
one of the younger men recorded information from Galpagalpa on 
the Yolnu use of medicinal plants. Briefly, the treatment for an injury 
by a stone spear was to bathe it with an infusion made from pandanus 
leaves. "He will become well by means of that medicine, pandanus and 
water, salt water or fresh water~ gornnur (hot) water, like that but 
not gornnur (hot), just m~rr ga~ga gornnur (moderately hot) and treat 
it with that. That's the way to treat stone spear wounds~ 
In this passage, Galpagalpa is making a precise distinction 
between "hot" and "moderately hot". This is not simply a contrast 
between t "Ho levels of classification, but a contrast between two 
classifications at the specific level. Clearly this gives an 
indication that the "general" term can function on both general and 
specific levels of classification. Later documentation in 
successive chapters further supports the choice of this solution 
to the problem. 
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In the practical situation, when evaluations are being made, the 
the initial choice appears to be between the pair of opposed terms at 
a general level. If the situational context demands it, supplementary 
evaluation will then be made at the more specific level. This indicates 
that qualitative evaluation is based on a two dimensional choice, the 
first being the assessment of the quality, and the second being 
concerned with the intensity of the expression of the attributes of 
that quality or perhaps, the quality of that quality, 
Distinct from the basic evaluative structure are those aspects 
of evaluation shown in figures 2: 5 and 2 :6, in which a number of terms 
are linked to either or both of the general oppositions as referring 
to aspects of them. In that wey, "weak/brittle", "crumbly/ granular" 
"pliable" and "crumbly/powdery" are all more precise classifications 
of aspects of the general term "weak". Similarly, "rough/potholey" 
and "rough/lumpy" are subsidiary, more precise classifications of 
aspects of "rough". These terms represent more specific definitions 
within the general quality, and form a set of sub-classifications 
of it. They are not associated with the intensity of its expression 
but form the basis of a second classificatory process which is used in 
conjunction with the first. The first was based on the concentrations 
or intensities of a particular quality. This second system is based 
on the discrimination of sub-classifications or variations of the 
quality, and indicates the use of a second classificatory structure. 
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I have also discussed a number of terms which represent the 
evaluation of an increase in the intensity of the "intense quality" 
classification. These terms were rurrwala (weightless), which 
represents an increase in the intensity of the quality of "intensely 
light" beyond the boundary of the classification, wunda9arr (hard/ 
strong), beyond the limits of "very hard/strong", and dM.ti mi rr (brittle/ 
cold) and 9ayamunu9 (deathly cold) , both of which are beyond the limits 
of natural cold. These terms indicate particular perceptions associated 
with boundaries of qualities. There appears to be a notion that there 
is some sort of limit to increase in the concentration or intensity of 
expression of a quality. That beyond that limit something non-natural 
has happened. That point is indicated by a change in vocabulary which 
matches the beyond-natural intensity of expression of th~ quality.It 
is not that the quality is changed, but that its expression has 
undergone a transformation. This notion then links with the nature of 
the perceived relations between oppositions. In both the relation 
between natural and beyond-natural, and the relation between 
oppositions, there is a perceived change in the expression of a 
quality. When the Yolnu are evaluating items which express these 
qualities, there appears to be a choice possible between the "beyond 
natural" and the "very ..•• " classifications. That is it seems that 
either evaluation can be applied. This in turn appears to indicate 
that the item is in a transition state, partly "natural" and partly 
"beyond natural". 
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VOLUME 
There appear to be two different quantitative approaches to the 
\ 
evaluation of substances which have an amorphous structure. The first 
of these establishes fixed standard units and uses these to measure 
the quantity of the substance. In the second approach, an arbitrary 
container is considered as a measure of volume, and the focus is 
placed on the degree of fullness or emptiness of it. For example, one 
may speak of a jug of milk, a quarter of a cup of sugar, or half a 
tank of petrol. Both approaches are measuring "volume", and both fit 
within Piaget's (1974:vii) discussion of the quantification of 
continuous quantity. 
The second of these approaches is superficially very similar to 
to that ta.ken by the Yolnu in that they too use terms that are 
generally translated as "full" and "empty" in relation to arbitrary 
containers. Apart from these features, the similarity disappears. In 
the quantitative approach, evaluation is made within a continuum 
between "full" and "empty". The relationship between the substance and 
the container is one in which the container is used as a unit of 
measurement to assess the quantity, and the focus is on the quantity. 
In the Yolnu (qualitative) approach, a relationship is perceived 
between the container and the contents, but the evaluation is 
concerned with the quality of that relationship. That is, it is 
focussed on whether there is or is not a relationship of "fullness" 
between the container and the contents. The container does not become 
a unit of measurement as it would from a quantitative approach and 
the terms used do not become measurement units. 
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In this section I consider first the way in which the basic set 
of terms is used to assess vollllD.e, establishing something like a 
fundamental set of meanings for them. Secondly, I examine a nlllD.ber 
of ways in which these terms are used to convey different meanings 
in different contexts, 
i :The evaluative terms and the relations between them. 
Bunbatjun told me the story of two brothers and tbeir uncle who 
went out in their canoe for turtle and fish~ The brothers gathered 
bait crabs. One of them dha~a9guQal (made full) a billycan with crabs, 
the other dha9a~gu~al (made full) a very, small basket. They anchored 
over a reef and caught many fish. Then they saw a turtle and gave 
chase but it disappeared. They returned to~~shing and dha~a9gu~al the 
canoe with fish. A~er that the small brother caught a fish that was 
so big that the other two men had to pull it into the canoe. They 
again searched for turtles and again speared bM.y~u (none). Then they 
returned home. When they reached the shore they called out to everyone, 
"Fish for everyone here dha~a~ (plenty) but turtle bl!.y~u (none). They 
all ate well and everyone was so happy that they told each other funny 
stories. 
In the narrative there are four references to fullness, each 
of which refers to the same relationship, but in association with 
containers of different sizes. In each case the usage is consistent. 
The variations lie, not in relation between container and contents, 
but in their size. The brothers have two different containers for 
bait which they "make full". The men then "make full" the canoe with 
fish, and when they return to those waiting, they report that they 
have in literal terms a "fullness of fish", meaning, enough to fill 
everyone in the camp to the point of satiation, The first three 
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examples refer to the fullness of physical containers, the fourth to 
the fullness of a container which equates to the ideal of enough to 
fill every person in the community to capacity. "Fullness", as an 
evaluation of volume is thus referring, not to the quantity in the 
container, but to the relationship between the container and its 
contents. This discussion can thus be considered from either the 
second of the two quantitative approaches, or the qualitative approach. 
The difference lies in the interpretation of the word "fullness". In 
the former it refers to a "quantity of fullness", in the latter to a 
"relationship of fullness". 
A woman collecting dirrpu (waterlily roots) evaluates the 
quantity in her basket it terms of the fullness or non-fullness of 
her basket. When she has l urrkun' it will probably be less than half 
full, and when she has mi!rr .J_urrkun' it will be between one third and 
two thirds full. Mi!rr dha~a~ will be about the same, though lurrkun' 
refers to inadequacy or partial fullness and dhaaa~ to fullness. Once 
a quantity is evaluated as mi!rr dha~a~, it is considered to be 
expressing the quality of f'ullness. Any quantity assessed as smaller 
than mi!rr dha~a~ is considered to be expressing the opposite of 
fullness, .J_urrkun' (smallness of quantity) as it would be in English. 
A basket with mirithirr dhaQa9 waterlily roots is full to the brim 
one with mirithirr .J_urrkun 1- has almost none. Where there was b1ly9u 
(none) turtle meat brought home, the hoped-for volume of meat had not 
materialised. It could have, if they had speared a turtle, and it 
certainly was in existence, but its expression had not been achieved. 
Where there were bi!y~u (none) waterlily roots in the basket, it was 
not that they did not exist, but that there was no expression of them 
in terms of volume in the basket. 
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These a.re qualitative evaluations, focussing on the quality of 
the expression of the attributes of volume. The attributes have not 
ceased to exist, they just have not been expressed. Figure 2:8 
demonstrates the relation between the opposed terms and their 
modifications, in relation to the fullness or non-f'ullness of a 
basket. There is no overt category for this section of the evaluative 
system. 
ii: Uses of volume assessment terms to convey meanings in different 
contexts 
In the everyday situation, the assessment of volume is usually 
in terms of an ideal of quantity adequate to meet a need rather than 
a purely abstract consideration. Such an ideal may be the quantity 
of ochre desired for a particular ceremony. Similarly there may 
be an ideal of an adequate quantity of meat or fish to feed a 
particular group of people as was exemplified by a "fullness" of fish 
in the narrative. In each of these cases, the perceived ideal 
quantity is spoken of as if there was a container the size of the 
ideal. The adequacy of a particular quantity is then spoken of in 
terms of the "fullness" or "inadequacy of f'ullness" of that ideal 
quantity. 
The social relationships between people involve a complex range 
of variations in the use of "volume" terms. While they cannot be fully 
discussed here, I introduce them to give an indication of their 
potential for influencing meaning. When a request for the supply of 
materials is answered in terms of the quantity of material available, 
the meaning cormnunicated by the use of the terms may have nothing to 
do with any factual assessment of the volume available and a 
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lot to do with social relations. That is~ th.ere may be no relation 
between the quantity said to be available and the quantity actually 
available, for the communication has little to do with ~uantity, For 
example, if a supply of yellow ochre is requested, an answer may be 
given which purports to indicate the quantity available, but which 
actually states the relationship between the expressed need and the 
willingness to meet it. Thus: 
Dha~a9 dhuwal. 
Plenty here/now. 
Indicates a willingness to give all that is 
required. 
Lurrkun' dhuwal. Indicates willingness to give a little. 
Scarcity here/now. 
B~y~u dhuwal. Indicates a total unwillingness to give. 
Nothing here/now. 
In addition to these straight forward meanings, there is potential for 
a considerable range of variations to be coIDillllilicated by the use of 
the terms. For example, a respondent's generosity may be indicated 
by claiming to have only a small quantity and then giving an ample 
supply, or his disrespect for the one making the request may be 
indicated by the reverse of this, that is, claiming to have a large 
quantity and then giving little. 
The meanings indicated by the use of the terms can be seen to 
be many and varied. Nevertheless they do not alter the basic meanings 
of the terms or the structural relations between them. In practice the 
Yolnu rely on the basic meanings for the effectiveness of their use 
in such communications. The structure of the relations between 
the terms used in assessing volume outlined in figure 2:8. 
General Classifications I Specific Classifications. 
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Figure 2:8. Relations between terms used in the evaluation of volume. 
SIZE 
Yuwuyuwutj lived at the beginning. He was an exceptional hunter 
always bringing back abundant fish and turtles, but he ate them all 
himself • .As he ate and ate, his stomach became ~utu (stout). Later the 
other Yolnu decided to retaliate because he did not give food to them. 
They lit the grass around him as he slept and burned him to death. Now 
he is dead because he was so greedy. 
This little story told to me by Dhliggal and illustrated by 
Manydjarri (figure 2:9) clearly indicates the quality of size associated 
associated with gandarr, one of the sections of the evaluative system 
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concerned with size. Within that overtly labelled section ~utu (thick/ 
stout/solid) is opposed to barka (thin/skinny) while gandarr (literally 
middle or waist), then refers to a domain of size which, covered by 
the meanings of the oppositions, appears to include solidness. When 
gandarr is evaluated in relation to an ideal size for humans, as in the 
story of Yuwuyuwutj, both the opposed terms have negative connotations 
as they indicate deviations from the expected normal size. 
Figure 2:9. Yuwuyuwutj who has eaten so much that he has become ~utu. 
The second set of terms used in evaluating size belong to a 
covert section of the evaluative system, concerned with general or 
overall size. Yindi(big/large)and yutjuwala (small/little) are used 
to evaluate the expressions of this quality~ a conception which appears 
to be close to the English concept of size. Together with their 
modifications, the two domains form sets of evaluative classifications 
as shown in figure 2 : 10. 
Size beyond normally expected extremes. 
The limits of bigness associated with "very large" and "very 
thick" can be considered as the normal extremes to be expected for 
the particular set of items. The items asses sed as being at those 
extremes are at a point of entering into an expression of the 
quality which is "beyond the natural". Items at this point can 
potentially be classified as at the extreme of natural or expected 
size. Beyond this point of inten~ity of the quality, new terms are 
used to classify each of two different types of size. Beyond normal 
for "very large" is bathala (huge/enormous), and beyond normal for 
"very thick" is £.umurr (exceedingly thick/stout). 
To describe an expression of size which is so intense as to be 
completely beyond normal, and therefore having an aspect of the 
supernatural about it, new terms are used. Wa~arr, which normally 
means creative or ancestral spirit, and motj, normally considered 
to be the name of a particular anc'estral being are used in 
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conjunction with yindi (big) or bathala (huge) to produce descriptive 
phrases. Wa~arr is also used in this way in conjunction with ~utu 
(thick/stout) to indicate a similar beyond-the-natural quality. In 
the expression : 
~utuyinan 
thick-becorre 
mirithinan WaQarryinan, 
very-become wa9arr-become, 
there is the indication that the thickness/solidness of a particular 
thing or person has become so abnormally big that it has taken on 
something of the all-pervasive nature of the creative ancestral 
spirits. This is exemplified clearly in an incident in the legend of 
the W!:lgilak sisters as it was told to me by Galpagalpa. 
"The two sisters made camp at Mirarrmina. They knew something 
was wrong when all their food ran out of the fire and into the 
billabong. The python,Wititj, had smelled them, and spoken from inside 
without them knowing. It was raining and the rain ~ututhinan 
wa~arrthinan (became thick/dense/solid, became the quality of wa:;arr 
the ancestor). It was like that because of the words spoken from 
inside the billabong." 
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General I Specific General I Specific 
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' 
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Figure 2:10. Terms used in evaluating two different qualities of size. 
The narrative clearly indicates the relation between the 
ancestral world and the beyond-natural size of the rainstorm. 
Examples of other variations in the use of such descriptive phrases 
are as follows: 
yindin, motjnha dhuwala waltjannha 
large ,ange.stral here/now rainstorm 
eing 
i.e. This rainstorm is not a natural one but supernatural. 
wa~arrnha yindi nayi 
spirit large it 
i.e. Its size is supernaturally large. 
bathalan wa~armha nayi 
huge spirit it 
i.e. Its hugeness is spiritual. 
It appears from this that there is perceived to be a normal range of 
sizes of things which can be assessed using the basic set of evaluative 
terms. Items too big to fit within the normal range of sizes are 
classified then as beyond the normal boundary. Outside this boundary 
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of "normal" there are then two classifications of size. One of these 
is "beyond normal size"; the other is "supernatural size" (this latter 
being linked to the qualities of the creative spirits). These 
categories indicate not only a qualitative increase in the expression 
of bigness, but also a qualitative change in the dimension to which 
the item belongs. Thus it is perceived that the item in question has 
at least partially, and perhaps totally ceased to exist as physical 
matter and has entered into a state of existence as spiritual matter. 
The relation between the normal extreme and the extra-normal 
evaluations of size are shown in figure 2:11. 
• bathalan waaarmha 
4 huge spirit I yindin motjnha mi ri thi rr yi ndi I bathala intensely large ~ huge large god I ~ yindin wa9arrnha I large spirit I 
I 
nutu mirithirr I dumurr Dututhin waDarryin 
thick intensely + exceedingly --L+- thick- spirit I 
thick/stout become become 
normal extreme beyond normal supernaturally big 
extreme. 
Figure 2:11. Relation between terms used to classify normal extreme 
size and extra-normal extremes of size. 
CONCLUSION. 
I have shown that the Yolnu evaluate each physical property 
by means of a pair of opposed categories, and I have argued that 
these categories are perceived to be in a discontinuous relationship 
with each other rather than being seen as particular points along a 
graded continuum. of expressions of the property. I have also argued 
that each of the oppositions is perceived to exist in three forms, 
and that each form expresses the one quality differently. I have 
suggested that for each quality, there are seen to be three forms 
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or expressions. One form can be thought of as a natural expression of 
its quality, a second which is a supernatural expression of it, and 
that a third form, that which is a "non-expression" of the quality, 
is the form taken by its opposition. 
The evaluation system itself appears to have two major levels 
of structure. The first of these focusses on the evaluation of the 
attributes of one only of the paired qualities in an opposition 
relationship. The second appears to focus on the attributes which 
unite the opposed terms. 
I have shown that once an item has been classified as expressing 
one of the opposed qualities in a pair, there are potentially two ways 
in which subclassification may occur within the "natural" expression 
of that quality. These are shown in figure 2:12 in relation to the 
quality "Ql". One of these wa;ys of subclassification has been shown 
to be based on more precise statements of the type of quality being 
evaluated. For example, "slippery" and "glossy" were shown to be 
subclassifications of "smooth". PQla - c in figure 2 :12 represents 
these more precise definitions of the quality.10 
The second way in which subclassification was shown to be used 
was that based on the evaluation of the intensity of the expression 
of the quality being considered. In this type of subclassification 
there were shown to be consistently three distinct categories, Ql, 
MQl, and IQl in figure 2:12. The central one, Ql, is used for an item 
which represents a sort of average expression of the quality. Of the 
others, one, MQl, is used to classify an item which shows a partial 
or moderate expression of the quality, and the third, IQl, classifies 
one which is thought to be a very concentrated or intense expression 
of it. 
There is some difficulty in analysis concerning the relationship 
between the classifications "quality Q" on the general level and 
"quality Q" on the specific level. In one sense it is the same 
classification being used on both levels. That is, a classification 
of "quality Q" identifies an item showing a generalised expression 
of the ·quality being evaluated, and it is used this way at both 
levels of the analysis. However, the "intense" and "moderate" 
classifications are related to it as subclassifications of its 
intensity when it is used at a general level, but when it is being 
used at the specific level, they are contrasted with it. It is because 
of these two different types of relationships, one at each level of 
classification, that I have chosen to consider it in both levels. 
• I Non-expressed Quality 1 Natural Expression 
1 of Quality 
I 
I NQll 
--~----
IANQll 
Beyond natural 
expression of Quality 
General 
Level 
Specific 
Level 
Figure 2:12. Relations between terms used in evaluating one of an· 
opposed pair of qualities. 
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The boundary of the "natural expression" of any quality is 
related to the maximum and minimum limits of the intensity of any 
expression. Beyond each of these limits there is a point where an item 
can be classified as outside the natural expression. In figure 2:12, 
NQl represents the "non-expression" of the quality, a point beyond the 
boundary of minimal intensity of the quality, and as suggested earlier, 
it is also the form taken by its opposition. ANQl, almost non-qu8.lity, 
is an expression consistently used by the Yolnu. It conveys the idea 
that the quality being assessed is of lower intensity than the least 
that "moderate quali ty"would be applied to~ hence I have placed that 
classification also outside the boundary · of "natural". Outside the 
other extreme boundary I have shown that there are two evaluations 
which can be considered as beyond the extreme intensity of the natural 
expression of the quality. BIQl in the figure represents those 
superlative classifications such as "weightless", "huge" or "deathly 
cold", each of which represents an expression of the quality which is 
"beyond intense quality". The other category, SQl in the figure, is 
the natural extension of the first. That is, it is so far beyond the 
the natural as to express a supernatural quality. This clas.sification 
was shown particularly in relation to evaluations of size, but I 
consider that the po~ential for it exists in all the other domains. 
This appears to be the way in which the Yolnu perceive the boundaries 
qualitatively. That is there is no quantitative assessment of quality/ 
non-quality, but rather a perception of boundaries established at 
the limits of expected quality intensity. 
The second major level of structure of the evaluative system 
has its focus not on one of the opposed terms but on the property of 
matter which is expressed by the oppositions. At this level, the 
category "non-expression of quality", NQl in figure 2:12, is replaced 
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by the new form in which the quality is being expressed, that is, its 
opposite, Q2 in figure 2:13. This new figure represents the structure . 
of the system at this 2nd level. There is a problem in figure 2:13, 
because there is generated a false impression by the structure of the 
figure itself. Ql is not the opposite quality to Q2 as it appears in 
the figure, but the opposite expression of it. In Q2 the Yolnu 
perceive Ql as continuing in existence irrespective of its external 
transformation. This means that each of the oppositions represented 
by the double-headed arrows in both figures, are oppositions not 
of kind, but of expression. 
Figure 2:13.Structure of the evaluative system as it applies to 
the property "Q". 
In this second level of structure each pair of oppositions at one 
level of classification is subsumed under a single category at a higher 
level. Mediation occurs between the opposite expressions in such a way 
as to emphasise the singleness of the quality that they are expressing. 
In the two figures, the perceived continuum of the quality can be 
followed along the single lines which join categories across the two 
levels of classification. It is found in doing this that between any 
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two terms in opposition at one level there is a term on the other level 
which forms a mediation between them. Where categories, are linked by 
double lines in the figure, these can be considered as alternative 
classifications of a single item, that is, an item expressing both 
qualities equally. Thus an item classified as MQl is automatically 
also· expressing the attributes of the classification of MQ2. Similarly, 
an item classified as BIQl is also simultaneously expressing the 
attributes of IQl. 
In figure 2:13, I have included supernatural qualities at both 
ends of the quality continuum. This is a hypothetical extension of 
the structures based on the duplication of the structure shown in 
figure 2 :12, and the logic of the system so far demonstrated. While 
I have been able to demonstrate this extension in at least 
one direction, I was not able to discover any documentation which 
would either support or refute the development of the extension in 
both directions;. 
N0rES. 
1: gulu is the cotton tree (Bombax ceiba) 
2: The canoe (see plate 2;1) was no closer to completion when I left 
Galiwinku three months later. 
3: "Linearity" appears to be a poor translation of "length". However 
the term "length" comes out of a quantitative evaluative system and 
it cannot readily be divorced from it, therefore, rather than 
attach the wrong connotations to djaka I have chosen to translate 
it by the only slightly less loaded term "linearity". 
4: m~rr, m~rr ga9ga and ga~ga appear to be interchangeable ways of 
saying "moderately". 
5: For more detailed description of the rope-ma.king process see 
Rudder (1975) and (1980). 
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6: "long" is also relative to the species of snake or type of rope. 
e.g. "long" skipping ropes and "long" anchor ropes are different • 
7: The meaning of weyin includes both "long" and "tall". 
8: During rrry time in Arnhem Land I managed the craf'troom at Yirrkala 
for eighteen months and later the craf'troom at Galiwinku for a 
further eighteen months. 
9: The original story was in the vernacular. For simplicity, I 
have retained only those vernacular terms necessary for the 
discussion. 
10: The symbols used in figures 2:12 and 2:13 can be considered as 
abbreviations with the following meanings. 
Q = the quality expressed 
PQla,b ,& cc: precise quality variations "a", "b" and "c", 
NQl = non-expression of Ql 
SQl = supernatural expression of Ql 
MQl = moderate expression of Ql 
Ql = general expression of the quality 
IQl = intense expression of Ql 
ANQl = almost non-expression of Ql 
BIQl = beyond intense expression of Ql 
Q2 = opposite expression of the quality 
CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF 
GROUPINGS OF DISCRETE ENTITIES. 
In introducing the previous chapter I described a contrast 
between two kinds of physical materials. One of these was said to 
have a discrete structure, such as trees, implements, and humans. 
The other kind of material was that without a distinct structure, 
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for example, water or sand. These latter were described as amorphous 
substances. In quantitative assessments, amorphous substances are 
evaluated in terms of numerical quantity. I have shown that the Yolnu 
perceive "volume" as an evaluation related to the "fullness" or 
"partial fullness" of containers • In this .chapter I demonstrate how 
the Yolnu evaluate groupings of physical things which have a discrete 
structure, and I examine the structure of the evaluative system 
used in doing this. 
When groupings of i terns are being evaluated by English speakers, 
this is normally done in terms of the number of i terns within the 
groups. It is common for the qualities of cardinality and ordinality 
to be considered simultaneously. According to Piaget (1952:viii) his 
results show that number (or quantification) is organised in 
successive stages of inclusions of the two aspects, and that the 
fusion of the two results in "the sequence of whole numbers which are 
indissociably cardinal and ordinal". Cardinality is the quality of 
sameness in sets or groups of items. For example, a classification 
which i~e~tifies five eggs, five fingers and five people as a single 
class, does so on th perception of the quality of "fiveness" displayed 
in each set. That is, the perception of its cardinality. Cardinality 
refers to the related wholeness of any quantity or group of items 
such that the perception of it focusses on that quality which 
identifies a particular quantity as distinct from all different 
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ones. It is possible to see relationships between pure cardinal 
numbers such that one can see that a whole two and a whole three when 
combined form a new quantity of five. A perception of serial relations 
is not necessary for this. 
In contrast to this, the ordinality of number carries with it 
the perception of a serial relationship between the nunber terms. The 
process of coW1ting is associated with the repetition of a series of 
such terms in a perceived order. It is the ordinal perception of 
number which is associated with the gradation of quantity, and it is 
this which is the foundation of quantitative evaluation. 
In this chapter, I examine Yolnu perceptions of groups of items. 
From a quantitative approach, such groups would be evaluated in terms 
of their size, or the number of items within them using the process of 
counting. 1 My argument is, that the Yolnu, when considering any group 
of items, take a qualitative approach to its evaluation. When this is 
done, they consider the group as a whole, they see that it is made up 
of a quantity of items, and then evaluate the quality of that quantity. 
Each group is seen to have a particular number of members and between 
the members of a group of a particular size, there is seen to be a 
particular type of structured relati onship. While the quantity of 
members is recognised(in terms of cardinal number), groups are 
evaluated according to the type of structured relationship which they 
are seen to be expressing. The quality of the group is then evaluated 
in terms of a set of categories, each of which represents a particular 
structured relationship and hence a particular cardinal number. 
56 
The first section of this chapter is concerned with those terms 
used by the Yolnu to identify the different structural relationship 
types. That is, the different cardinal number terms. A problem arises 
if the Yolnu terms are translated by the English number names, for 
when these are used their reference includes both cardinal and 
ordinal properties, and hence, because of the quantitative 
perceptions which are linked to ordinal number, a completely wrong 
meaning is conveyed. For this reason, as these terms are discussed, 
I attempt to overcome the problem of description by referring to the 
Yolnu terms as relationship types . In the second section of the chapter, 
I examine the concepts of quantity as they are revealed in the forms 
and uses of pronouns, nouns and verbs . Thirdly I discuss some attempts 
that have been made to match the Yolnu categories with the English 
number system. Finally I attempt to demonstrate the structure of the 
system used in making the different evaluations . 
TERMS USED FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF DISCRETE QUANTITIES. 
The Yolnu discriminate between two types of group, using as a 
basis for distinction the type of preciseness with which the structure 
of the group can be determined. In one kind it is perceived that the 
relationship b etween items can be precisely determined, and the terms 
used function as precise references to both internal structural 
relationship and quantity , and therefore as cardinal numbers. The 
other kind of group is one in which the definition of both structural 
relationship and quantity within the group is non-precise. I discuss 
the contrasting sets of terms as ''precise'' and "non- prec ise" 
relationships (or quantities). 
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Of the terms used to identi:f'y the precise kind of group, I 
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consider that a small number can be considered as primary terms, and 
and the remainder as being one or the other of two further types, 
secondary and derived. I examine the primary terms first, then the 
secondary and derived ones. Following that I consider how the Yolnu 
perceive groups of the non-precise kind and the terms used in 
evaluating groups which contain four or more items. 
i: Primary terms. 
In discussing the verb gulul'yun (to eat a purely vegetable 
diet), the definition was given: 
Vaka eat bep, oatha waogany luka. 
Not eat meat,vegetable alone/ eat. 
food separately 
The word wa~gany, in this context, refers particularly to the qualities 
of separateness and isolation. These qualities can be seen again in 
the sentence: 
Dharrwa muka walal gan .Q_Mpthurrnydja, yurr waagany 
Many you know they_ were sitting (plural) ,but solitary 
yolnu marrtjinany, uuriui bala munhawu. 
person went, on that night. 
there is emphasised a sharp contrast between the group of people who 
sat in the camp, and a single person who went off on his own at night, 
11alone". The word waDgany, here refers to the isolation of an individual 
person, a solitariness, in contrast to a relationship. 
MMrnna 1 ,the second of the primary terms, has within its 
domain of meaning the concept of duality or pairedness. This can 
be seen in the following example: 
Ga d_huwandja dhMwu, nhakun mMrrma 1 miyalk bala marrtjin 
And this/now story, like duo woman away went 
maypalwu, mMri 1 manydji manda uunhi. 
shellfish-for, that pair related as they(duo)there/ 
grandmother - granddaughter, then. 
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Here the word mMrnna', assesses the quality of relationship between 
the women in the group, as well as their quantity with a statement of 
their pairedness. This relationship is emphasised by the term 
mMri'manydji, which identifies a particular type of pairedness, that 
is, the reciprocal kin relationship of grandmother - granddaughter 
pairedness, without losing sight of their discrete individuality. The 
third person dual pronoun, manda (they) ' then re-emphasises the 
quality of pairedness. The conceptualisation of mMrnna' is thus one 
of cardinal quality, the particular kind of relationship which exists 
between items in a pair. 
1.urrkun', the last of the primary terms, describes a trio of 
items . .An example of its use is found in the following introduction 
to a narrative: 
nhakun 
like 
walal lurrkun' 
they(all) trio 
marrtjin, bala 
went away to 
rMkunharaw . 
fish-for. 
Nhinan walal gan wMoaour, nhakun ounhiny, mandany 
Stayed they(all) were place-at, like there/then, they(duo) 
wMwa'manydji 
pair related 
as brothers 
marrma' 
duo 
gawa 1 1 mi rri !JU. 
mother's brother. 
ga 
and 
Wa!)ganydj a 
single 
mandao 
their(duo) 
1urrkun' here is shown to be clearly understood as 
composed of a pair of separate brothers together with their 
uncle. The apparent example of addition here, is simply an awareness 
that less complex relationships exist within more complex ones. Thus, 
11trio'' can be considered as a complete relationship in its elf, or it 
can be considered on the basis of the other relationships of which it 
is composed. 
The mean:ings of the three primary terms can be summarised as, 
wangany: isolated, alone, solitary, the state of the individual 
mlirnna 1 
l urrkun 1 
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person or item prior to the establishment of a relationship 
the cardinal number one. 
duo, clearly perceivable as a set in the form of a pair, 
a precise relationship composed of two solitary items. The 
cardinal number two. 
trio, perceivable as a precise relationship and quantity 
composed of a pair plus a single item, or of three separate 
items, or of three separate i teni.s. The cardinal number 
three. 
Each of the terms refers to the perception of a precise relationship 
between the items in a group, and simultaneously each of them focusses 
on the uniqueness of that particular relationship as a precisely 
perceivable unit. Each of them is thus describing cardinal quality only? 
ii : Secondary and derived terms. 
I have named as a secondary term one which the Yolnu identify 
lexically, but which, as I will show later, functions in a different 
wa:y from the primary terms. Unlike the derived terms it is not 
developed from the primary terms. For the present purposes of 
discrimination between the secondary term and the primary ones, it is 
sufficient to note that it is not used to describe a quantity of other 
sets or groups, though the primary ones are. 
The word goo (a hand), describes a distinct set of items 
eqivalent in quality and quantity to the set of fingers on a hand. 
They are a set, but a set of units which expresses the handness of a 
hand, that is, tbe qualitative relationship of the set of fingers as 
a single unit; that peculiar relationship which exists in a set of 
five discrete items. An alternative term used instead of gon is the 
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word rulu. Rulu describes a particular arrangement used in heaping 
turtle eggs for distribution. Each of these heaps takes the shape of 
a square pyramid. Use of the term will be discussed more fully later, 
having no real relevance at this point save to note that it is used as 
an alternative term for gon to identify a discrete group of i terns. 
The derived terms are marnna I -marnna I (dUO and dUO) and 
lurrkun'-lurrkun' (trio and trio). These are, as is obvious from their 
form, repetitions of the primary terms to cover a duplication of the 
relationship and a corresponding duplication of the quantity. That is, 
marnna'-marnna' describes a pair and a pair, and similarly, ]_urrkun'-
- lurrkun' describes a trio and a trio. Neither of these terms can 
be claimed to be equivalent to a whole number, though each classifies 
a particular set of items. In the past each has been taken to be 
identical to an English number as will be discussed later. They are 
used in a descriptive sense for the perceptual grouping of items into 
recognisable structured precise relationship patterns which match 
exact quantities. 
After having completed the analysis for this chapter I was 
discussing it with one of the Yolnu primary school teachers? She 
indicated a number of different things that we could see two of; two 
pens, two pages in a book, two trees. "Look at these," she said, 
pointing to them, "when we think of two, we alweys think of 
dhuway'manydji (husband and wife pair) ,or yapa'manydji(older and 
younger sister) orWawa'manydji older and younger brother) or 
l undu' manydj i (a pair of friends)." She was demonstrating that any 
two items .of any kind were thought of in terms of human relationships. 
Continuing on she said, "When we think of three we think of 
nandi 1mirriQU (actual mother) bapa'mirri~U(actual father) ga yothu 
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manda~ (and child theirs(dualJ). When there are four or more we SS¥ 
m~rr dharrwa (moderately many)". In these colillllents emphasis is on an 
identifiably precise relationship perceived as analogous to categories 
of hum.an relations. The focus is heavily on the quality of the 
relationships. The term for "moderately many" is discussed below. 
iii:Categories of non-precise relationships or quantities. 
Groups of items which are too large or vague to be perceived 
as expressing precise quantity relationships are classified using 
a different set of terms. The focus of this second set of 
terms is the quality which can best be described as contradictory to 
the quality of preciseness, that is, the terms are concerned with 
groups in which the relationship between items is non-precise, vague, 
or indistinct in definition, and the quantity of items in the group 
is not precisely determined. The central term, dharrwa, has been 
translated in the past from a quantitative perspective as "many" 
with a focus on the idea of "a large number''. However, when it is 
considered from a qualitative perspective, the meaning emphasised is 
the quality of non-preciseness of relationship between items in a 
group, that is, one in which clearly distinguishable relationships 
have become obscured or blurred. Smaller precise groups can be 
distinguished within, or extracted from, the large group, but its 
precise confirmation as a unity is not clearly determined. 
There arethree terms used in describing these types of 
relationships. M~rr dharrwa, defined in the above quote from the 
Yolnu teacher as "four or more", refers to a grouping more complex 
than those identified by precise relationship terms, and where clear 
relationships are therefore more difficult to identify. Dharrwa can be 
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used to describe any grouping of things in which there are more items 
than can be classified by precise relationship terms. It classifies 
any group of things which carries a generalised expression of the 
quality, "non-precise relationship" (non-precise quantity) . Mi rith i rr 
dharrwa then refers to an intensification of that quality as it is 
expressed in a large group where precise relationships have been 
completely obscured by the large quantity of items. It classifies the 
group's quality as a "very much non-precise relationship" and as 
a "large indeterminate quantity". 
As a generalised classification, dharrwa has a wide range of 
applications in terms of group size, as can be seen in the following 
examples. In the phrase dharrwa manda weti nhanal, 
many they(dual) wallaby saw, 
dharrwa refers to a large, vague grouping of the animal "wallaby~ 
where neither specific quantity nor specific relationships between the 
animals is distinguished. An example of a very small generalised 
grouping of items classified as dharrwa comes from another hunting 
story. 
Dhuwandja marnna djanda ga manymak, ga wan'kurra 
Here/now duo goanna and good, and bandicoot 
lurrkun', ga dharrwan 
a trio, and many 
maranhuny. 
food. 
nhanDU nunhi ... fivenha nhakun 
his there/then .. five-become like 
In the context of the story dharrwa refers to "more than a precise 
relationship" or "plenty", however,as the narrator continues the 
story, he realises that he can extract a precise relationship from 
the group and gives it, albeit in English. I will show later that it 
is a normal Yolnu process (perhaps more so now under the influence of 
external pressure) to identif'y precise relationships from within 
larger groups where this is pos sible and considered necessary. 
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Nevertheless the example gives some idea of the lower limits in terms of 
group size to which it is natural to apply the term dharrwa. 
In contrast to classifying a small group, it is common to use the 
term dharrwa in association with a long list of enumerated items, 
particularly of such items as might be gathered in a day's food 
collecting. For example: 
Maypal galinyu bumar dharrwa; latjin, ragudha, nyonda, 
Shellfish we gathered many ; species, species,species, 
(dual exclusive) 
niniku ...... and so on to the end of the list. 
species •• 
In each of these examples, while dharrwa has been translated as "many", 
it is not just a conceptualisation equivalent to "a large number", but 
includes the notion of indistinct or vague relationship between the items 
in the group, and of non-preciseness of quantity. The focus in each of 
these examples is on the vague quality of a large group which makes it 
difficult to isolate precise relationships, hence the perception of the 
quality as one of non-precise relationship. 
If the secondary and derived terms are temporarily excluded, we 
find two sets of terms. One set refers to precise groupings where the 
definition of the individual items is distinct, the members of the set 
are in an identifiably precise relationship, and the quantity can be 
classified precisely. The second set of terms refers to groupings in. 
which the quantities represented by the precise terms have been exceeded, 
the definition of the individual items is blurred, and the relationship 
between the items is no longer precisely discernible. 
When the two sets of terms are compared it can be seen that an 
analogous relationship exists between them. This is illustrated in 
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figure 3:1. In each set of terms there is one term that can be 
considered as an "almost" category, a second that refers to a 
"general" category, and a third which classifies an "intense" 
expression of the quality being evaluated. In addition to being in 
an analogous relationship, the two sets of terms can be considered as 
being in a relationship of transformation, that is, it is possible to 
see the quality which is being described by the terms (the cardinal 
quality of quantity/the quality of relationship) as going through a -
transformation. This occurs as the quality changes through a 
progression of categories of increased complexity, to the point where 
it is perceived to transform into a different kind of expression of the 
the quality. That is, a change is seen to occur in the expression, 
from a state where relationship can be evaluated in "precise" 
categories, to a state in which relationship is expressed in, and 
and must be evaluated in terms of its "non-preciseness". 
No Relationship bllynu 
(nothing/none) 
Precise waogany I mllrnna' I 1urrkun 1 I -(solitary) (pair) I (trio) I I Relationships (part of quality I (quality of I (full or complete 
of relationship) I relationship) I I quality of I 
I I relationship) I 
-
Non-precise mllrr dharrwa I dharrwa mirithirr dharrwa I (moderately many) I (many} (very many) 
Relationships (moderately I (non-precise (very much non-precise 
I 
non-precise I relationship relationship or 
relationship or I or quantity) quantity) 
I 
quantity) I 
I 
Figure 3:1. Analogous structures of sets of terms used in evaluating 
relationships between items within groups. 
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CONCEPI'UALISATION OF QUANTITY AS REVEALED IN THE FORMS AND 
USES OF PRONOUNS,NOUNS AND VERBS. 
i:Pronouns. 
In the various Yolnu languages and dialects, quantity 
reference in the pronouns is consistent for each of the different 
cases. It is therefore not necessary to examine examples from 
more than one c ase. As all the Dhuwal and Dhuwala language 
speaking groups use the same pronouns in the nominative case I 
have chosen to restrict discussion to that set. This separates 
into three groups of pronouns in accordance with their reference 
to quantity (or struct~ed relationship type) as follows: 
Those used to refer to a singular subject; 
oarra = 
oayi = 
I nhe = 
he ,she, or it, 
you 
Those which refer to a duo or pair of individuals; 
D al i = you and I manda = they (dual) 
!) alinyu = he or she and I nhuma = you 
Those used to refer to a trio or more; 
limurr = you all and I 
na purr= they all and I 
walal = they (trio or more) 
nhuma = you (trio or more) 
In the above it will be noticed that the same word,nhuma, is used 
for you(duo) and for you (trio or more). When it would otherwise 
be uncertain as to which meaning is relevant, this is clarifi:ed 
by the combined use of nhuma with either manda (they duo) or 
walal (they trio). Thus manda added to nhuma to produce the 
phrase nhuma mandl (you pair) clarifies reference to duality. 
Walal addedl.to nhuma produces the phrase nhuma walal (you all/ 
you many) clarifying the reference to trio or more. 
Distinction between the precise quantities and non-precise 
quantities is not relevant to the use of nhurna in a general sense 
because it includes all the audience being addressed. The use of 
double pronouns ,in that situation, as outlined above, appears 
to be as much a consideration of emphasis or style, as of quantity 
reference. Where it is relevant, distinction is made between"trio1 
and "more than trio•. When the emphasis is on a 'trio~ specifically, 
then the quantity term l urrkun 1 '(trio), is used in conjunction 
with the pronoun. Thus the expressions walal lurrkun 1 (they trio) 
and nhuma lurrkun 1 (you trio) are developed. It appears not to 
be necessary to be specific with the first person terms (limurr 
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and napurr) to specify the"trioMquantity, as the structured 
relationship is usually known before the personal pronouns are used. 6 
When emphasis is placed on a particular grouping as being'more than a 
trio", this emphasis is conveyed by the use of the word, warrpam (all/ 
the lot) or dharrwa (many), in conjunction with the third group of 
pronouns listed above 
In the above ways, the pronouns are used to distinguish between 
'solo" and •duo" reference, and between aduo" and "more than duo'~ The 
distinction between "trio" and 'non-specific quantity" is not displayed 
lexically in pronouns, but is made specific by the addition to the 
pronoun of terms which enable contrast to be established between a 
trio of persons, and all persons. 
ii: Nouns. 
In the reference to the types of structured relationships or 
quantities in nouns, there is a basic contrast between those 
representing non-human items and those representing human or 
humanised nouns. 7 In the non-human nouns, all reference to the quantity 
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is carried outside the noun. The noun is then a classification of a 
class of item, and number is irrelevant to its form, all quantity 
reference being carried by additional terms used in conjunction with 
the noun. In human nouns it is often carried by the same methods 
as for non-human nouns. However there are two differences. 
First the pronouns are often used in conjunction with the nouns to 
carry the quantity reference, and secondly, when the reference is to 
more than three persons, a different form of the noun is often 
employed to indicate a non-precise quantity. In the discussion of 
quantity reference in nouns which follows, I have chosen to consider 
the reference to precise quantity first, and then to follow that with 
discussion of the non-precise quantity type. 
With non-human nouns, precise quantity is communicated by using 
the terms described earlier which refer to precise quantity groupings. 
That is the three primary terms for cardinal number. In the non-verbal 
sentence, We_!i ~unha 1 , reference is made to a named object, "wallaby", 
Wallaby there 
but no reference is made to quantity. The use of nouns by the Yolnu 
in such situations is a classification or an identification of an 
item, and can be used in reference to either precise or non-precise 
quantity. With the addition of a precise quantity reference, the above 
mentioned non-verbal sentence changes form to become: 
Marnna' we_!i ~unhal. 
Duo wallaby there. 
There is no change in the noun to indicate structured relationship 
type (or quantity). Any other precise reference could have been 
indicated by substituting different precise quantity terms in place 
of m~rrma' without effecting the noun structure. 
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With human nouns there are four ws:;rs of expressing precise 
quantity. First it may be through the same use of precise quantity 
terms as above. For example, MMrrma' miyalk bala marrtjin maypalwu. 
Duo woman away went shellfish-for . 
.Again, any of the precise quantity terms could have been used 
with the noun. Secondly precise quantity may be indicated 
by making use of a personal pronoun in conjunction with the notm. 
For example: ~ayi yol~u marrtji wandirri menguma wetiwa 
He/she person went running searching wallaby-for. 
In this sentence the personal pronoun functions the sam.e way as 
the precise quantity term. Thirdly, precise quantity is frequently 
expressfilby using both a personal pronoun and a precise quantity 
in reference to the one noun. For example: 
... mMrrma' manda marrtjin gan miyalk godarr munhawumirr. 
duo they duo went continued woman morning early. 
Finally there is one set of nouns which expresses an exact duo 
quantity through precise paired kinship relationship terms. With each 
of these nouns a particular reciprocal relationship between a pair of 
kin is referred to. Thus: 
wMwa'manydji, is a pair of individuals related as an 
elder and a younger brother, 
gawal 'manydji, is a pair related as mother's brother and 
sister's child, 
bMpa'manydji, is a pair related as father and child. 
In each of these terms the stem (wMwa, gawal, bMpa), is the term 
used by the latter (junior) relation, to address the former. For 
our purposes here the significance lies in the specific reference 
to a particular precise quantity in the relationship which 
indicates duality or pairedness. 
In the description of non-precise quantity, there is again 
distinction made between the treatment of non-human and that of human 
or humanised nouns. Non-human nouns are described by two terms, 
dharrwa (non-precise quantity) and mala (group). Dharrwa, as we have 
seen earlier, refers to the non-specific quantity (and relationship) 
in groups of more than three people or things. The stresses applied 
to words in speech appear to indicate that mala is an assessment of 
a group of a particular class of items, with more emphasis on a class 
of which there is a group, than of the grouping of a particular class. 
By contrast, dharrwa appears to place the emphasis more on the quantity 
than on the class it assess. For example, in the phrase, 
nunhi m~ypalnydja mala bbrurngunala, in its narrative 
that/there shellfish group cooked-were-made-to, 
context, there is a contrast being made between the shellfish which 
were cooked, and the fish which were not. The emphasis is carried by 
phrase level stress on "shellfish". While there is a non- precise 
quantity, quantity is only incidental to the contextual focus. 
By contrast, in the following example, which I have requoted from 
the earlier section on non-precise quantity terms, the emphasis 
is reversed. 
Maypal nalinyu bumar dharrwa; latjin, r~gudha, 
Shellfish she and I gathered many: species,species, 
nyonda, niniku ..... , 
species, species, ... , 
The emphasis here is on the fact that there is a large group of items 
with a non-defineable relationship or quantity, than on the fact that 
these items are shellfish. 
One further method was found for communicating non-precise 
quantity reference with non-human nouns. That was in the terminology 
associated with dugong,where three distinct terms were discovered. 
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Gala9gamirr (dugong) is a species name, which, as mentioned above, 
carries neither relationship nor quantity reference. A second term, 
djunuaguya~u refers to a small herd of the animals, a reference to 
the non-precise quantity in a small group. The third term, djinbaypay, 
was used to refer to a situation where the dugong were everywhere in 
what appeared to be unlimited and undefineable quantity. While it is 
quite probable that other examples of this type of quantity reference 
exist, in the collection and identification of between 800 and 900 
names for natural specimens, (Rudder 1977), I discovered no other 
examples of a change in vocabulary which could be related to a change 
. t •t 8 in quan i y. 
With human and humanised nouns, non-precise quantity is 
communicated in three ways, First, classifications in the form of 
human nouns have non-precise quantity indicated by either or both of 
the terms dharrwa (non-precise quantity) and mala (group) in the same 
way as has been demonstrated for non-human nouns. Secondly, as was the 
case with precise quantity human nouns, non-precise quantity may be 
indicated by the use of the appropriate personal pronoun.For example, 
walal (they all), in association with the "classificatory" noun. Also 
as was the case with precise quantity, the indication of quantity may 
involve the use of a pronoun and a quantity term in conjunction with 
the noun. For example: 
Wa9ganymirr walal yolDu mala gan wakir'yurr DUnhal 
Once they all persons group stayed for a there/then 
night or two 
Dharrwa muka walal (yolvu) gan ~~pthurrnydja. 
Many truly they all(person)continued stayed. 
Again in these two examples there is an emphasis difference 
indicated by the use of mala (group), and dharrwa (non-precise 
quantity). In the former the emphasis is on the people and in 
the latter, emphasis is on the quantity. 
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One final quite common way of indicating quantity in human 
nouns involves a change of form from that taken by the "classificatory" 
nouns already described. There are three ways in which this is done. 
The first involves the addition of a suffix. For example, Q.irramu 
(man) becomes _9.irramuwurru (men). The second involves reduplication 
so that yolnu (person) can become yolnu'yulnu (people), and the third 
involves a change in vocabulary such that yothu (child) is replaced 
by djamarrkuli (children). These changes produce what have been 
described for the language as "plural" nouns (Lowe N.D.Lesson 83). 
However they do not have quantitative reference but are used to 
indicate non-precise structured relationship (non-precise quantity), 
and cannot be used with a pair or a trio of items. As a result, one 
cannot say lurrkun' yolnu'yulnu (trio, non-precise quantity of persons) 
as this is a contradiction in terms because lurrkun' (trio) is a 
reference to precise quantity and yolnu'yulnu (people) refers to 
non-precise quantity. The boundary of non-precise quantity reference 
in nouns is clearly set as "more than a trio". 
Concepts as expressed in the nouns thus indicate two points 
concerning quantity. First, with non-human nouns, the general rule 
appears to be that quantity is not indicated within the noun, but by 
the use of additional qualifying words. These additional quantity 
indicators are used to communicate the same limited number of precise 
quantities as are conveyed by the terms used for precise quantity 
groupings • Secondly, with both human and non-human nouns additional 
terms are used to indicate quantity. However the contrast between the 
precise and non-precise quantity in the human nouns is indicated 
decisively by the use of the separate non-precise quantity forms 
of the nouns. 
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iii:Verbs. 
There is, revealed in the verbs, a conceptual distinction 
between action which is repeated an indeterminate number of times, 
(multiple action), and action which is repeated a precise number of 
times (precise action). This distinction is revealed in the use of 
particular verb forms For example, barrtjun (to spear) refers to an 
indeterminate but multiple repetition of the action, while dharpuma 
(to spear) refers to action repeated a precise number of times. The 
structure of the multiple action form of the verb is frequently 
developed by a reduplication of either the stem of the precise action 
verb, or of its first syllable. Alternatively, as I showed above in 
relation to the verb "to spear", there may be no similarity between 
the two forms . For some verbs, there are two different words for the 
multiple action form. For example, there are two multiple action 
forms of marrtji (to go, come or walk), one of these is w~ngama, 
the other is marrtji 1marrtji. 
The contrast between the two types of action is clearly 
demonstrated through the contrasting meanings of the two forms of 
the verb "to hit", (wutthun and wutthu 1wutthun) .The former refers to 
the multiple repetition of the action of hitting, the latter to a 
precise repetition of the action. For example, in the utterance: 
nayi nunhi wutthu 1 wu!_thunna dh~ bU!!_bU 
he/she there/then hit-hit door house 
i.e. He knocked on the door of the house. 
there is the notion of multiple hitting or striking (by a single 
subject on a single object). In contrast to this, in the example: 
D ayi wutthurruna yothunha 
he/she hit child 
i.e. He hit the child. 
there is the notion of a child being struck a limited and precisely 
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determinable number of times (with both subject and object being 
single). 
In demonstrating that the quantity reference in verbs is 
independent of subject or object numbers, I consider first a variety 
of examples of the use of intransitive verbs, and then further examples 
of transitive verbs. For the discussion of intransitive verbs I have 
chosen examples that use the verb "to return", which has both precise 
action and multiple action forms. In the utterance: 
Bala ro~iyinan marrtjin nayi, 
Away returned went he/she/it, 
i.e.He/she returned from here (back to where he/she came from). 
the solitary subject performs a single action. In a second example: 
example: Manda marrtjin 
They(duo) went 
roniyinan, the verb is used in association 
returned, 
with the dual pronoun to describe a precise action by a pair of people 
acting in unison. In a third example: 
Napurr marrtjin r~lin roniyirra 
We(all) came towards returned, 
i.e. We all came back (to where we had come from), 
a precise action is carried out by a group acting in unison. In no 
case is quantity in the subject reflected in the verb. In each of these 
examples, the verb used has the precise action form although the 
subjects range from a single person to a large group. It is when an 
action is perceived to be repeated a multiple number of separate times 
that use of the multiple action form of the verb is indicated. For 
example: Bala napurr roDi'ro~iyirra , uses the multiple action verb 
So we(all) returned 
to describe a group of women returning from hunting, not moving as a 
unit, but scattered through the bush. All of them were moving, but 
each separately, so that there is the perception of the action 
occurring in many places at once. 
This absence of concord in relationship/quantity reference 
between the verb and its subject and object continues in transitive 
verbs, as is exemplified by the two different forms of the verb 
"to spear". In the utterance: 
Wungandja dhu dhuwal walal dharpum, 
Dog will this/here/now they(all) spear, 
i.e. They will spear dog(s). 
Here, the object, "dog" ,is a general classificatory term which as I 
have already shown, contains no relationship or quantity reference. 
The verb is in the precise action form although the subject is 
non-precise quantity (trio or more). Statements which refer to a 
single subject spearing a species item are quite common as: 
Guya ~ayi dharpunal. 
Fish he speared. 
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In this sentence the object is a classificatory noun without quantity 
reference and the verb is the precise action form. A single person can 
carry out a multiple action in spearing a quantity of fish as for 
example: ~arra gana guya barrtjurruna dharrwa. 
I -- continued fish speared-speared many. 
i.e. I speared many 
fish. 
Alternatively the action may be multiple though both the subject 'and 
object are single as when a man spears anot~er man many times. 
Dharrwamirri ~anya barrtjurruna uurioi yolguy 
Many times him speared-speared that-did person-did 
i.e. That person speared him many times. 
The action is also multiple when both subject and object are 
multiple 
Bunan walal ... bala barrtjurruna marrtjin ... warrpam'nha bumar. 
Arrived they .. then speared-speared went ... all of them killed. 
i.e. ~hey arri ved, then went spearing (and) speared them all. 
Th:is range of examples gives reasonable indication that the 
perception of multiple acti on is not dependent on quantity reference 
in either subject or object. That is a multiple action verb is not 
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multiple to agree with other parts of speech, but refers to a separate 
and distinct quality of the action. It is the action itself which is 
perceived as repeated an indefinite number of times, and the form of 
the verb is relevant to that alone. While there sometimes appears to 
be concord between such reference in the verb and in either or both 
subject and object, this does not control the verb form. 
In an attempt to define the boundaries between the two qualities 
of action, I made use of the adverbs which qualify the repetition of 
action more specifically, obtaining the following examples 
of what were claimed by my informant to be correct sentences. It 
was emphasised to him that reference was to the spearing of one 
large fish. 
Waoganymirr nayi dhuwali dharpugal 
Single-having he there/then speared 
i.e. He speared the fish once. 
Marrma'mirr 9ayi dhuwali dharpu9al 
Duo-having he there/then speared 
i.e. He speared the fish twice. 
Lurrkun'mirr gayi dhuwali dharpu9al 
Trio-having he there/then speared 
i.e. He speared the fish three times. 
To this point in the increase in quantity the 
guya. 
fish. 
guy a 
fish. 
guya. 
fish. 
verb takes the precise 
quantity/repetition form. There appear to be no further adverbs with 
precise quantity reference. When I made the suggestion that it would 
be possible to construct them ma.king use of the suffix -mirr (having/ 
possessing), these were rejected by the Yolnu. When I used the precise 
action form of the verb with the adverb dharrwamirr(many having), 
the sentence was changed to the multiple action form as below: 
Dharrwamirr gayi dhuwali barrtjurruna guya. 
Many-having he there/then speared-speared fish. 
i.e. He speared that fish many times. 
It would appear from the above that the boundary between precise action 
is such that up to, and including a triple action is considered to be 
precise action, and that. multiple action refers to quadruple or 
more. 
iv:Patterns of quantity reference in Pronouns, Nouns and Verbs. 
Certain patterns have emerged during the discussion 
of quantity concepts in the forms and uses of pronouns, nouns 
and verbs. I have shown that there is a clear distinction made 
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in the pronouns between"solouand"duo" reference and between these 
and"more than dual" reference, these distinctions being contained in 
the internal structure of the pronouns. However the contrast between 
"trio" and~more than trio'~ while perceived, is made clear not by 
internal structure, but by the use of specific quantity terms in 
conjunction with the pronoun. The conceptualisation of quantity 
revealed by the structure of the pronoun system can be visualised as 
in figure 3:2. 
8 ( 
duo 
) 
non-precise 
multiple 
quantity 
Figure 3:2. Quantity reference in the structure and use of pronouns. 
By contrast to the detailed quantity evaluation in pronouns, 
quantity reference in the structure of nouns is basically restricted 
to an opposition between precise and non-precise quantity. Though 
there are a number of dyadic kinship terms, the basic opposition is 
in certain personal nouns only (see figure 3:3.). Where a greater 
degree of precision is required, use is then made of precise quantity 
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terms, or of the pronouns to indicate definite quantity. When this is 
done, there is again the use of precise terms for single, pair and 
trio, and the pattern which develops is again as in figure 3:1. 
precise non-precise 
( 
quantity quantity 
Figure 3:3. Simple opposition revealed in the noun structures. 
In the verb structures there is a simple opposition between 
precise action and non-precise, multiple action as in figure 3:4. 
precise 
action 
multiple 
-4-(~~~~----J>~ (non-precise} 
action 
Figure 3:4. Simple opposition revealed in the verb structures. 
When the modifications are considered, a precise boundary is 
established between these two domains of meaning as in figure 3:5. 
thrice 
Multiple Action 
many times 
(more than 
three times) 
Figure 3:5. Boundaries of quantity reference as revealed in verbs. 
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Throughout the structures of pronouns, nouns and verbs, there 
exists a consistent pattern in the reference to quantity. This 
demonstrates an opposition between precisely distinguished quantity, 
and generalised non-precise quantity. When the modifications are 
taken into consideration, it appears that the boundary in all three 
cases separates as precise quantities those which can be described 
as •single•, "dual" or Mtrio'~ from those which involve a "greater than trio'' 
quantity. 
ATI'EMPTS TO MATCH YOLNU QUANTITY TERMS TO WESTERN NUMBER SYSTEMS. 
i: Interpretation of early attempts to discover a "Yolnu 
Number System". 
Many attempts have been made to match the Yolnu precise 
quantity terms to the terms used in the Western number systems. 
For example, Chaseling (1957:53) asserted that, 
"If a definite number is used at all, it is usually under 
five. Fingers are the theoretical basis for counting, 
and one is 'wonggain'; two 'marrama';three is two plus 
one; 9four is two and two; five is known as a hand 'korng'. 
Six is hand plus one and so on to ten, which is two 
hands, 'korng marrama'. When pidgin is in use, the 
numerals are one to five, and a~er that it is 'big 
mob'". (His spelling). 
Various non-Aboriginals since Chaseling's time in Arnhem 
Land (1934-1941), have recorded terms reputed to be numbers from 
one to twenty. These appear to use almost the same system as 
recorded by him. However one major variation in terms appears to 
be that lurrkun' (trio) is now the commonly used term for three. 
In displaying the terms in figure 3:7, I have deliberately chosen 
patterns of dots to match the vernacular terms rather than use the 
English numerals. I .n this way the structure of the system is made 
more visible. 
It appears at first glance that these terms do in fact 
represent a true counting system. However I will attempt to show 
that this is not so. Even though the system can be stretched 
slightly to reach as far as "thirty", it has not been 
generally accepted by the Yolnu. There is every likelihood that 
it was developed at the instigation of, and perhaps even by 
non-Aboriginals. I have not heard it used by the Yolnu except where 
they are working with Europeans in a non-Aboriginal context. For 
example, it may be used in "counting" small quantities of items in 
the trade store, in the fishing industry, in the school, or in 
attempts to translate numbers in various types of translation. 
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Even in such contexts, the Yolnu almost invariably choose to use English 
numbers (o~en with the sounds modified to fit Yolnu phonology), It 
is my assertion that, while this to the western observer appears to 
be a system of counting, it is for the Yolnu , the development of 
a number of qualitative classifications for precise quantities and 
has then little to do with seriation and hence ordinal numbers. 10 
An examination of the system as displayed in figure 3:6, leads 
to four points which support this assertion: 
a: The first six items are those earlier discussed as 
primary, secondary and derived terms, which are perceived as precise 
sets or relationships, each with its own quantity. 
b: The term 90Q (hand) represents a perception of a 
different kind from the primary terms. Its use differs in that 
Symbolised Yolnu Term 
Quantity 
Literal Supposed 
Translation English 
* 
** 
*** 
** ** 
***** 
* * 
* * 
* * 
***** 
* 
***** 
** 
***** 
*** 
***** 
**** 
***** 
***** 
***** 
***** *• 
***** 
***** 
** 
***** 
***** 
*** 
***** 
***** 
**** 
***** 
***** 
***** 
***** 
***** 
***** 
* 
***** 
***** 
***** 
***** 
waagany 
mM.rrma' 
lurrkun' 
mM.rrma' m::irrma' 
1urrkun 1 1 urrkun 
or goo waggany ga 
waogany b::lythinyara 
goo waogany ga 
mM.rrma' b::lthinyara 
gon waogany ga 
lurrkun' bMythinyara 
Eq_ ui valent 
nothing/none 0 
solitary/single 1 
alone 
duo 2 
trio 3 
duo (and) duo 4 
hand solitary 5 
trio (and) trio 6 
hand solitary and 
solitary le:rt over 
hand solitary and 
duo le:rt over 7 
hand solitary and 
trio le:rt over 8 
gon waggany ga mMrrma' hand solitary and 
ga mMrrma' bMythinyara duo duo over 9 
gon mMrrma 1 
gon mlirrma 1 ga 
wangany b::lythinyara 
goo mlirrma' ga 
m::lrrma' bliythinyara 
go!) mMrrma' ga 
lurrkun' bliythinyara 
hand duo 10 
hand duo and 11 
solitary le:rt over 
hand duo and 12 
duo left over 
hand duo and 13 
trio le:rt over 
goo mMrrma' ga mMrrma' hand duo and duo 14 
ga mMrrma' bliythinyara duo le:rt over 
go9 lurrkun' 
goo lurrkun' ga 
waogany bMythinyara 
hand trio 15 
hand trio and 16 
solitary left over 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
goa m::lrrma' ga 
gon mlirrma' hand duo and hand duo 
20 
Bo 
Figure 3; 6. System purporting to enable counting from one to twenty. 
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unlike them it is not used alone but is alweys q_ualified by 
one of them. Any group of items larger than five is broken up into 
hand-sized units. The goD set then replaces the solitary item as the 
unit of classification and the precise relationship/q_uantity terms 
are then applied to goD as the new unit in place of the solitary items 
previously classified by them. When this is recognised, terms that 
were thought to be eq_ui valents of ten, fifteen and twenty in the 
"Yolnu Counting System" are revealed as being sets of hand.,.sized units 
classified by the precise q_uantity terms. 
c: The word baythinyara is a nominalised form of 
the verb bMythirri which means "to miss out on something " or 
"to not be included". Thus each of the terms which use bM.ythinyara 
refers to a precise q_uantity of sets with a precise q_uantity of 
solitary items "left over". For example, go~ mM.rnna, ga j_urrkun' 
baythinyara is a statement of the perception of"duo sets"with a 
"trio of solitary items left over'; or"which miss out on being 
included in the set". This appears then not to be a conceptualisation 
of whole number, but the breaking up of a group of items into 
combinations of recognisable smaller relationship/quantity sets. That 
is, an attempt to distinguish precise q_uantities within a large group 
which would normally belong in the dharrwa (non-precise quantity) 
classification. 
d: The terms marnna' mMrnna' and lurrkun' lurrkun' are 
reduplications sometimes separated by the word ga (and). The initial 
term in each of them is not modifying the other, that is, whereas 
J_urrkun' goD is three hands, lurrkun' lurrkun' is not three threes, 
but three and three. In this wey, each term in the reduplication 
retains its own value as a precise q_uantity perception and the 
reduplication functions as a pairing of those values. 
T he system. then has only an apparent equivalence 
between its terms and English numbers. It is not a counting system., 
but gives a qualitative assessment based on the conjunction of two 
separate sets of terms available for classifying quantity. 
Thus the so called "system" is actually a list of terms ordered 
in sequence by a recorder. These terms enable a precise 
qualitative description of quantities which require only a cardinal 
perception of number. There is no necessity for any ordinal 
perception to precede its establishment, nor has its establishment 
generated such a perception. 
ii: The distribution of turtle eggs, and an attempt to relate 
this to number. 
A second system exists which the Yolnu use for visualising 
items in sets. This was originally used in the distribution of a 
nest of turtle eggs amongst a group of people. In the distribution 
of these , a" set" of eggs was put together using a precise pattern 
in which four eggs formed a base, and a fi~h was sat on top of 
them to form a small square pyramid called a rulu (set or group) •11 
(see figure 3:7. ) . The distribution was then by a quantity of sets 
per person. In the pyramid structure, the top egg was described 
as its head (buku or .Q.~mbu) so that a completed pile could be 
referred to as bukumi rr. (head-possessing). Four eggs without a 
head on top was then bukumiriw (headless), and any eggs le~ over 
or more than a complete pyramid were b~ythinyara (left over) 
This produced a distinct set of precise quantity terms somewhat 
similar to the one I have already discussed which used a "hand" 
as its basis. 
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bukumiriw 
incomplete set 
or headless 
rulu or bukumirri rulu ga mMrrma 
set or head- bMythinyara 
-possessing set and duo left 
set over 
Figure 3:7.Modifications of basic set used in distribution 
of turtle eggs. 
In 1975 a group of some of the most experienced Yolnu 
school teaching assistants under the leadership of Rose Guywana 
Gumbula, came together from all the major Yolnu communities 
for a weekend mathematics conference. The stated purpose was,"We 
want our children to learn mathematics in our own language so 
that we can recdgnise the numbers and shapes etc, and learn 
language English and our language" (Gumbulu 1975a). During the 
conference an intensive and serious attempt was made to use the 
turtle egg distribution system as a basis for the deyelopment of 
of a number system in the vernacular. (Which probably better than 
anything else demonstrates the non-acceptable nature of the earlier 
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described system). This new system, based on the pattereed layout of 
the turtle eggs, resulted in what appeared to be the achievement of 
a means of counting up to twenty objects, tholigh it was not capable 
of generating terms to match quantities of more than twenty items 
(see figure 3:8). 
In developing this system, the word rulu (set oi group) 
was used in preference to the word bukumirri (head-possessing) 
* * * * * 
* wa9gany mM.rrma' 1urrkun 1 
solitary duo trio 
* * * * * * *• * * 
* * * * * * 
* * * * * 
* 
* * 
* * bukumi riw 
headless 
* * 
* 
* * 
* * 
* * 
* * 
* 
* * wangany rul u 
solitary set 
* * 
* 
* * 
*.* 
* 
* * 
waogany rulu waogany rulu wa9gany rulu waogany rulu mM.rrma' 
waogany mMrrma' lurrkun' bukumiriw 
bM.ythinyara bMythinyara bMythinyara bMythinyara 
solitary set solitary set solitary set solitary set 
solitary duo left trio left headless 
left over over 
* * * * 
* * * * * * 
* 
* * * * 
* * * * * * 
* * 
over 
* * * * 
* * 
* * * * 
* * 
* 
mttrrma'rulu 
wal)gany 
bttyth i nya ra 
duo set 
solitary 
left over 
mMrrma' rulu mttrrma' rulu 
* * * * 
* * * * * * 
* * * 
* 
* * 
mMrrma' 
bM.ythinyara 
duo set 
duo left 
over 
* * * * 
* * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
* 
* * 
l urrkun 1 
b~ythinyara 
duo set 
trio left 
over 
* * * * 
* * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
* * 
* * 
left over 
* * * * 
* * 
* * * * 
* * 
* * 
mttrrma'rulu 
bukumiriw 
bMythinyara 
duo set 
headless 
left over 
* * * * 
* * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
* 
* * * * 
rulu 
duo set 
* * * * 
* * 
* * * * 
* * 
* 
* * 
l urrkun 1 
rulu 
trio set 
* * * * 
* * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
* * 
* * * * 
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l urrkun 1 rul u 
waogany 
bM.ythinyara 
trio set 
solitary 
left over 
lurrkun'rulu lurrkun'rulu lurrkun'rulu lurrkun'rulu 
mlirrma' Turrkun' bukumiriw bukumi rri 
baythinyara bttythinyara bMyth i ny a ra bMythinyara 
trio set trio set trio set trio set 
duo left trio left headless head-
over over left over -possessing 
left over 
Figure 3 ~ 8. Patterns and terminology used in a Yolnu attempt to 
to develop a counting system. 
to describe the sets of five items until the number twenty was 
reached. At that point it apparently became better reasoning 
from a Yolnu perspective to class "twenty " as shown in figure 3: 8, 
12 .. than to call it bukumiriw rulu. Sinularl y it appears poor 
reasoning to have rulu rulu (set set or set of sets), and it 
would seem that the two terms rulu and bukumiriw are classificatory 
nouns which describe particular relationships/quantities, but which 
are not thought of as belonging to the same category of quantity 
evaluation terms as the three primary ones, hence they do not fit 
into the category of words which can modify others. 
There are two basic differences between this new system 
and the previously described one. First,m~rrma 1 m~rrma 1 (duo duo) 
has been replaced by bukumiriw (headless). With this change 
there has been a conceptual shi~. Four items were earlier seen 
as the duplication of a set of two solitary items. Perception 
of the same quantity is now seen as a distinct set which, instead 
of being related to solitary items, is related to t he rulu (set 
or group) as an almost complete group. Thus four items, a 
problem at the boundary of the two systems of classification, 
(i.e. by sets or by units), is treated in the first system as 
being 11 more than 11 the basic set of primary precise quantity units, 
and in the second system as 11 almost 11 or 11not quite 11 one of the 
precise quantity sets. The second difference between this system 
and the earlier one is that reduplication as a means of describing 
a larger quantity has been dispensed with. 
The system developed at the Yolnu conference, like the 
earlier system, is based on a shi~ in the classificatory unit 
by which items are being assessed. In this way the perception 
of precise quantity is transferred from a quantity of solitary 
items to a quantity of sets. This, while having the appearance 
of developing a set of ordinal numbers, has in fact developed 
an extended set of cardinal numbers. The relationship between 
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the conceptual structures associated with the perception of 
precise quantities of items and the perception of precise 
quantity of sets , one of reclassification is an analogous one 
rather than a contrastive one as can be seen in figure 3:9. 
Perception of precise 
quantities of items 
* * 
* 
* * 
* * 
* 
Perception of precise 
quantities of sets 
* ** * trio 
***quality 
Figure 3: 9. Analogous structures seen in qualitative perception 
of quantity of solitary items and of solitary sets. 
iii: Summary of discussion of attempts to match Yolnu concepts 
to English numbers. 
In the preceding discussion I have shown that the Yolnu 
systems developed do not require a perception of ordinal number. 
I have shown also that the two systems are composed of lists of 
classificatory terms which have been developed for the 
identification of precise quantities.In the second system, one 
which is known to be Yolnu in origin, I have shown that an 
analogous relationship exists between the terms used to classify 
precise quantity with individual items and terms used to 
classify precise quantity as sets. 
The use of modification was shown earlier in relation to 
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the classification of dharrwa (non-precise quantity) using m~rr 
(moderately) and mirithirr (very much). The classification of 
rulu (set or group) in the second system has a distinct 
modification (missing in the first system). The absence of the 
"head" item in the set provides the modified form bukumiriw 
(headless). The addition of extra items to produce a "set with 
x lef't over", produces a classification like "very much a set", 
the equivalent of an intensification. Each of the different 
"lef't over" quantities can be argued to fit this same category of 
intensification, so that there can be argued to be three categories 
at this set level of classification. At the same time each of 
the "left over" quantities are classified in accordance with the 
perception of their precise quantity. 
There are then, in the supposed counting systems, three 
distinct levels of classification being used in conjunction. In 
the first, the individual items are classified according to 
a perception of them as a precise quantity of units, In the 
second, sets of items are classified according to a perception 
of them as a precise quantity of sets. In the third, the 
classification of the set and its modifications are used. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
In the preceding discussion I have argued that what may appear 
to be numerical quantity is evaluated on the basis of qualitative 
structured relationship which is limited to the cardinal quality of 
13 
number. They are therefore not counting systems either, but systems 
for classif'ying larger groups in terms of the relationships 
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identified within them. I have argued that while these systems allow 
the identification of larger precise groupings, they do not require 
the perception of a larger relationship/quantity term than "trio", 
with the possible exception of the "hand set". 
Following Levi-Straussian logic (1972), it is .:p'°ossible to 
formulate two different arguments for the limitation of the 
primary numbers to the equivalents of 1, 2 and 3. The first of 
these would suggest that the Yolnu had no need for numbers 
14 beyond this quantity, either for practical or intellectual purposes. 
The second is that the quantities one, two and three are conceptually 
and that four is not, therefore the cut-off point would occur at the 
limit of conceptual importance. The relevance of both these 
arguments is obvious in the light of discussion in the second chapter 
and will become more clearly supported by the evidence in the 
following chapters. 
Psychology literature suggests another feasible 
reason for the boundary which occurs between the quantities 3 
and 4, and for the contrasting styles of perception of quantity. 
Taves (1941) claimed that there are two mechanisms for the 
discrimination of visual numerousness. A small quantity of things 
from l to 7 or 8, are discriminated in one way and larger numbers 
are discriminated in another way • Chi and Klahr (1975:438) carried 
his experimentation further arguing that "In both adults and young 
children, there appear to be (at least) (sic) two distinct 
quantification processes. One process, operating almost errorlessly 
on the range below n=4 is about 5 or 6 times as rapid as the other, 
which operates on the range above n=3". Klahr(l973) had 
suggested that the lower numbers were recognised by the process 
of subitizing (instantaneous visual recognition) and that the 
second group of numbers was probably recognised by a process of 
subitizing sub-sets of dots while computing a running sum. This 
latter process he suggests, is what is conventionally called 
counting. It appears to me that the results of this experimentation 
form a significant correlation with my own argument that the Yolnu 
recognition of quantities is not achieved by counting. Significantly 
also the boundary between subitizable and non-subitizable quantities 
is in the same location as the boundary perceived by the Yolnu 
between precise and non-precise quantities. While it is interesting 
to note this harmony, I do not consider the primary basis for the 
limitation of precise relationships to the trio to be its 
subitizable size. In later sections of this thesis I will argue for 
a harmony between these classifications and metaphysical perceptions. 
Inthe preceding chapter I argued that the Yolnu perceive 
a re-classification beyond the boundary of a category as being a 
classification into a new dimension of existence. I have shown that 
a similar transformation occurs between the sets of terms used for 
classifying precise quantity relationships and those used for 
classifying non-precise quantity relationships. I am now suggesting 
that the Yolnu use of analogous structures in the attempt to evolve a 
counting system (figure 3:9) follows the same structural pattern. 
In figure 3:10 I have attempted to illustrate the 
Yolnu perception of a change in the state of existence, by 
ma.king use of a spiral diagram in which the outer circle 
contains the transformation of the inner one. I have drawn it 
as a spiral rather than as two concentric circles, as this 
better conveys the idea of a link between the two dimensions of 
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existence. I also gives a better illustration of the perception 
that there is a continuation of the same quality in a new state 
of existence . Thus that which is a solitary item transforms to 
become a solitary "set". At this point it does not matter whether 
the "set" is called a "hand" or a "group of turtle eggs", the 
quality is the same in both states of existence, that is, "solitary". 
It is the change in the state of existence which is being classified, 
a change from existence as an item to existence as a set. In the 
same wa;y "two items" is transformed into "two sets"(ten), and "three 
items" is transformed into "three sets" (fifteen). 
15 
( 3 sets) 
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items and quantity perceived in sets. 
One other feature of significance in the figure is the 
transformation of what I have marked as "X'' which, in the figure, 
takes the place of the word b~YQU· This is normally given the literal 
translation of "nothing/none". In this case it refers to the absence 
of any established relationship, that · . is the non-expression of the 
quality "quantity", rather than being a reference to the non-existence 
o f quantity. There is, associated with "X", the perception of 
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a condition of"pre-existent" or "other existent"state. In 
figure 3:11 the transformation of "X", has been indicated as "X!", 
denoting the transformation of the same quality to a new state. 
The position of "X!" in relation to the two dimensions of 
existence is an intermediate one, beyond the first state and 
"pre-existent" of the new state. This perhaps helps to explain 
the ambivalence with which it has been handled in the previously 
discussed systems. Thus the term m3rrma' m3rrma' (duo duo) 
focused on it as beyond the first state of precise quantity, 
while bukumiriw (headless) focussed on the pre-existence of the new 
state, that of relationship as "set". The transformation of"X ! " to 
"X! ! " marks the "beyond the 'set'" state. It indicates the end of 
the state of existence of "quantity" as. relationships/quantities of 
"sets" and the "pre-existence" of a new state. 
At the Yolnu teachers' conference it appeared that it was not 
possible for them to develop further terms using the same structure. 
It seemed also that they were unable to form another transformation 
in numerical terms. If the same logic were pursued, it would be 
possible to make transformations in a variety of different ways. For 
. 15 
example, to larger precise sets or to non-precise categories. In 
terms of the logic revealed in the previous chapter, further 
investigation may find that when groups are perceived to transform 
beyond the presently established sizes, they could be seen as 
transforming from a "natural" category of quantity to a supernatural 
or spiritual one. Whether such was found to be so or not, the 
potential for such a transformation is available within the structures. 
NOTES 
1: Sayers ,B .J. ( 1982: 187) suggests th at, "the Aboriginal not only 
doesn't see any value in precise counting, but, particularly in 
a more traditional Aboriginal environment, he doesn't understand 
the number concept basic to counting". 
2: I have distinguished as "primary" those terms which first, refer 
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to a precise grouping of discrete units and which secondly can be 
used to classify sets of other differently sized groups. "Secondary" 
terms are then those which refer to precise quantity groups but 
which are not used to categorise other groups. "Derived" . terms are 
those developed through the alteration or redeplication of primary 
terms. 
3: Hallpike,C.R. (1979:242) is clearly searching for the notion of 
"number" terms being not quantitatively but qualitatively related 
to each other when he suggests that, "it is not at all clear that 
primitive enumeration, because it is so closely tied to action and 
graphic configurations, conceives the natural number series as the 
product of the successive iteration of the unit 'one', rather than 
seeing each number as a distinct configuration in its own right." 
4: Rulu is translated by Jennison (1927) as "sheaf". He notes that 
items can be tied up into a rulu. In the contexts where I have 
encountered its use, it has been applied consistently to a square 
pyramid of turtle eggs. 
5: This teacher had been one of those keenly involved in the maths 
conference discussed on pages 83 to 86. 
6: In the narration of past events it is common to enumerate the 
individuals and their relationships at an early stage in the 
story. 
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7: By "human" nouns, I mean those nouns referring specifically to 
people. Humanised nouns refer to those items which are treated as 
having a human personality but which are named as non-human. Such 
items occur frequently in myths where distinction between animals 
and humans is blurred. Humanised nouns are used in conjunction 
with pronouns, but I have not discovered any multiple quantity 
forms of them. 
8: In subsequent checking I found that these multiple quantity terms 
for dugong were not known by other Yolnu than the small group of 
fishermen who told them to me. They appear to be specialist 
vocabulary, and I have included them only for their value in 
indicating further areas for investigation. 
9: Chaseling appears to have obtained the phrase "two plus one" by 
translating the Yolnu words m~rnna' ga wangany (duo and single), 
giving in doing so the impression of counting when in fact it 
represents the separate classifications of the elements in the 
group. 
10: There is always the possibility that such a system or the following 
one (see also note 13) could develop into a genuine ordinal system, 
but it would require a radical change from the qualitative to a 
quantitative perception of evaluation. 
11: See note 4 above. 
12: It would appear that whenever the term bukumiriw (headless) is used, 
its implied meaning is bukumi riw rul u meaning "a set without a 
head". To use that term as a translation of "twenty" would be 
completely illogical in qualitative thought structures. 
13: In taking this approach, I am in conflict with Harris ,J. (1982), 
not in his claim that Aboriginal people have numbers, but in his 
assumption that these mean the same as the numbers in our Western 
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quantitative systems. According to Harris (pl69-173) quoting 
Sobek (1981), Galarrwuy Yunupingu has produced a number system 
which enables the counting of numbers up to 1250. However, 
Galarrwuy's ingenious effort is based on the use of quantitative 
thinking, and whether his system gains any widespread acceptance 
remains to be seen. 
14: Levi-Strauss (1966:8) argues in fact that classifications are 
extended beyond the essential to meet intellectual requirements 
rather than, or instead of, satisfying needs. Assuming this to be true 
true for the Yolnu, the limitation to such small numbers would 
appear to indicate is a relatively irrelevant concern, but that 
there is real relevance to them in establishing the limits of 
precise quantity at the number three. 
15 :It is possible to follow the same logic in mathematical terms .. 
If this is done there can be a second transformation from a 
"set of five" to a "set of twenty-one" (one unit greater than 
the present limit), "ten" is then transformed to "forty-two" and 
"fifteen" to "sixty-three". 
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CH.APTER 4 
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES USED IN THE CLASSIFICATION AND 
NAMING OF COLOURS. 
Considerable attention has been given in Anthropological 
literature to the number of"basic color terms" used in different 
cultures ,1 to the status of those colour terms2 and to the concepts 
involved in the colour naming process.3 I consider some of these issues, 
but from a different perspective. For my purposes, the number of 
of colours named, and the focal points of those colours are of 
secondary interest onlY. My concern is with the actual process by 
which culturally relevant colours are named, the structure of the 
evaluative system used in that process, and the perceived relationships 
between colours or colour classifications. That is,I am interested in 
what the Yolnu do conceptually with the colours that are apprehended 
with the physical senses. 
In the approach to this subject I used a variety of materi~ls. 
Three different colour charts with different arrangements of colour 
chips were discussed with different Yolnu, 4(one of these being the 
chart published by Berlin and Kay(l969)- henceforth B & K). In 
addition to these I used as a basis for discussion, a numbered set of 
pigment samples obtained from a variety of sources in Arnhem Land, 
together with photographs of bark paintings in various stages of 
production. Finally the use of colour terms in everyday situations 
was recorded wherever this was noted, though in practice,colour is 
rarely a topic of everyday conversations. 
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I have found it necessary to consider at some length a m.llllber of 
aspects of colour conceptualisation. In particular, the relation 
between concepts associated with colour and those concerned with the 
colour pigments.In the following discussion I demonstrate that the 
Yolnu do in fact apprehend with the physical senses the full range of 
colour across the colour continuum of the spectrum, and show how this 
is broken into bounded entities by the classificatory system. 
I begin by discussing a number of ways in which colour terms are 
met with in conversational contexts, albeit ones which I partially 
contrived, and a general consideration of the Yolnu domain "colour/ 
design". 
i: Terminology associated with colour and design. 
A single term is used to classify the section of the evaluative 
system concerned with colour. This is the word miny'tji which means 
both colour and design. In different contexts the focus tends to be 
more on one of these attributes than on the other. It appears 
nevertheless that neither is ever completely absent and that whichever 
attribute is emphasised, the meaning includes both. 
In a corner of the Galiwinku craft room there were a number of 
buckets of pigments. These had been collected for the craftsmen to use 
in producing artifacts. In the buckets there were cakes of clay, 
crushed white clay and also pie o=s of red and yellow ochres. I asked 
one of the painters what was in the buckets. 11 Gamunu9gu miny'tjiw, 11 
Paint/white clay for colour/ 
design, 
he replied and then proceeded to separately identify various pieces 
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from the buckets. One was miku, a piece of local haematite-rich 
sandstone. Later he declared that, that had really been ratjpa(haematiteJ, 
and showing me a piece of red ochre from the neighbouring centre of 
Yirrkala declared, 11 Dhuwal 
This/now 
yuwalk miku, 11 For him the second 
true red ochre. 
sample was real and the first one only a substitute. The next sample 
shown was a different piece of reddish ochre. This so he said was 
also miku but not real miku either, rather it was gangul (yellow ochre) 
which had been roasted in the fire until it changed colour to red. A 
bucket of white pipe clay was gamunu~gu, though he had earlier used that 
word with a wider reference to cover all the samples. This gamunu~gu 
he said was also watharr (white). I queried this, pointing to a 
large cake of pinkish clay amongst the white, but it was also g~unu~gu. 
Pushing this identification I asked him 11 Yow?·11 (Is it really?/Oh Yes?) 
as if doubting his answer. He broke the cake, and laughing at my 
ignorance displayed a streaky mixture of. white and red clay. "See," he 
said, pointing to the white streaks. It was obvious that I was being 
shown that I didn't know everything, and that there was white on the 
inside even though not visible on the outside. He then explained 
that while it was gamunUQ9U, it was not a first choice sample to use 
on the fine bark paintings, though it would be completely satisfactory 
for smearing over the body for general ceremonial uses. Later to 
complete my education, he showed me a piece of black stone which he 
declared to be mol (black). It too had come from Yirrkala, and it 
seemed that Yirrkala pigments were the only real ones. For him, a man 
more oriented towards Yirrkala than to Galiwinku, others were only 
substitutes. 
This painter saw the colour terms as the names for the solid 
colours, that is, the ochres used in painting the designs on bark 
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paintings. Each colour was, for him, best exemplified by the ochres 
from particular sites with which he was associated. The meaning of 
the word miny'tji (design and colour) in that context focussed on 
design, with colour more a secondary attribute used in the creation 
of design 
The leader of one o~ the local music groups showed me that 
miny'tji can be used in contexts where the pigments are not being 
considered and the only colours used are black and white. He showed me 
a copy of the cassette box label that his group had had printed, 
displaying the group's name and photograph, and asked me if I liked the 
miny'tji. When I asked the meaning of that word, he explained that he 
was talking about the photograph but that it also meant the writing 
and the overall design. His focus was not on colour, although the 
colours black and white were involved in the design being displayed. 
On a different occasion I was sitting in the camp with one of 
the families discussing the work I was doing. I mentioned that I was 
learning the ways that Yolnu thought about mi ny' tj i . One of the senior 
women immediately chose to show me exactly what the word meant by 
dramatising the thoughts and actions she would use in choosing a new 
dress in the local general store. As she did this she took advantage 
of the clothing being worn by members of the group sitting around us. 
examining a shirt here or a skirt there as if she was talking to 
herself about dresses in the store. 
Nh~ ~arra dhu miny'tjiwa dj~lthi rri girri'wa? 
What I will colour-for desire clothes-for? 
Mak mol ? Gangulmirri 9arra dhu m~rrama, ga wiripu 9arra 
Maybe black Yellow-having I will get, and different I 
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Plate 4:1. Examining the cololU' chart published by Berlin and Kay. 
Note the pattern of white 1 ines separating the cololU' chips. 
-;:. 
--
Plate 4:2. Examining the I.S.C.C. - N.B.S. Color Name Charts. 
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dhu mlirrama gamunu~gtJTii rri. 
will get white-having. 
She explained that she was considering colour printed dresses and 
describing them to herself by the colour which in some wey stood out. 
One dress had sections of black, another emphasised yellow while the 
third had white sections contrasting with a basically coloured dress. 
In this choosing of dresses, the focus of meaning is almost the 
reverse of that used by the musician and the craftworker. Colour has 
become the most significant attribute of miny'tji without design losing 
all relevance. The "yellow-having" or "white-having" refer to the 
dress which has that colour. "Black" refers to colour rather than to 
design. 
The dey following the above discussion I returned to the family 
camp to visit the husband. He had been involved in the discussion of 
of colours and had listed the names he used at that time. On this 
second visit I was intent on recording his responses to the colour 
chips on the B & K colour chart. I showed the chart to him, pointed to 
it and asked, 11 Nhli dhuwal miny'tji mala? His instant 
What this(singular) colour/design 4 group? 
response to my poorly worded question was, Yirritja, giving the name 
of one of the two moieties.After some discussion of this response, he 
finally coIIIDlunicated to me that he had focussed on the white spaces 
between the colour chips. Looking diagonally across the chart he had 
s een the white spaces as white lines outlining a pattern of diamond 
shapes. As there are a large number of traditional designs used by 
the Yirritja moiety members which are based on such diamond patterns, 
(see plate 4:1.), he had thought in those terms. After a round-about 
discussion of other things, during which time he showed me that 
different colours were relevant to different designs, he then 
proceeded to identify on the chart the colours he had named for me 
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on the previous day. Later in searching for an understanding of these 
responses, I discussed them with another man. The problem, he explained, 
lay in my poorly worded question. The word, mala, with its two distinct 
meanings (group of things, and clan group) would have caused confusion. 
Also it might have been thought that I had used the possessive form 
ma 1 aw with its almost silent final letter. 5 While still confusing it 
could then sound as if I was trying to translate the English question~ 
"What group's design is this?". As I had for a number of years 
regularly discussed traditional designs with the first man, this would 
have been a natural choice for him to make. 
The situation in which I have found the focus of miny 1 tji to 
be most consistently on colour is in the discussion and description 
of natural species. Colour terms are then frequently used to discriminate 
between species which are otherwise almost identical.Two yams are 
distinguished by colour alone, different parrots have certain colours 
on different parts of their bodies and two different Eucalypts have, 
among other features, different coloured flowers. Such differentiations 
using colour terms as a basis are frequently used under the category, 
miny'tji. 
Since traditional design is of great significance to the Yolnu 
it follows that the most general use of miny'tji focusses on design.6 
However even when it is used to refer to the pattern of cross-hatched 
infill in traditional designs, the colour of the cross-hatching is 
relevant to the meaning. It can be seen in the above examples that 
while miny'tji refers to pigment, to colour and to design its meaning 
can be focussed almost completely on any one of them, the particular 
emphasis being.conveyed by the context of its use. 
ii: The naming of pigments. 
Each pigment used by the Yolnu comes from a specific named 
location. Each has its own special significance in relation to the 
site and to the creative ancestor believed to have distributed 
ownership of the site (see table 4:1). I was also told that each 
of these pigments also has a secret name or set of names that 
refers to the pigment from that site only. The revelation of 
these names is restricted, generally being told only at the men's 
secret ceremonial grounds and they were not told to me • 
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The pigments from different sites vary considerably in both 
colour and texture. For example, yellow pigments may occur as a soft 
powdery cla:y, as a soft stone with sedimentary layers visible in it 
as a hard st one, or as in one sample that I was given, as a brittle 
hard stone composed of large, almost crystal-like sections. The place 
of origin of different pigments can often be identified by Yolnu 
on the basis of such features. 
Though colour is a significant feature, the naming of pigments 
involves considerably more than their colour. A yellow pigment is not 
just a yellow pigment, but a particular transformation of a significant 
ancestral substance, associated with the activities of a known creative 
ancestor at a particular location. Thus pigments are not simply a 
s ource of solid colour, but the tangible presence of transformation of 
the ancestral world, and as such are considered to have both a physical 
and a metaphysical substance. One yellow pigment may be named as 
Dhondjipuy buthalak (Dhondji-belonging-to yellow), another may be 
called either Mirrnatjawuy buthalak (Mirrnatja-belonging-to yellow) or 
dhalwa!Pu djukurr (Green Turtle fat), thus giving a precise 
identification while avoiding the use of secret names. 
Location of Site I Mythological Association I Pigment Colour I Trans formation of I Moiety I Owned by 
Ban 'tula I man a (shark) I yellow I shark's flesh I Dhuwa I ~iya-dhalinymirr (Elcho Island) I I I I I and 
I I red I shark's blood I I Beyu-dj arrakmirr 
I I I I I 
white shark's fat I I I ( dj ukurr) I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I 
W!:lrr9ga I yarrpany I pale yellow I dj ukurr (fat of 1 Dhuwa I Murrugun (blipurru) (Elcho Island) I (honey bee) I I hive) I I 
I I 
dark yellow 
I mapu (pollen I I G'Ll!!..birri (mala) balls) 
I I I I I 
Mirr9atja I dha lwa!J>u I yellow I djana(fat of 1 Dhuwa I Marr a.gath umirr 
I green turtle) I I turtle) I I and ~iya-dhalinymirr 
I 
blfru 
I I I I Miwatj 
I 
yellow 
I djana(fat of 1 YirritJa, Gumatj 1 (saltwater crocodile) crocodile) 
I I I I I 
Dhondji 1 Rliw I yellow I fat of crocodile I Yirritja1 Bi~9arr (blipurru) 
I ( fres water crocodile) I I I I 
I I I I I 
Balawala:Jur 
I galaagamirr I 
bright red I faeces of dugong 1 Yirritja1 Mandji1'.-ay (blipurru) (Howard Is) (dugong) after roasting & blood of dugong 
I I I I I 
Yinitjuwa I ma~an (cloud) I black I cloud 1 Yirri tj al Maymuru (blipurru) 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
Yirrkala wlirrarra red 1 sunshine at 1 Dhuwa 1 Mlirika (blipurru) 1 (red sunset clouds) I 
1 sunset (?) I I I I 
Galiwinku I wlirao I red-purple I not revealed. 1 Dhuwa I Gunbirri (mala) 
I (sugar glider) I I I I 
Table 4:1. Location, Associations and Ownership of some pigments. 
f--J 
0 
w 
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Beyond this use of unchanging locality-specific and secret 
names, there is considerable variation in the naming process. I used 
some twenty plus different pigment samples as a basis for discussion 
of and identification of the pigments and their sites. In these 
discussions it was common for. a single term to be used as a general 
name for all the pigments of one basic colour range, Thus all yellow 
pigments could be named gangul or buthalak and all reds could be 
named miku, though there was usually a distinction made between the 
purple-red haematite and other reds. Some people would refer to the 
haematite as miku (red pigment), then alter their identification to 
ratjpa (haematite pigment), the common name for the ore from Elcho 
Island. An example of this is shown in the earlier described discussion 
of pigments with the cra~worker. Another man suggested as he corrected 
himself that ratjpa could not be called miku, as they belonged to 
different moieties. It is possible that he was referring to the ver-y 
bright red pigment from neighbouring Howard Island, when thinking of 
miku as the opposite moiety but there are pigments from both moieties 
known by that name. It appears that a number of different groups call 
their own red pigment miku, each declaring at least in private, that 
theirs is the true one. It seems also that there is general agreement 
concerning pigments that ratjpa (haematite) is distinct from miku. 
Black pigments were given a variety of names. Mol and gurr9an 
are terms which appear to mean "black" in most contexts. Oj unapa l is 
a non-secret name for the black pigment stone, while ~urr~gitj and 
l_irrgi, common names for charcoal,( also used as a pigmen~, are o~en 
used as names for the black . stone. Apart from the name for the black 
stone, any of the other terms can be applied to any of the black 
' 
pigments. 
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The white pigments had a similar variety of names. They were 
of'ten simply called watharr, which appears to refer specifically 
to their white colour. Galkarra and gapa!!_ are names applied as general 
terms for any white pigment, though by far the commonest term used 
at Galiwinku was the word gamunuagu. This word has aa extremely 
di verse us age again varying in meaning according to context. The 
discussion with the craf'tworker (see page 91) provides one example of 
this diversity. In that discussion gamunu~gu refers first to the full 
range of paint pigments, as if it meant "paints". It was then used to 
refer to cakes of whitish cley as a specific pigment and then finally 
to speak of the streaks of white within a ccnglomerate of red and 
white, In the dramatisation of shopping in the store (see page 93), 
gamunu~gu is referring specifically to the colour white. On a different 
occasion I overheard a discussion between a Yolnu worker engaged in 
house painting and one of the non-Aboriginal staff; 
Way galikali 
Hey subsection 
bl!yri uthi nan 
nothing 
gamunu~gu ! 
gamunungu! 
term 
Lit: Hey 
She asked: Nhl! 
What 
Lit :What 
He: Paint .... 
become 
(I've) run out of gamunungu! 
gamunu~gu? 
gamunuygu? 
is gamun'U.9gu? 
white undercoat. (spoken in English) 
Here the aspects of being paint, and being white are both important. 
Another man called it the bl!purru, or collective name, which includes 
all white paints, both Yolnu and Western in origin. 
Where the range of pigments was discussed in relation to 
traditional designs there appeared to be five general pigments. These 
were red,yellow,black,white and haematite. Whether the first four of 
these were collective terms for pigments of a single colour range or 
whether they are colour names in terms of origin is a problem 
I will discuss in the next section. There seems to be a general 
consensus that ratjpa is a pigment, but there was confusion as to 
whether it was a colour or not. 
iii: The naming of primary colours. 
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When the Yolnu are confronted with a wide spectrum. of colours 
such as those displayed on a colour chart, they are clearly able to 
discriminate between very fine colour differences. An examination of 
the way they name the colours that they distinguish, indicates that 
they perceive certain areas of colour as centres of focus and adjacent 
ones as being related to these. These foci are what I have chosen to 
call "primary colours". The colours seen as related to these or as 
modifications of them I have called "secondary colours". This approach 
differs considerably from that used by B & K and those who have 
continued the discussion of "basic color terms", 7 but it is more 
useful for the directions of structural analysis that I have chosen 
to take. This is because it enables a comprehensive discussion of the 
perceptions involved in the naming and evaluating processes and an 
analysis of the structures used in those perceptions. 
In relation to the colours named in English, there are five 
colours consistently discriminated by most Yolnu; black, white, red, 
yellow and blue. However, in the areas related to red there are a 
number of other colour foci which are identified separately and which 
do not relate to English "basic color terms" at all. The number of 
these separately named foci varies from Yolnu to Yolnu and I will 
return to the discussion of those variations later. At this point I 
consider the various primary (or focal) colours named and the process 
by which they are named. 
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There was completely universal agreement with regard to the 
naming of the first four colours, the first two of these being names 
for colours only. The name for black as a colour is mol and its use in 
reference to charcoal or to manganese ore is to their blackness only, 
each of them having more precise names. Watharr (white), is used to 
describe the white of white clay, of paper, of feathers and other items 
referring consistently to the colour rather than any other attribute. 
In the examples of the use of colour terms on pages 97 - 101, whiteness 
was described several times by the term gamunu~gu . This term's use was 
discussed earlier in relation to pigments. It is used quite commonly as 
a classification of white on colour charts and in other situation, 
frequently enough to consider one of its meanings to be "white". 
However, it has other meanings whereas watharr does not and as this latter 
term is the most commonly agreed to colour name for white I consider 
it to be the primary term and other words to be supplementary to it. 
Miku (red) and buthalak or gangul (yellCM) are names applied to 
both pigments and colours. They are used as common names for all 
pigments of the appropriate colour, irrespective of the site of origin. 
The names are also applied in a general way to the red and yellow areas 
of the colour spectrum, their domains being modified in relation to 
the number of colours named by a particular person. There is however 
fairly general agreement that the focal point of miku on the ISCC Color 
Name Charts is on "vivid red': and "strong red" while butha 1 ak occupies 
the "brilliant", "strong", and "vivid" areas of four colours on the 
charts, "orange", "orange yellow", "yellow" and "greenish yellow". 
The fi~h of the generally used colour names is mulkuminy (with 
its alternative pronunciation of milkuminy) This was identified as 
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"light" areas of the "blue" and "greenish blue" colour charts. This 
term is also the name for the gall bladder, the contents of which is 
a bluish green in both animals and marine species. This organ is 
significant in that its contents are painted onto wounds such as those 
inflicted by stingray spines to both relieve the pain, and to heal 
the wound. One informant, speaking of the use of this name said, "We 
use mulklJTliny as a colour name but i~s not only a colour. We use it 
a~er it came from the mulkllTiiny inside fish or wallaby or turtle. We 
could just as easily say "sea" or "sky". Another man, while indicating 
the focus of mulkuminy on the colour chart, referred to it as the 
colour of deep water, contrasting it with green which he said was the 
colour of water over reefs. A third person said that he always called 
blue g~rak, which is the name given to blue sky clear of clouds. With 
these sorts of comments being made, and an awareness that the previously 
described colour terms were pigment names, I became dubious as to the 
authenticity of mulkuminy as a colour name of any antiquity. However 
it is known to have been in use at Elcho twenty years before the 
present settlement was commenced, as Jennison (1927) recorded its use 
during his time there (1921-23). 
The name of the haematite ore,ratjpa, is also used as a name for 
certain colours quite distinct from those classified as miku. Generally 
these match with the "grey", "dark" and "very deep" areas of both 
"red purple" and "purplish red" on the charts. There appears to be 
some confusion among the Yolnu over the classificatory relationship 
between this colour and miku and a few people appear to treat it almost 
as a subclass of miku. There is however a strong possibility that 
English colour classes have influenced this. The English colour "red" 
is regularly translated as miku and I have heard ratjpa described in 
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English as a "red colour". It would seem that this could easily cause 
con:fusion in cross-cultural communications about meanings. The Yolnu 
have an awareness of this difficulty as shown by the comment mentioned 
earlier (page 104)where one of the men attempted to justify 
discrimination between the two colours on the basis of moiety ownership. 
The other most common colour identified is brown. Labelled 
gundirr it can range in colour on the charts from "moderate", "deep", 
"brownish" and "dark reddish" oranges, through "deep", "moderate" and 
"dark" yellows to "light" olive brown. Primarily gundi rr is the name for 
termite mounds. The name is used in a number of weys. It can refer to 
the broken lumps of termite mound used as a heat source in an earth 
oven. It is also the name for a paint made from the crushed cley from 
the mound painted onto the body as camouflage when hunting wallabies. 
In each situation where the word is used it functions as the name of 
the item rather than being a description of it. 
Several other terms were encountered in the naming of colours. 
Some people referred to gula9gula9 as a colour, though there was no 
uniformity in its identification on the colour charts apart from the 
fact that it was applied to some area of the reddish colour chips. 
gula~ is the common name for blood and it appears that gula~gula~ 
is derived from it. One of the artists claimed that there were two 
kinds of red which could be named .!.arrani, and that these 
corresponded to two other regular uses of the word. One of these 
is as the name of a red fruit,or as the name of the tree that bears it 
(Syzgililll. suborbicularis). The other is as the name for children of 
mixed parentage. This man saw these two different meanings given to 
the word as a basis for the identification of two different kinds of 
red. He distinguished them as larrani borum (red fruit) which ranged 
on the charts from "deep", "strong" and "moderate" purplish pink to 
"moderate" yellowish pink, and larrani Yol9u (red person) which 
ranged from "dark" yellow to "moderately yellowish" brown. 
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In the above identifications of colours a particular naming 
process is involved. This is related to the Yolnu perception which 
appears to, in some way, equate part of an item with the whole item. 
Using that perception it seems that the name of anything can be used 
as the name for any of its parts, the name for any of its uses, or 
the name for any of its attributes. In each of these cases the 
meaning communicated is established by the context of its use. Thus 
gundirr is the termite mound, gundirr is the pieces of the mound, 
gundirr is camouflage paint made from it, and gundirr is its colour. 
Similarly clear blue sky can be glirak and clear blue colour can be 
glirak, a particular red fruit is _larrani, a red person can be _larrani 
and a red colour can be larrani. This I would suggest is a significantly 
different process from either the use of one name to describe another, 
or the metaphoric reference to one item in terms of the other. Rather 
it appears that one, in possessing attributes of the other, expresses 
something of the nature of the other. This is well illustrated in 
the uses of the word gundirr. It is fairly clear that the term originally 
was the name for the termite mound, but other things given the s a.me 
name are not likegundirr, they are gundirr. That is they are in some 
Wfzy' perceived to be essentially the same. 
In table 4:2, I _ have attempted to show the relation between the 
pigment names, the colour names, and the identifications given to a 
number of pigments from different locations. It is possible to 
separate colour names from pigment names by recording responses to 
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Specific Pigments General Pigment Names Colour Names 
Ban'tulawuy gamunu9gu gamunu9gu watharr 
(belonging to Ban'tula) (white) 
Yinitjuwawuy mol djunapal mol 
(belonging to Yinitjuwa) (black) 
gu~urru .!_i rrgi 1 i rrgi 
(woolley-butt charcoal) (charcoal) 
ma9gu li rrgi 
(mango charcoal) 
Ban'tulawuy miku 
(belonging to Ban' tula) 
Yi rrka 1 awuy mi ku miku miku 
(belonging to Yirrkala) (red) 
Ba 1awa1 a9ur mi ku 
(At Bal aw ala) 
muru~gun (a weak form 
able to be crushed) 
ratjpa ratjpa 
ratjpa, dM.l (red purple) 
(a hard form needing 
to be ground) 
Warrdigawuy butha I ak 
(bel nging to Warrnga) 
buthalak buthalak 
Mir~atjawuy buthalak or (yella.v) (belonging to Mirrnatja} 
or gangul gangul 
Dhondjiwuy buthalak (yellow) 
(belonging to Dhondji) 
mulkumi ny 
(blue) 
gundi rr gundi rr 
(brown) 
Table 4:2. Relation between pigment names, colour names and specific 
pigment locations or varieties. 
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to the two questions ,"What is this?", and "What miny'tji is this?". 
AB the table shows, many, though not all the answers are identical. In 
normal practice a red pigment is miku and its colour is also miku, 
for the one word has both meanings. 
From the foregoing discussion it appears that the lexicon of 
colour terms is not fixed, but open-ended. This allows for its expansion 
or contraction in relation to increased or decreased needs for 
differentiation. Whether individual Yolnu use a wider or narrower 
range of colours than others, each person appears to treat all the 
colours in their personal lexicon as being on the same level of 
classification. That is they do not generally recognise any of the 
terms described thus far as being subclassifications one of another. 
If there is an exception to this, it could be in regard to ratjpa 
(haematite), as there is some confusion concerning its position in 
relation to miku (red). 
iv: The naming of secondary colour. 
There appear to be two quite separate processes available for 
naming any colour sample considered as not truly matching any of the 
named primary colours. The first of these is the one already discussed, 
based on the use of the name of some other item the colour of which 
consistently represents the colour being classified. 8 The other naming 
process appears to first focus on the identification of a set of 
named primary colours,( which, according to the individual may be from 
four to six or more in ntnnber~ and then to evaluate the relationship 
between these and the colour sample being named. That is, any colour 
sample which is not one of the named focal or primary colours is seen 
as classifiable in relation to them. These "secondary" samples are 
able to be classified in relation to the primary colours in one of 
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three ways. First as a moderated form of the named colour, secondly as 
a modification of one colour in the direction of one of the other ones, 
or thirdly by a combination of the two names. Degrees of these 
modifications can be emphasised by voice inflection, but these do not 
appear to effect the above systems. 
In earlier chapters I have discussed the use of two evaluative 
terms used to modify classifications. These were mirithirr (very) and 
m~rr ga9ga or m~rr (moderately/partially/almost). The use of mirithirr 
in conjunction with a colour term establishes a new classification 
which indicates an intense saturation/intense purity of the colour. 
For example the "brightest" red is mirithirr miku (intensely red) and 
undiluted black is mirithirr mol (intensely black) irrespective of 
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whether the sample has a matt or a glossy surface. The use of m~rr or 
m~rr ga~ga with a colour classification indicates that the boundary of 
the classification is being stretched to include the particular sample. 
Thus the sample being classified is seen to have the attributes of the 
colour to which it is being related, but is considered to be only 
partially expressing them. In this approach to classifying colours 
there is thus included the notion of an ideal of each colour which 
then contrasts with samples that do not meet that standard. The result 
is the establishment of three classifications of each colour. That is, 
moderate colour (the colour term with a modifier), general colour (the 
colour term) and intense colour (the colour term with an intensifier). 
The structure of this classificatory system is outlined in 
figure 4:1, using miku (red) to demonstrate the way modifications are 
applied to a primary colour term. The classifications are made on two 
levels, physical and metaphysical. On the metaphysical level, the 
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ideal miku is, in both colour and substance, considered to be a 
pigment formed as the metamorphosis of ancestral substancJ-? There is 
then the colour expression of that pigment, which is also miku, 
forming a general central category, and potential for samples which 
do not express the colour at all, being classed as a tYJ?e of 
Pre-category. That is, being of ancestral substance, but not expressing 
the appropriate colour.Each of the three classifications at this level 
is thus considered to express the nature of the ancestor in some way. 
On the physical level of evaluation, the central (colour) category 
from the metaphysical level is considered in terms of the intensity 
of expression of that colour. Here the three classifications previously 
discussed are applied. M~rr miku then refers to a partial or moderate 
expression of red, miku to a general concentration in which the 
colour red is dominant over any other colours or impurities, and 
mirithirr miku describes a specimen considered as pure colour of 
highest concentration. 
Nature and Colour and Colour, 
Substance Nature Substance 
and Nature 
Metaphysical yaka miku miku miku 
Level (not red) (red) (red pigment) 
Physical m~rr miku mirithirr 
Level miku miku 
/moderate~ (;red) (intense 
red) red) 
Figure 4:1. Structure of evaluations used in assessing miku. 
The second process by which secondary colours are named is a 
variation of the first. It is also one which enables reference to a 
precise colour not presently visible. In this approach a moderated 
colour classification is combined with the name of an adjacent 
colour, thus indicating the direction in which a colour has been 
modified. Using this approach, a yellow which has been perceived as 
modified can be classified in a number of ways. For example, marr 
115 
ga9ga buthalak, ma~utji mikllllirr, is moderate yellow, reddish (literally, 
eye red-having/red-eyed), marr ga9ga buthalak, gundirnnirr is moderate 
yellow, brownish or brownish yellow, (literally br<:Mn-having) and 
marr ga9ga buthalak, mulkuminymirr is greenish yellow, (literally, . 
moderate yellCM blue-having). A variation of this second approach, one 
which appears to indicate a greater degree of departure from the focal 
colour uses a verbal form of the second colour term. Thus, a pure 
orange colour chip was described as miku marr ga~ga, buthalakthinya 
marr, (literally, red moderate; yellCM-becoire moderately) • 
The third way in which I discovered secondary colours being 
classified was practised by two people only. One of these was an 
elderly man who spent many years of his life in a leprosarium where 
English was necessary for communication. He uses quite a few English 
words in his normal vocabulary. The other was a man in his forties 
with considerable experience over at least fi:fteen years with Western 
water colour and oil painting techniques and pigment names. The way in 
which they were naming modified colour was to use one colour name to 
modify another. The examples of this from them are mo 1 mi ku (black red) , 
and mol gundirr (black brown). Other Yolnu have insisted that mol 
cannot be used to refer to light values, or to modify other colour 
terms and that the expressions mentioned are not correct. On these 
grounds, I have chosen to ignore this method of description as not 
reflecting traditional practices. 
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v: Good and bad colour. 
In discussing the naming of secondary colours, I mentioned in 
passing that the evaluations of intensity were based on criteria of. 
saturation and purity. In the examination of pigment samples and of 
colour charts, thes·e criteria emerged consistently as the basis of 
evaluations, although adherence to, or deviation from them was 
perceived to take a variety of forms. 
Two separate assessments were made for me by different Yolnu who 
examined the B & K chart as a whole entity in contrast to examining 
and identifying the separate colours. Figure 4 :2 records the results of 
one of these. He assessed the complete colour range, separating those 
colours which were considered mel .Q_arrtjalk (eye clean) from those 
which were not. Figure 4:3 shows the assessment made by a different man 
~v /!/ ~ 
1/1/ ll l/ ]/ l/ v II vll 
llV v v 1/1/ Ill/ l/V 11 [/ II [/ /II II 
I/)/ v v llV vv [/]/ 1J v I/ 11 /[/ l1V 1111 \I l/ Ill.I V[/ 11) l/[) I [I !J 
JV v vv l/IJ IJ! J IJIJ !J 11 !Ji) 11) ll/ lJ l/ lJ llJ 111 
/[/ v IJ J ) ) JIJ Ii/ I J I IJ 1111 l/11 
I/I/ l/IJ 11 J J I J I J 
Figure 4:2. Identification of mel darrtjalk (clean eye)colours on 
the B and K chart . 
who separated those colours which he considered miny'tji manymak 
(colour good) from the rest which were described as yMtjkurru (bad). 
though he did not name the colours he considered as "good". 
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. 
Both of these men made the evaluations spontaneously in an endeavour 
to help me understand Yolnu perceptions. In each case the colours 
selected were those which would be described as the most highly 
saturated. Black and white were not included in the choice of favoured 
colours, and this is almost certainly due to the structure of the 
B and K chart which has separated both black and white from the main 
chart. In contrast to this omission of black and white, the earlier 
discussed dramatisation of shopping in the store (page 100) indicated 
that both intense black and clear white are considered as good colours . 
. . ..... I 
1:. :: ~.t 
. .. . ., ., 
.• ~ •• •."' :· ~·· ·.J 
. . 
1\. ·.: 
! .;, ·:· ; 
·.· .. · ... · 
· .... , . 
\ .. . 
" . ~ . 
Figure 4:3. Identification on the B and K chart of miny'tji manymak 
(good colour). 
The Yolnu use a number of other terms to evaluate the quality 
of colour in addition to the above. For example, mMrr ~athirriya~u 
means "not good enough", "not a pure or representative specimen", or 
"not a true sample". It is used in the selection of pigment specimens 
when they are tested by rubbing on the surface of a rock. In that 
context it refers to a specimen which contains the required colour, 
but which is not considered pure enough. Such a specimen may be a 
reddish stone which is too brown or a yellow which is too red. The 
same expression is applied to fruit indicating that while it is 
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not unripe, it is not quite fully ripe, and therefore the colour of 
a perfectly ripe specimen has not been fully expressed. When the term 
is applied to colour it thus is an evaluation which sa;ys in effect 
that the item is usable when nothing better is available but not 
really what is wanted and not the perfect example of a colour. 
C olours ma;y also be assessed as having another substance or 
colour combined with them in some wa;y which reduces their concentration 
or purity. A colour ma;y also be described as bulu~ga (dirtied), defined 
as "like rainwater which falls clean but now lies in a puddle where it 
is muddied"). There are · a number of other words which describe a 
similar perception of reduction in intensity through dirt or impurity. 
Alternatively, what is perceived as an impure specimen of a colour 
ma;y be impure because of the intrusion of -another colour. For example, 
a yellow may be described as miktJTiirr (red-having) a description applied 
to what in English would be considered as orange or orange-yellow, 
or it could be mulktJTiinymirr (blue~having) which would describe what 
was in English a greenish yellow. Each of these evaluations indicates 
the perception of ideals of colour which are represented by the named 
primary colours with any divergence from that ideal representing a 
qualitative reduction in both concentration and purity. 
vi: Variation in the assessment of the Berlin and Kay chart. 
In using the B & K chart, I used the same approach for 
all eleven informants in that all were asked first for the names of the 
colours, and were then requested to identify them on the chart.I was 
not able, because of field conditions, to use a single recording 
technique with all informants, but worked as opportunity presented 
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A 
E 
• • • • • • • c ••• 
. . . . ., • • • • • • • ••• # • 
••••• 
F 
Figure 4:4. Discrimination of six colours.Colour (•) and Moderate colour. 
A: watharr D: mulkuminy 
B: buthalak E: gapa!!_ 
C: miku F: lirrgi 
....... , ..... 
, . . 
c 
D ' ..... ' 
. . . . . . , .... • • • 
• 
• r 
F ••• , . 
• 
Figure 4:5.Seven colour named. Intense Colour(•) and Moderate Colour. 
A: watharr D: mulkLJTiiny 
B: buthalak E: gundirr 
c: mi k u F: mo 1 
G: gul u~ul 
A 
, ..... . 
D 
. . . . , .. 
• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
E 
•••• c 
•••• 
••••••• 
••••••• 
• •••••• 
Figure 4:6.Five colours named. Intense 
A: watharr 
Colour (•) and Moderate 
D: milkLJTiiny 
Colour. 
B: gangul E: gurr~an 
c: mi ku 
.•..••............ , .. 
A 
.... , .. 
' ... ' .... D 
.. ' . ' 
. , ..... , 
Figure 4:7.Five colours named. Colour (•) and Moderate Colour. 
• 
c 
. , 
• 
• 
• 
• ••• 
A: watharr 
B: buthalak 
C: miku 
A 
D: mulktininy 
E: mol 
A 0 
D 
••••• 
• ••• 
. ... , .............. '"'' ····· ..... ·~ 
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Figure 4:8. Four colours named. 
A: watharr 
B: buthalak 
Colour(•) 
C: miku 
D: mol 
Moderate Colour 
and Focal Point ( 0 } . 
Figure 4:9. Seven colours named. Boundaries are of greatest area 
assigned to each colour. Focal point (I ) 
A: watharr D: mul kuminy 
B: buthalak E: gurr~an/mol 
C: miku F: ratjpa 
G: gundi rrmi rr 
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itself. Variations in the recording technique and the amount of 
information requested (see figure 15) did not effect the structures of 
the evaluations, but did cause variations consistent with the 
particular technique employed. These reveal some clear indications 
about the nature of Yolnu perception of colour that would not have been 
available without the variation. 
With one man, all colours were identified in such a way that he 
could see all his assessments simultaneously (figure 4:4}. He indicated 
no overlaps between colours, nor between two classifications within the 
domains of any one colour. In presenting this precise separation of 
classifications he was showing that for him they were perceived as being 
sharply divided and distinct from one another with definite boundaries 
between them . Four people had each colour with its modification recorded 
before proceeding to the next colour. .Of these four, two were asked .to 
indicate the zone of their colour then to indicate areas that were 
moderately that colour (figures 4:7 and 4:8). The other two (figures 4:5 
and 4:6), were asked to indicate the intense examples of their colours 
and then the moderated form of them. None of these people made overlaps 
between the boundaries of the two assessments of each colour.(Though 
in the figures I have enclosed one within the other) . Thus the four of 
them were also indicating that their classifications were sharply 
divided and distinct. However, the two elderly men responsible for the 
evaluations shown in figures 4:5 and 4:7 both remarked as they were 
assessing the moderate classifications that some of the chips were 
mixtures of two primary colours and could be classified both ways. 
For example, one colour chip could be classed as both moderate red and 
moderate white, and another one could be both moderate yellow and 
moderate white. In making these connnents they showed an awareness that 
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A (background of chart) 
Figure 4:10. Seven colours named. 
A: watharr 
B: buthalak 
c: mi ku 
D: mulkuminy 
Figure 4:11. Five colours named. 
Figure 4:12. 
A: watharr 
B: butha l ak 
C: miku 
Eight colours 
A: watharr 
B: buthalak 
C: miku 
D: mulkuminy 
named. 
D 
, II II• II II • II II II 
...... , , . 
. , , ..... . 
Intense Colour ( • ) and Moderate. 
E: mol/gurrnan 
F:gundirr 
G: gula9gula~ 
Colour ( ' ) 
' 
Moderate Colour , 
D: mo l and Focal Point ((J). 
E: ratjpa 
Colour ( , ) and Moderate Colour. 
E: mi lklJlliny 
F: ratj pa 
G: gundirr 
H: mol 
Figure 4:13. Eight colours named. Intense colour(~), 
and Moderate colour. 
c 
~Colour zone (more intense colour = •) 
(\)Colour zone (more intense colour = ' ) 
A: miku E: buthalak 
B: l arrani borum 
C: yol~unydja larra.!!_i 
D: mulkuminy 
• • 
A 
F: gamunu9gu 
G: mol 
H: ratjpa 
....... , .. 
••• 
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Figure 4:14.Four colours named. Intense colour(•) and moderate colour. 
A: watharr C: miku 
B: buthalak D: mol 
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there were different ways of assessing colour. For example,it 
was possible to assess the colour of the chips, or alternatively, 
one could select the chips which represented particular colours. 
In the evaluation of the B and K chart they were being asked to 
follow the latter approach, therefore their evaluations showed clear 
boundaries between classifications of "colour" and "not that colour" • 
.As a result also, some areas of the chart were le:f't unclassified, being 
considered as "non-relevant colour" or "unnamed colour" in relation to 
the colours being identified. 
The remaining six people who examined the chart were asked to 
make each assessment of color, modified colour or intense colour 
separately. Each of these separate assessments was recorded and then 
erased before the next one was made. Two of these six, (figures 4:9 
and 4:10) were asked first for the zones of their named colours, next to 
identify the areas of intensity of those colours and then finally the 
zones of moderation. In doing this I attempted to ask for the assessment 
of colours which were not adjacent to the one just completed. The next 
two(figures 4:11 and 4:12) I asked for the domain of each generalised 
colour named, for the moderation of each colour, and then for the 
focal point of each colour. The last two people were asked for the 
intensity of some colours, the general zone of others and the 
moderations of each (figures 4:13 and 4:14). One of these last two 
was then also asked to indicate the focal point of each colour. 
Four of these last six people, in making their assessments, 
showed overlaps of the boundaries between primary colours and of the 
boundaries between the categories of each colour. One, (figure 4:12), 
showed no overlaps except between two categories of a single colour. 
The last of the six (figure 4:14), was a young well educated man with, 
125 
Figure No. Recording Procedure Information Requested Results 
4 All colours recorded Indicate colours named six colour 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
on chart and all and then moderation of with no 
visible at one time. each colour. 
Two zones of one 
colour on chart 
then erased 
before next 
colour started. 
Each assessment 
of any kind 
made 
separately and 
erased before 
next assessment 
made. 
Indicate intensity of 
colour and then 
moderation.of it. 
Indicate colour named 
and then moderation of 
that colour. 
Indicate general zone 
intensity and 
moderation of each 
colour 
Indicate general and 
moderate zones of 
each colour and 
focal point of each. 
Indicate two zones 
of each colour 
overlaps 
Overlaps only 
between 
moderations 
of adjacent 
colours 
1--~~~~~~~~~ 
No overlaps 
No overlaps 
between intense 
and moderate , 
overlapping of 
most adjacent 
moderations. 
Overlaps of 
moderate reds 
only 
Small dc:a:nains 
with no 
overlaps 
Much overlapping 
No overlapping. 
Figure 4:15. Variations in the approach to the Berlin and Kay Chart. 
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at the time, severe emotional problems. He found real difficulty ma.king 
each of his assessments. The collation of these shows quite small 
domains of each category and no overlapping of boundaries at all. In 
each case where people were asked to indicate the focal points of 
colours these were located within the"intense" classification domains. 
In these varied assessments there appears to be a definite 
correlation between the recording style and the results obtained. 
(see figure 4:15). Where classifications are recorded without reference 
to one another, there tended to be overlapping between adjacent 
categories, and sometimes overlapping of more distant ones. The type 
of relationship between categories produced by this recording approach 
is schematised in figure 4:16. 
Figure 4:16. Relationships between categories evaluated separately 
11 I I = "intense" colour 
\\~or ,f;:// = "moderate" colour. 
= "general" colour 
A,B,C,- F.= focal points of 
each colour. 
Where the individual's assessment was visible on the chart in 
front of him, he gave no chip more than one classification, and there 
were therefore no overlaps between the boundaries of categories. This 
type of classification is schematised in figure 4:17. 
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The first of these two patterns appears to record what the Yolnu 
apprehend with the physical sense of sight. In this approach the person 
examines the whole of a continuum of colour in an attempt to identify 
every colour chip which can be considered as representative of a 
particular colour classification. This results in the indication of a 
domain of colour being identified which includes a range from the best 
examples to those which only partially express it. With different people 
there is variation in the extent of this range, but for each individual 
the process is the same. The result is that those chips which can be 
considered as representing a mixture of two or more colours will be 
given that many separate classifications. The overlapping of categories 
clearly indicates that the Yolnu both apprehend with the physical 
senses the full continuum of colour across the spectrum represented 
by the colour chart, and are able to verbalise it. 
Figure 4:17. Relations between classifications when all are visible 
on the chart simultaneously. (Coding as for figure 4: 16) 
The second of the patterns, (figure 4:17) appears to indicate 
perceptions ·as they are constrained by culturally standardised 
classificatory principles. In accordance with these, the colour c~ips 
are allocated to distinct relational classes. The evaluations then 
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reflect the structures which exist at the cognitive level and they 
demonstrate the way in which continuum is dealt with in the culture by 
by classification into discontinuous classes. 
In these assessments of the B and K chart, it is the contrasting 
structures of the evaluations established in the two contra.sting types 
of evaluations which are significant for this discussion, not the 
evaluations themselves. In the first type, the assessment is not 
relational, and the results reflect physical perception. In the second 
the assessment is constrained by culturally established criteria, and 
the results reflect the imposition of the cognitive structures on 
perception. 
vii: Variations in the meanings of evaluations according to context. 
I have shown in figure 4:1 the three part classification of 
natural or physical colour and pigments from two different evaluative 
approaches, physical and metaphysical. By establishing a hypothetical 
set of five colours, and pigment samples representative of them, it 
is possible to demonstrate the relative nature of the classifications 
of them. I have schematised these relations in figure 4:18. At the top 
of the figure, I have placed the hypothetical samples. The first line 
of evaluations illustrates the classifications which could be made of 
the pigment and colour samples from a metaphysical approach in which 
the focus is on the purity and concentration of the "colour" 
represented by the pigment transformation from a person's own site. In 
that context, a really good pigment sample from another site is only 
relatively good or average by comparison. The second line of the 
figure illustrates how the evaluations from the same metaphysical 
perspective are likely to be applied when there is an absence of the 
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Perspective Different Mixed Average Concentrated Pigment 
of focus of Colour or Colour Sample Colour or from own 
Evaluation Pigment or Colour or Pigment from (sacred) 
Pigment Pigment other site site 
In terms of Moderate 
"ideal" Not "x" "x" "x" Intense"x" 
Absence of Moderate 
better Not"x" "x" "x" ~ntense 
samples "x" 
In terms of Moderate 
"colour" Not "x" "x" "x" Intense"x" 
Figure 4:18. Relations between classifications made in different contexts. 
"better" (one's own) pigments. This could apply particularly if there 
is a situation of urgency in the need for a particular coloured 
pigment as when painting a corpse or preparing for mortuary rites. 
The bottom line of the figure represents how the evaluation is applied 
where the focus is on the colour and the approach to evaluation is in 
terms of physical properties. Thus while the structure of the relations 
between the evaluations remains consistently three part, the meaning 
of each evaluation remains relative both to the other evaluations and 
to the perspective from which evaluations are made. 
viii: Conclusions. 
In this chapter I have discussed in detail, various aspects of 
Yolnu classification and conceptualisation of colour. Examination of the 
material reveals that the Yolnu have developed solutions to two different 
kinds of problems. The first of these is related to pragmatic issues 
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concerning the classification and evaluation of colour. These involve 
answering such questions as, "What colour is this?", "Is this red?", and 
"What quality of red is this?". The second is related to metaphysical 
issues concerning the innate nature of colour and of pigments and the 
relations between them. It involves answering such questions as "What is 
colour?". 
I consider first Yolnu solutions to the pragmatic problems 
restricting the discussion at this stage to considerations related to 
colour only. Issues concerning the relation between colours and pigments 
are dealt with in association with the metaphysical problems. The 
pragmatic issues can be divided up into roughly three areas each of 
which can be linked to one of the three questions used above as examples. 
I use these questions as a focus in discussing each of the respective 
problem areas. 
The first problem area concerns the identification of the colours 
with which the Yolnu are confronted. It relates to the question, "What 
colour is this1". In confronting this problem the Yolnu have divided up 
the colour continuum in relation to identifiable colour referents as I 
have shown, these range from the colours of four or five pigments to 
the colours of fruit, sky, or other objects. The result has been the 
establishment of an open-ended lexicon of colour terms under a general 
category "colours". Structurally this solution can be considered as being 
composed of a class, colour, which has a number of members. The number 
of members appears to be irrelevant beyond the fact that the current 
minimum is four. On this basis, the members of the minimal lexicon can 
be listed as; "a", "b", "c", "d" and "n", where "n" represents not a 
category, but an open end to the lexicon through which other items may 
be added. The thought behind such an addition appears to be not that 
the item is new in terms of existence, but that it is new in terms of 
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recognition and of being separately distinguished. Any colour, for 
example "a", is perceived to have its own distinguishing features which 
are characteristic of its identity. Its identity is then represented 
by the expression of those features, while the contrasting features of 
any other colour, for example "b", are those which distinguish it from 
"a". The structure of the relationship between class and classmember and 
and between the members themselves can then be represented as in 
figure 4:19, by a simple taxonomic-like tree diagram. 
Class 
Class Members 
Colour I 
, 7 .:.e:, .... __ -
,,,," I ', ' .... : .::: :=,: - -
c;~f EJ EJt~st~rEJ 
Figure 4 :19. Structural relations within the class "colour". 
The Yolnu who use additional colour terms simply add them at the 
same level without considering this as altering the structure. For 
example, "x". Where they distinguish what appear to be "varieties" of red 
such as miku (red-ochre red), larraD_i (apple), gulangulan (blood) or 
ratjpa (haematite), these are used, not as sub-categories of red, but as 
separate and distinct members of the class "colour"on the same level of 
classification as each other. This was shown particularly in the 
responses recorded on the I.S . C.C. charts of colour chips. Where 
each separate"red" was named there was then a reduction in the 
range of colour assigned each of the adjacent colours. Confusion 
comes where the Western term "red" has been consistently translated as 
miku (red:::_ochre red), and attempts have then been made to force the 
11 
other terms into a sub-category level where they do not fit. 
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The second pragmatic problem area considered by the Yolnu relates 
to the boundaries established for the members of the colour lexicon. 
The simple question "Is this 'b'?",indicates an assumption that an ideal 
for the colour "b" has been established, and can be recognised by the 
presence of certain attributes. The Yolnu answer to the question is 
either "Yes" or "No", and the structure of the solution is that of the 
b • • t • b t "b" d II I I II . inary opposi ion e ween an not b . There does not appear to be 
any assumption that "not 'b'" will be a particular opposite colour. 
That is the colours are not paired in oppositions, but each is 
contrasted against all others in the lexicon. 
It appears that in the establishment of boundaries for particular 
colours such as miku (red-ochre red) or gangul (yellow), precise colour 
foci have been selected, and then all colours which could be considered 
as in any way representing its attributes have been classified with it. 
This has resulted in each colour term being used to classify a wide 
section of the colour continuum. It has also raised for the Yolnu the 
th~rd problem, that of the evaluation of the relations between the colour 
foci and particular colour samples which, while falling within a general 
colour classification, may not match its focal point. 
The Yolnu have chosen to relate these non-focal colours to the 
foci of the colour lexicon through an evaluative frame which appears to 
be inevitably composed of three categories. Each of these maintains a 
consistent relation to the others irrespective of the Yolnu vocabulary 
which is used to describe or classify them as shown in figure 4:20. The 
classifications are o~en given in answer to, or as modifications of the 
answer to the first question. In fact they are answers to the (covert) 
third question, "What quality of 'x' is this?". 
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CATEGORIES TERMINOLOGY USED. 
1: Moderately "x" mMrr gaQga "x" (moderate "x") 
(moderate, impure or bulu9ga "x" (dirty "x") 
diluted "x") m~rr manymak "x" (moderately good "x") 
"xii' 11y 11 -mirr ("x" diluted with colour "y" 
2: Generally "x" "xii 
(ordinary/average "x") manymak "x" (good "x") 
3: Focal "x". mirithirr "x" (very much "x") 
(Concentrated or pure "x") mel darrtjalk "x" (clean-eyed "x") 
mirithirr manymak "x" (very good "x") 
Figure 4:20. Evaluative Categories and Yolnu Terminology. 
These three categories are relational statements, relative to each 
other and to the perceived nature of "x" as determined by the solution 
to the yet to be discussed philosophical problems. 
The second kind of problem considered by the Yolnu is concerned 
with the nature of colour and of pigments, and with the relations between 
them. Linked with the consideration of these issues are the Yolnu 
metaphysical investigations into the relationships between the tangible 
elements of the physical world and the intangible elements of the 
supernatural. In simple question form the problem area is confronted by 
asking, "What is 'x'?", where 'x' can be either colour or pigment. The 
varied answers given by the Yolnu enable an exploration of their 
assumptions concerning the nature of colour and pigment and an analysis 
of the structures used in framing those answers. 
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In the ethnographic sections of this chapter I have demonstrated 
that the Yolnu do perceive relationships between the colours of pigments 
and the colours of other things. They have also been shown to see 
relationships between the coloured pigments and the supernatural dimension 
of the creative beings. In relation to this latter, they appear to have 
assumed that,that which exists,is in essence unchanging, and perhaps 
unalterable, although the external appearance or form may change or be 
changed. This notion is perhaps best exemplified in the red pigment 
from Balawalanur on Howard Island (see page 103). In its natural state 
this is a greyish-white clay which has to be roasted before it turns 
red. Before roasting it is referred to as miku (normally red, or red 
pigment) without being visibly the colour miku. After roasting it is 
miku and its colour is also miku, a colour which can be rubbed off onto 
other things making them also miku. In each of these forms, the grey 
clay, the red colour, and the red pigment, it is known to be 
simultaneously the actual faeces and blood of an ancestral dugong. Its 
essential nature is thus perceived to be all of these things irrespective 
of the external appearances of the current transformation. 
This notion was further demonstrated in the earlier craftroom 
discussion (page 96) where a piece of red-coloured pigment was described 
as really yellow that had changed its outward expression of colour. It 
is known that heat will change the colour, but for the Yolnu, this 
change is considered to be in outward appearance only. Although the 
outward appearance was red, the pigment was gangul (normally yellow or 
yellow pigment) from a particular site at Mirrnatja, and was the yellow 
fat of an ancestral green turtle. The essential nature of the substance, 
linked to yellow was unchanged, and still called gangul irrespective of 
the red outward appearance. The consideration which is in focus then, is 
neither colour nor pigment but the essential nature of the supernatural 
which is expressed in each. 
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From the metaphysical approach there are three forms in which the 
essential nature is expressed. In the first it is present in a tangible 
form, but not expressed. This is exemplified in the miku which is an 
unroasted grey clay, or the "yellow" ochre which looks red. The second 
expression of the essential nature is that of colour. It appears that the 
colour of the pigment, the colour of things coated with it, and it seems 
that of any item which is naturally or even artificially that colour can 
be perceived as being an expression of the essential nature. The third 
and most intense expression of the nature is that in the pigment form. 
This last expression is both the colour and the essential nature of the 
ancestral item transformed, and has in some way the power to transform 
. 12 
other items into its likeness. 
The relations between these three forms are analogous to the 
relations between the three categories of physical colour. The first form 
of the essential nature and the first category of colour represent 
partial or incomplete expressions of the particular focus of 
classification. The second classifications are analogous in that they 
represent generalised expressions of the particular qualities in focus 
when these are compared to the third classifications which represent the 
"ideal". The "ideal" in each case can be considered as equivalent to an 
absolute representation of the quality being considered. The relations 
between these classifications are compared in figure 4:21. 
In addition to the analogous' relations between the two three-part 
structures, the Yolnu perceive a continuum to exist between them as 
outlined in figure 4:22. Because the same classifications are made at 
more than one level, it is possible for the Yolnu to answer the question 
"What is 'x'?" at more than one level. The classification of "not 
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colour 'x'" on the physical line becomes identified with the 
classification of "non-expression" of "x" on the metaphysical line, 
enabling the Yolnu to consider that "not colour" does not mean the same 
as "non-existence". That is, existence is able to be considered as 
continuing even when not visually apparent. The second or central 
metaphysical classification of "x" has meaning as, "generally expressing 
the colour of 'x'" and as "generally expressing the nature of 'x' ". In 
either case, "x" can be considered as a pigment, its colour, or the 
metamorphosis of a particular ancestor. 
Classifications Category 1. Category 2. Category 3. 
of Colour. moderate, impure, ordinary, concentrated 
diluted "x" average "x". or pure "x" 
Classifications Form 1. Form 2. Form 3. 
of Essential partial general physical solid, 
Nature. expression or expression or concentrated 
non-visual visual pure 
expression expression expression. 
Figure 4:21. Comparison between classifications of colour and of the 
"essential nature" of pigments. 
The use of the one name for the pigment, for its colour, and for 
or 
the other differently coloured forms in which it occurs, is an expression 
not of the use of the name of one to name the other, nor is it a 
metaphoric reference from one to the other, but the use of one name to 
identify related expressions of the one essential nature. Thus when a 
blue coloured chip is related to the colour of sky or water, what is 
perceived is an expression of the essential nature of these things. 13 
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Non-colour General Physical Colour "x" Pigment "x II . 
expression of General expression of natureof "x" Nature "x" 
nature of "x" 
Not Physically Partial "x" Generally "x" Pure "x" More than 
colour "x" physically 
Physically colour "x" colour "x" 
Figure 4:22. Relations between physical and metaphysical classifications 
of the colour "x". 
When other previously unnamed colours are named, they are seen as I 
argued earlier, not as named a~er some object but as expressing something 
of the object and thus as being a different expression of its nature. 
Jones and Meehan (1978:34) suggest for the Anbarra that there is "the 
implication that the actual pigment is within the entity that has that 
colour". I would argue that for the Yolnu, the essential nature of any 
item of a particular colour is potentially identifiable as expressing 
the essential nature of any ancestral being identified with that same 
colour. 
NITTES. 
1: For example, Berlin and Kay (1969), Durbin (1972), Jones and 
Meehan (1978), Brown and Witkowski (1980), and Hargrave (1982). 
2: For example, Berlin and Kay (1969), and Witkowski and Brown (1981). 
3: For example, Jones and Meehan (1978), Hallpike (1979) and 
Turton ( 1980). 
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4: : The other two charts were made up from ISCC-NBS Centroid Color 
standard colour chips. One of these was the set of ISCC-NBS Color-
-Name Charts, The other a freely arranged spectr1.lll1 of the chips. 
All three charts were covered with clear celluloid enabling responses 
to be recorded with chinagraph prior to transfer to record sheets. 
5: The correct wordings for the different questions were as follows: 
Nha dhuwalanydja mala miny'tji? 
What this group colour/design? 
(asking about the multiple items). 
Nha dhuwalanydja miny'tji? 
What this colour/design? 
(asking about the item as a whole). 
Yolku malaw miny'tji? 
Whose group's colour/design? 
(of people) 
(asking about the design ownership). 
6: Morphy (1977:92-93) discusses other examples of the use of the 
word miny'tji. 
7: See notes 1 and 2 above. 
8: It is this process which I have shown to be the means of 
increasing the colour lexicon. 
9: I investigated whether there was any difference between the perceptions 
of colour with matt surface and that with highly reflective surfaces 
such as coloured aluminium foils. Discrimination was made between 
the shiny and dull surfaces but the colours were treated as unaffected 
by these. 
10: This perception appears to be very closely linked to the perceptions 
of transformations of creative beings, a view which holds that a 
t~ansformation is essentially the creative being in a different form. 
This notion appears to be relatively widespread throughout Australia. 
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Munn (1970:141-163) discusses it in relation to the Walbiri and 
Pitjantjatjara, and Strehlow (1947) describes it in use by the Aranda. 
11: The Yolnu do have sub-categories of some classes as I show in 
Chapters Two and Five. There is therefore a cognitive level 
structure which exists for sub-classification. The evidence from 
my field investigations however is overwhelmingly in support of 
the argument that in the domain of colour, all terms used as 
primary terms in the sense that I have described are treated as 
on the same classificatory level. 
12: In certain situations, particularly related to ceremonial, the 
object thus painted, instead of being seen as symbolic of the 
essential nature, is seen as possessing and expressing and perhaps 
even as being transformed into that nature, thus causing the 
intangible ancestral being to become tangible in a new 
metamorphosis. 
13: In the next chapter I show that both sea and sky are perceived 
to have or express life. Thus there appears to be a link 
between the essential nature of all things and some attribute 
of life. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF LIFE AND EXISTENCE. 
The classifications applied by the Yolnu to living and existing 
things are many and varied. My concern is to identify the different 
systems used in these classifications and to discover the structures 
of those systems. 
The following discussion falls into two main sections. In the 
first I consider Yolnu categories of life and existence, and various 
concepts associated with the allocation of items to those categories. 
In the second I examine different systems of classification applied to 
one of these first Yolnu categories, that of "Naturally Living Things". 
The second section contains the main body of data, which is dealt with 
from three different perspectives. First I consider matters relevant 
to species and sub-species levels of classification. Subsequent to this 
I examine a range of classifications applied to the species and thirdly 
the types of variations encountered in the classifications made by 
different Yolnu. 
1: Categories of Life and Existence. 
The Yolnu have divided what they perceive to be the total 
environment of existing things into five categories. Each of these is 
distinguished from the others by the mode in which they express the 
characteristics of life. These categories include all things which have 
a physical form and which are able to be apprehended with the physical 
senses. They also include those things of an intangible nature which are 
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understood to have existence, but which cannot normally be considered 
to have a physical form. I discuss first the attributes by which these 
five categories are distinguished and then examine the structural 
relations between them. 
Figure 5:1 gives an outline of the simplest of these 
distinguishing features, with reference to a representative item 
from each category. There is seen by the Yolnu to be a contrast 
between the physical things which are walaamirr (life-having/ 
life-expressing) and those which are walQamiriw (life-without/ 
life-not-expressing) . Those which are "life-having" are considered to 
fall into different categories each of which expresses a qualitatively 
different attribute of "life". 
Category 1 2 3 4 5 
~ rock sun u animal man spiritual 
Physical + + + + -
Life-having - + + + + 
Moving - + + + +or-
Breathing 
- -
+ + +or-
Law-keeping - - - + + 
Abnormal 
- - - -
+ 
(Law status) 
Figure 5:1. Basic attributes of five categories of existence. 
In the category "life-without" are those thing which do not move 
themselves and those things which have had life in some way and now are 
dead. Rocks, sand and earth are included, as are the ochres (in the 
sense of being physical materials), and the whole of the physical 
landscape. The dead wood of trees, the empty shells of shellfish and the 
bones of animals of all kinds including human , are remains of items 
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which have had life and now do not. Implements such as canoes and 
spears do not move themselves, so they are included in this category . 
Fresh water which has become stagnant or polluted, such as rain water 
which has become muddied in a puddle is also considered to be 
"non-living". 
The first of the categories of living things includes things 
which move themselves and those which have an effect on others. This 
latter may be by causing them to change in some way, by actively 
changing them or by causing them to move. At this point Yolnu 
perception is quite different from that of Western society, which 
would place all the items in this category into a Western "non- living" 
category. 
For the Yolnu, the sea or salt water is "life-having". Two 
People gave different justifications for their assessments of it as 
belonging to this category. The first said it was because "You can see 
it moving, the second said, "It drowns people". Fresh water is 
"life-having" when it is still fresh and drinkable as"when it has fallen 
into a clean rock hole. It also has the capacity to "refresh the life 
of plants". Rain fits this category for the same reasons. I was told 
that clouds move, and change in shape, size and colour, "so they must 
be alive". Fire is alive, "touch it and you will find out". The sun gives 
light "for Yolnu and trees and what all else", so it with moon and stars 
which also move across the sky, is "life-having". Trucks and cars are 
also "life-having" whether they are actually moving or not, as long as 
the engine will work. Once a vehicle breaks down it "dies" and hence no 
longer belongs to this category but transfers to the category of 
"life-without" things. 
While it was movement or the potential to change or cause change 
which most characterised the first category of "life-having", the second 
category is characterised by the ability to breathe or to reproduce. As 
one person observed most of them are yanaramirr (tail-having), ya~ara 
being the tail of animals and birds, fish and stingrays, a part of the 
fleshy structure of shellfish, and the trailing or climbing stem of many 
root fqods. All of these things then fall into this second category of 
"life-having". 
The characteristics of this group which exemplify "life" are not 
always easily visible, but a number of justifications were given for 
each of the above-mentioned items being included. Shellfish which are 
attached to rocks,"squirt when you touch them" and that shows that they 
are breathing. The opening and closing of bivalves and the retraction of 
univalves into their shells was also seen as breathing. All plants are 
known to grow from seeds, " You can see that because when you pull up 
the prickly grass from round the camp and burn it, other prickles grow 
up again from the seeds". Similarly the cycad palm is observed to drop 
its seeds and the various stages of their transformation into new 
plants are known and named . Animals of all kinds and marine 
vertebrates and crustaceans are all in this group as they all have 
all three of the above-named characteristics. 1 
The third category of "life-having" things is the only one which 
is lexically marked. It is the category YolDu (human or person).There 
are a number of features which are seen to distinguish humans as a 
category from all others. Largely these are described as the presence of 
those features absent from the previous categories, or the absence of 
some of those present. For example, humans don't have tails as the 
members of the previous category do. In contrast , they do have ~aya9u 
(the location of the emotions), so they are able to forgive others 
and to contribute to the well being of others, while as one person 
suggested, using kangaroos as an example of the "naturally living" 
things, "it is characteristic of kangaroos that they do not forgive 
2 
one another. Humans have and keep laws while animals do not, and 
humans are also dju~unymirr (with understanding) so that, unlike 
animals, when they have experiences they learn from them. Finally, 
humans have spirits which continue to exist after death, whereas 
the members of the other two "life-having" categories do not. 3 
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The final category is one basically concerned with "spiritual" 
existence, and is established as a category through the Yolnu 
metaphysical approach to existence. It includes the non-physical 
remains of humans af'ter death, as well as a number of other things. 
There is considerable variation between Yolnu as to what items do 
fit into this category, and where there is agreement as to the 
inclusion of an item, there is of'ten some variation in the perception 
of its nature or its definition. It ' appears that anything in any way 
spiritual or supernatural can be included in the one classification. 
If there are any sub di visions, these did not appear in my discussions 
with the Yolnu. Into the category come the creative ancestors (wa~arr), 
who were physically alive in the distant past. These beings are now 
non-physically present, though they have left physical manifestations of 
themselves in ceremonial objects and in many transformations in the 
physical environment. These transformations are able to be perceived 
from two different perspectives. Viewed with the focus on their 
spiritual attributes, things like pigments, landforms and man-made 
objects which are normally in the "without life" category are all 
considered to have non-physical or supernatural attributes and to 
belong to the category of "spiritual" things . 4 
There appear to be two aspects of the after-life existence of 
humans which also belong to the "spiritual" category. First there is 
the birrimbirr which appears to be an after death transformation of what 
the Yolnu see as the normal non-physical part of humans. Secondly there 
is the mokuy, a term with a number of distinct meanings. One meaning of 
the word is the after death transformation of the physical form of a 
person, a transformation which appears to express the less pleasant 
characteristics of the deceased. When there is a death, the dead person 
is referred to as mokuy. In that context, the reference is to both the 
physical corpse, and to the person who has died. In addition to those 
uses of the word, there area. number of named and distinct spirit beings 
which are collectively given the name mokuy. These are associated with 
particular clans and believed to dwell in particular locations in the 
clan territory such as in a named section of rainforest or of the open 
Eucalyptus forest. Each of these is known to carry on activities similar 
to humans but in an exaggerated form. 
The relationships between the meanings associated with the members 
of this "spiritual" category is complex and cannot be fully explored 
in this thesis. It is sufficient to state that the menbers of the 
category are perceived to exist, and to recognise that together they 
fall into a single generalised category which can best be described 
as "spiritual" existence. 
The Yolnu have been able to establish the five categories of 
existence by focussing on the attributes as described above. It 
is now possible, having discussed each of them separately, to consider 
the relations between them. In their discussions of these categories 
the Yolnu frequently combined a physical perception of them with a 
metaphysical perception. For the purpose of examining them I will attempt 
to separate the two and then to show their inter-relations. 
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All physical things are included in the first four categories. The 
vernacular terms wal~amirr (living/life-having) and wal~amiriw (life-
-without) indicate a basic dichotomy between those things which have or 
are expressing some attributes of the quality "living", and those which 
are not. Each of the three categories of "life-having" things forms a 
part of one side of this dichotomy, and each of them separately is able 
to be seen as structurally in opposition to the category of "non-living". 
Each of them is also seen as containing items which in varying degrees 
express attributes of the quality "life". The first of these categories 
includes those things which least express "life". The second, that which 
includes animals and plants, expresses a more intense quality of life and 
the third or human category, the most intense expression of life. I have 
for the sake of clarity,chosen to identify the first category as 
"expressing life", the second as "naturally alive" and the third as 
"human life", as these terms convey something of the Yolnu perceptions 
of the categories. The categories of physical things can thus be 
considered, as shown in figure 5:2, as lying along a continuum from less 
to more intense expressions of life, from non-living to human. 5 
-E--------~-1 Living I 
I expres si:g· ~~:.-,-t:a~-::~~y- ~i~~ 1 r~~n Life I I Non-living 
-<--- - - - Continuum - of- Expression- of- Life 
Less Expression More Expression 
of Life of Life 
Figure 5:2. Relations between categories of Physical Things. 
The Yolnu metaphysical approach adds a further dimension to each 
of the first four categories and then includes a fifth category, 
"supernaturally alive". "Living" things become not just "living", but 
' 
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"physically living" things which are both physical, and express the 
quality of "life". "Non-living things are then perceived not as "not 
alive", but as being "physical" and as "not expressing" the quality 
"life". Thus there is a continuum. maintained, but along it an empha&.i& 
shi~ occurs such that there is a progressive transformation from 
physical to non-physical and from a non-expression of life to a 
supernatural expression of it. 
Different attributes of some items enable them to be 
included in both the polar categories so that the qualities of 
these items can be seen as in a relationship of opposition to the 
categories at both ends of the "living" continuum.. In this way the 
continuum is able (from a metaphysical approach) to be bent into a 
cyclical pattern with the same items at both ends. The category 
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Figure 5:3. Metaphysical relations between categories of Existence. 
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" t 1. . " b . t d . no - iving ecomes ins ea of a non-existence of life, a phase in the 
cycle of life. Simultaneously it can be considered that the life which 
exists in items in this category is in an opposite form or state such 
that the category represents a phase of non-expression rather than being 
a category of non-existence. Because of the contrast between the two 
sets of attributes in the items which fall into the two polar categories, 
there becomes not a completely circular continuum but a spiral structure 
in which a form of parallel or analogous relationship is perceived to 
exist between the two polar categories. I have attempted to illustrate 
the structural relations of this continuum in figure 5: 3 
2: Living Things. // 
i: The Species. 
a. The Recognition of Species 
The Yolnu consider that living things exist as a wide range of 
species, with each member of a species having the same kind of existence 
as every other member of it. There is no attempt to be exhaustive in the 
naming of species and while there are over six hundred named species, 
those that are named are the ones which are significant in some way or 
another. Unnamed species are known to exist. While these are generally 
ignored as insignificant, in a number of generic groups all small 
species are grouped together under a single term that appears to mean, 
"all small species of this class". For example,laaiaa are all small 
lizards, djikay are all small birds, and nyiknyik are all small 
marsupials. 
There is generally a direct correspondence between the Yolnu 
classifications of species and the scientific ones, though there are 
a number of variations from this. A number of scientifically separated 
species with very similar characteristics may be classed as a single 
species by the Yolnu. For example the yam bMwa9 represents two scientific 
species. In contrast to this, two Yolnu species, genydja and djan'pa 
were given the one scientific cl~ssification of Ficus virens. 6In terms 
of the analysis of classificatory structures, it is not important whether 
there is direct correspondence between the two systems or not and I 
include these examples only to show that there a.re variations. 
i:b. Discrimination Between Species. 
There appears to be no consistency in the choice of features by 
which species are distinguished. Rather it seems that discrimination is 
SPECIES 
garriwa 
Chelonia depressa 
Flat-back Turtle 
birr~arr 
Lepidochelys 
ulivacea 
Pacific Ridley 
guwarrtji 
Eretmochelys 
imbricata 
Hawksbill Turtle 
dhalwatpu 
Chelonia mydays 
Green Turtle 
gttrun 
Caretta caretta 
Loggerhead Turtle 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES 
s!_iltji bil kpil k 
back flat 
body like garriwa but s!_iltji gurriri and lays 
1 ittl e eggs back short 
garrupumirr 
having back covered with plates of turtleshell 
nyumuku.!:!_iny aurru 
little nose 
mMrr mol mulkurr 
moderately 
dark head 
mulkurr dumurr 
head large 
yindi s!_iltji, mol 
big back, dark. 
Figure 5:4. Distinctive features of five marine turtles. 
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on the basis of whatever features are prominent. Each species within a 
class or subclass may be distinguished from the others by a different 
characteristic. For example, there are five species pf marine turtles 
in the region and each of these is described (as in figure 5: 4) by its 
most prominent features. 
As can be expected from the descriptions of the first two of the 
above species, many of the Yolnu who now have limited hunting experience 
fail to distinguish between them. In contrast, the more experienced older 
men have no difficulties with identifying them even from photographs-. 
The features described above concentrate mostly, though not exclusively 
on shape. The precision with which they can also be explained visually 
by some individuals is shown in the following drawings (figures 5:5.a, 
and 5:5.b) which were done for me by the senior Golpa clan man. 
Neither of his drawings were ever miss-identified by other older men. 
a: g:irun b: dhalwatpu c: . miyapunu 
Figure 5:5. Two turtle species and a composite drawing.7 
In addition to shape and surface appearance, other attributes such 
as colour and habitat may also be significant as in the descriptions in 
figure 5:6 of three distinguished species of dolphins. 
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yinydjapana 9urru weyin nhakuna warrukay - lirra weyin 
nose long like barracuta teeth long 
ye 11 ow/white on underside, purple-brown body. 
buku-yul~u dhumbul 9urru yurr rumbal balanya bili yinydjapana 
short nose but body . just the same as ,, 
light yellow-brown body - short teeth,galki maniaur 
(lives) close river-at: 
dhawulul9ani~ ~urru weyi n, yurr yindi - black, swims in deep water 
nose long but big 
Figure 5:6. Distinctive features of three dolphin species. 
Habitat is frequently referred to in the description of species other 
than dolphins. For example, the only distinction made between two edible 
insect larvae was that one, gMmuruQ, is found in the swamp rushes and in 
the rotting timber of particar trees, while the other, gunaaa, is found 
8 in termite mounds. Other features referred to in discriminating species 
are, the style of locomotion the sounds made, and behaviour patterns. 
Thus some pigeons have distinctive flight patterns, some hawks are 
distinguished by their calls, and some snakes by their placid nature in 
contrast to the fierceness of others. 
In practice, the recognition of species is learned, not by the 
memorisation of distinguishing features, but by the identification of 
specimens in the field. Recognition of a ~erson's authority in identifying 
specimens is based not on a knowledge of the distinguishing features, but 
on recognised status within the community as a person of seniority and 
therefore of knowledge. When two informants of relatively equal status 
disagree in the identification of a specimen, they may resort to pointing 
out particular features in support of their opinions. If relations are 
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amicable agreement may be reached in this way. In general, distinguishing 
features are resorted to in the description of absent species, rather 
than being consciously used in the identification of specimens. In 
teaching another person, or in emphasising the correctness of an 
identification, a person in a teaching role may use them in a context 
such as, This is garriwa. See, its back is flat. 
i:c. Intraspecific Classifications. 
Once a specimen is identified, there are various other factors 
which may or may not be taken into consideration. For some species there 
appears to be no concern at all with intraspecific classifications, for 
others a considerable a.mount of interest is shown. I list six areas 
in which intraspecific classifications are made and discuss the first 
four of these in an attempt to indicate the scope of interest shown, and 
the structures used in making them. The areas are sexual classifications, 
observations of anatomical variations, naming of anatomical parts, 
variations in maturation/size, and the use of kinship terms and personal 
names for family pets. 
Sex, at least in larger species, is a matter of general observation 
and comparison. There is nevertheless considerable variation in the 
degree of lexically marked discrimination in the different species. In 
some species where the sexual features are easily observed, separate 
names may be given for the male and the female in addition to the species 
name. For example, in the species we!i (agile wallaby), a large male is 
called balkitj and a large female djarrwutu. In the species mi!iwirri 
(brush-tailed possum), the male is gapaQ_i, and the female is marrau. In 
other species, one sex will be given a discrete name while the species 
name is used for the other. For example, the species name garrtjambal 
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(antilopine kangaroo) used in a general sense can refer to either male 
or female. However in some contexts it appears to be used specifically 
of the male in contrast to the female which is then named gandalpurru. 
Similarly dhalwa_!Pu (green turtle) refers to the species male or female 
while the female may be specifically called wayapa. The female when 
ashore depositing eggs is called dhalaluwa in a classification which 
combines both sex and action discriminations. 
~here the basis of discrimination is restricted to sex alone, then 
the potential structure for sub-classifications is as shown in figure 5:7. 
It is possible for either or both sexes to be left lexically unmarked. 
When discrimination is then desired it can be made by applying the 
general term for woman (miyalk) or man (£irramu) without altering the 
structure. 
~ (we_!i (agile wallaby)) 
,,,, ,. "' ............... 
,,,. ... 
""' ... mai:~'x"I I fema~e "x"I 
(bal kitj) {djarrwutu) 
Figure 5:7. Structures used in discrimination by sex. 
I did not discover a great deal of interest in morphological 
variation, though there is one definite example related to one of the 
turtle species. Amongst the dhalwa_!Pu (green turtles) there is apparently 
the regular appearance of specimens with a shallow depressions up the 
centre of the carapace. These specimens described as ~araka dhukarrmirr 
(carapace having a road or path) are separately named wol. 
The structure of the system available for such subclassification 
can be represented as in figure 5~. The difference between this 
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structure, and the preceding one is that neither the potential number of 
variations nor the basis for discrimination is fixed. 
~(dhalwa_!pu (green turtle)) 
,,, ... 
"" .... 
""' ... 
""' 
,,,,. 
,,, 
... ,,, 
.... I variant •l of "x" lvariant"n of "x"] 
(dhalwa_!pu) (wol) 
Figure5:8. Structure used in discrimination of variations from 
an expected standard. 
The naming of anatomical parts can only be briefly considered. 
Body parts are highly significant and a very large vocabulary is used. 
For example, there are over eighty nam:ed parts of the human body and 
many of these have two or more alternative names. In classifying 
these parts, the Yolnu divide the body into a number of major sections, 
(head, chest, stomach, legs, arms) and each of these is then further 
subdivided into their various parts. Where there is a perceived 
analogy between the human body and the structural parts of a 
natural species, the analogous parts are usually given the same names. 
Nevertheless there is considerable vocabulary which is species specific, 
and some which is applied only to a group of related species. 
One example of the analogy drawn between human body parts and parts 
of other species is found in the application of body part names to parts 
of trees. Some of these are shown in figure 5:9. However there are other 
named parts of trees which are quite distinct from any analogy to the 
human body. For example, wurrki (flower), dhaparnnarr (roots which are 
exposed or growing above the ground), and merrku (small twigs or bra~ches). 
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Name Body Part Part of Tree 
makarr thigh main below-ground roots 
rumbal trunk/body main trunk of tree 
wana arm branches 
-
marra hair leaves 
gurrkurr veins secondary below-ground roots 
dhaka 1 cheek fruit or seed pods 
ma~utji eye seeds 
barrwan skin bark 
-
Figure 5:9. Analogous names for human body and tree parts. 
Some anatomical terms have a very wide usage, in particular 
rumbal (trunk/body) and ma~utji (eye). Rumbal is not only the trunk of 
a tree, but the trunk or body of all types of animals,birds, fish, 
reptiles and even shellfish . It is also the main root of a yam, and 
appears to refer to the body without appendages. Ma~utji is the eye of 
all biological specimens which have eyes, the operculum of shellfish, 
the hole made in the sand by some shellfish and also the seeds or nuts 
of plants. Wambal or yaDara (tail) is a common feature of all the above 
named animals and also refers to the climbing stems of root foods. 
~araka (bones) refers to the hard skeletal remains of all animals, the 
shells of shellfish and crustaceans and sometimes also the wood of dead 
trees. 9 
Particular groups of species are perceived to have specific named 
body parts in common . For example fish have djimi (Dorsal fins), binbin 
(scales), bus!_is!_i (gills) and wus!_uy (pelvic and anal fins) , while all 
birds have binbarr (wings) and bu}.Pul (feathers) and some have a gungu.!J_ 
(crest). 
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In contrast to this generalised type of anatomical term, there 
are many names which apply only to one part of a single species. In 
particular, many fruits and flowers have separate names distinct from 
the name of the plant on which they occur. For example lMluk is the 
fruit of gunga (pa.ndanus), though the general name for fruit is dhakal, 
and wMkwak is the flower of .Q_irrpu (a water lily) though the general 
name for flower is wurrki. 
Figure 5:10, illustrates the structure of the relation between a 
tree and its anatomical parts. The significance of this structure is 
that it is fundamental to the notion that any classification can be 
divided into a number of recognisable parts, being based on the 
perception of discernably different units within an item. In this 
case, the notion has been applied to anatomical parts, but the same 
idea is reflected at other levels of the classificatory system. This 
anatomical structure I distinguish from the taxonomic structure in 
that each appears complementary to the other, the former being 
based on the discernment of difference, the latter on the discernment 
of similarities. 
1 "x" p~rt 1 I 
(wana) 
(branch) 
__ J'x:J~~~r~a (tree) ) 
--- ,,, ' ..... --
-- ;' \ ......... ---
_, -- ,,, , \ '......... ----
- ,,, \ ' 
.----~~~'-'~~, \ ' ~~---="---~~ ...... l "x" part 2 I "x" part 3 l l "x" part 411 "x" ;art n. I 
(rumbal) (makarr) (marra) ? 
(trunk) (roots) (leaves) ? 
Figure 5:10. Structure used in the discrimination of the anatomical parts 
of a tree. 
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In examining classifications related to maturity/size, I did not 
discover any way of separating the two attributes and it would appear 
that the Yolnu consider them simultaneously. The contrast between this 
system and the preceding irrtn:l.specific ones is that they were applied 
to separate elements within a species, while maturity/size 
classifications are applied to a single specimen. 
The most complete lexicon of terms that I have yet discovered for 
different sized specimens is that applied to the various turt;le species. 
As I was given the different names I was also given a description of 
the comparative sizes of the different specimens. This was made in 
relation to the number of men needed to carry a turtle from the boat to 
the cooking place. This relationship is shown in figure 5:11. Of greater 
4 or 5 men 2 or 3 men 1 man tiny 
-· dhalwa_!pu rrew walan~u walanau 
(Chelonia 
mydas) 
garriwa daytay bandamirr 
-
(Chelonia 
depressa) 
birrnarr 
(Lepidochelys 
olivacea) 
guwarrtji bundi wiriyarr 
(Eretmochel ys 
imhricata) 
gMrun watj is!_i ka ma tj indi 
(Caretta 
caretta) 
Figure 5:11. Identifications of different sized turtle specimens, size 
being expressed as the number of men required to carry one. 
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significance however for structural analysis is the fact that in each 
of the species where immature specimens are named, there are 
perceived to be three stages of maturity. These three stages, as can be 
seen from the figure are relative to each other within a single species 
and not relative to their overall size. 
I did not discover a lexically marked discrimination between the 
sexes of the emu (wurrpa_!}), but there are separate names for the stripey 
chicken (gas!_arrkas!_arr) and for the immature bird (marrwawul) 
which is described as whistling instead of drumming like an adult. Again 
there are three marked stages of maturity. There appears to be a tendency 
to observe and label stages of maturity among the plants also. This was 
noted particularly with plants which have a cyclical availability of 
their edible parts. 
One plant with an edible root (Gardenia megasperma) has three 
different names for different stages of maturity. A specimen with very 
small leaves is called dhunguruk, one with middle sized leaves is 
djalpiny9u, and one with old leaves and a very big root is s!_ilkurru~u. 
Warraga the cycad palm (Cycas media) has a fruit which used to provide 
the only carbohydrate food available in any quantity at one particular 
time of the year. Three stages of maturity of the fruit on the plant 
are recognised and named, then after it has fallen to the ground, three 
stages of the fruit's transformation into a plant are also recognised 
10 
and named. 
In each of the preceding examples there are three stages of 
maturity/size observed. In addition to this there is a constant relation 
between these stages in that the first named or smallest specimen is 
immature, the second is considered as mature and the third or largest 
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seems to represent the notion of ideal or absolute maturity. In the 
stages of the above mentioned cycad fruit these three stages apply to 
each of the two different phases of its existence. The three part 
classification's structure can be illustrated as in figure 5:12, which 
uses the stages of the green turtle as an example. 
~(dhalwa_!Pu) 
"' I ' 
. .;""' I ', 
.; ,,. I ...._' 
"' I ' 
"""' ,. I ...... , 
""' I ' ' 
..... 
.... ~' -i mm __ a_t_ur_· _e_"_x_'_'l- -·- .. -1 ma tur~ 
walan~u rrew 
"x" 1··-·w··-i ideal "x" I 
dhalwa_!Pu 
Figure 5: 12. Relations between maturity/size classifications 
The Yolnu extend these maturity/size observations in relation to 
their metaphysical perspective. First there is the notion that there is 
a pre-existent stage for each species. This notion is supported by their 
observations of developments from the eggs of turtles and birds, the 
seeds of plants such as the cycad and the coconut, and the embryo of 
various marsupials. Secondly there is the normal physical form of the 
species as discussed above. Finally there is a further stage which, 
while not being lexically marked is commonly referred to. This is 
observed particularly in the larger species of animals and turtles, but 
also in some of the smaller ones, in trees and in some vegetable food 
species also. An abnormally large animal may be either killed in the 
hunt, or may approach a man or group of people without showing the 
normal fear of man, or a woman may dig up an unusually large yam. Such 
an occurrence is instantly recognised as not normal and the specimen as 
something more than normal. It will be considered that the specimen has 
been transformed in some way such that the specimen has become the 
embodiment of a human spirit or is actually the transformation of a 
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human spirit71various interpretations appear to be possible as to what 
this beyond-the-natural specimen is. It may be considered as the spirit 
of a child coming to its parent(s) thus indicating that the wife is or 
will become pregnant. If there has been a recent death it may be thought 
of as a visit from the deceased in which case the animal may be spoken 
to and even offered food. In addition to these occasional experiences 
there are abnormally large trees known to exist permanently in various 
places throughout Arnhem Land. I have been shown such trees in the 
Wessel Islands and Keen (1978:163) also reports them in other parts. 
These are perceived to be not only trees of a particular species, but 
to be transformations of the creation ancestors or to be associated with 
some artifact or action of theirs. 
It is in these ways that the Yolnu are able to approach the 
phenomena around them from a metaphysical perspective and make a second 
three part classification of the species as in figure 5:l.3. In this 
system the first stage is seen as one of pre-existence, the second as 
physical existence, and the third as in some way supernatural or 
transformed and thus representing the ultimate existence. 
EJ . 
___ ,, ', ------
~ - -
...... -- ', ------
1 pre-exis::Ut "x"l lphysicall;· existing "x'i-lu_l_t_1-.ma---~---e_-_;~;;:__i_s_t_e_n_c_e_o_f_'_'x-, ... i 
Figure 5.: 13. Observed stages of a species "x" from a metaphysical 
approach. 
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2:ii The Classification of Naturally Alive Things into Categories. 
In forming the hundreds of natural species into groups, the Yolnu 
have established a number of different classificatory systems. Each of 
these is based on the selection of a different set of attributes from 
which discriminations of similarity and difference may be drawn. I 
discuss the systems established on three different bases, life-form, 
f'unction and habitat, and attempt to show the structures of each and 
some of the relations between them. 
The first system of classifications corresponds to what Berlin et 
al. (1973) describe as "life-form ta.xa". That is, the species are grouped 
together on the basis of perceived similarities in the type or quality 
of existence or life-form. The second system groups items on the basis 
of their function, or the use which is made of them. A variety of such 
potential functions are listed such as, foods, medicines, implements and 
others. I have linked these together under the category of "use" classes 
for the purpose of discussion. The third system links together species 
found in the same ecological habitat. 
2:ii.a.Life-form Classes. 
The Yolnu universally distinguish nine life-form classes as 
follows; 
1: dharpa, plants with definite stems, 
2: mulmu, plants without a definite stem, 
3: warrakan, includes all animals, birds and reptiles with the 
exception of the next two taxa, 
4: bMpi, all snakes, legless lizards and worms, 
5: miyapunu, marine turtles and marine mammals 
6: maranydjalk,stingrays and sharks, 
7: guya, fish, 
8: maypal, shellfish, crustaceans and some insect larvae, 
9: guku, native bees and bee products. 
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In addition to these nine, many people will also add some or all of 
another four classes, usually naming the class by the name of one common 
member of it. These additional classes are; 
10: g~lkal, ants, 
11: gundirr, varieties of mound producing termites/ their mounds, 
12: wurrulul, flies and perhaps some other flying insects, 
13: garkman, frogs. 
There are a number of other species which appear to be ungrouped in any 
way, and to be known by their species name only. For example, centipedes, 
spiders, trepang, sea urchins, and insects other than those included in 
classes 9 to 12 above. A number of whole groups of insects are known by 
single terms only. That is, there is one term for each of; cicadas, 
grasshoppers, fleas and lice, butterflies and moths, m.osquitos, and 
sandflies. Some groups of insects are separated into distinct species 
without being seen as belonging to groups in any way. For example there 
are several different named species of wasps. For the Yolnu who do not 
recognise any or all of the last four of the life-form classes, the 
members of those classes also join the large number of ungrouped 
separate species. 
Only four of the life-form classes are genuinely divided into 
sub-classes at a level equivalent to that discussed by Berlin et al.(1973) 
as "generic taxa". These are warrakan, miyapunu, maranydja 1 k and maypa 1. 
To subdivide the other classes the Yolnu make use of "use" or "locality" 
categories, I have omitted them here as they ar e not established on the 
same basis. Warrakan, as a class, is divided i nto three sub-classes on 
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the basis of the style of movement. These are; 
warrakan butthunamirr: those having flight. That is, bats, 
birds that fly, and possums that glide, 
warrakan marrtjinyamirr: those having upright movement. That 
is, the remaining land animals and the emu but 
not the echidna. 
warrakan gal 'yunamirr: those that drag. That is, lizards, goannas 
goannas, crocodiles, tortoises and the echidna. 
Miyapunu, as a class is divided into two sub-classes. These are; 
~arakamirr miyapunu: those having shells, That is, turtles. 
balawalamirr miyapunu: those having twin horzontal flukes on 
tails. That is, dolphins, dugong, and whales. 
Alternatively this sub-class is named, yaoaramirr 
(having tails) or barrwanmirr (having skin). 
Maranydjalk, as a class is divided into two sub-classes. These are; 
maranydjalk: stingrays, 
mM.na: sharks 
Maypal, as a class is also divided into two sub-classes. These are; 
maypal: molluscs and some insect larvae 
dhu~galmirr/go~mirr maypal: those having hands. That is crabs, 
shrimps and crayfish. 
These sub-classes, apart from those of maranydjalk, are obviously 
labelled with descriptive terms. Nevertheless they can be described in 
Berlin et al.terms as secondary lexemes. They suggest (page 218) that the 
fact that they are not primary terms does not prevent them from being used 
as generic taxa. The fact that they are so obviously descriptive in 
derivation not detracting from their use at this particular taxonomic 
level to identify an otherwise unlabelled grouping which has been made.12 
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The structure used in these classifications is re~resented 
in figure 5: 14. In this there are nine obligatory classes (some of 
which have sub-classes) and a number of optional classes 
(n = 0 to 4). The system is apparently open-ended with_ the 
potential existing for the inclusion of still further classes 
were this to be considered relevant. In the figure "s" represents 
"species of any quantity': and "x" represents ungrouped species. 
I Naturally Alive Things 
Life-form Classes 
Life-form Sub-classes 
I I 
@0 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~ , ,, 
/ I '\ 
' I ' ~~~ 
I I 
I 
G1 $ ~ $ $ ~ 
~' ~~' ~ !~'~ : 
I ; 1 : I I : I I I I 
I I 
I I I I 
~00000 
I I : I I I I 1 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 Species 
Figure 5:i4. Structure of classifications of Life-form categories. 
Where additional species are grouped into new life-form classes; these 
appear to be taken from the ungrouped species. There appears to be 
potential for extension at three levels. Previously unnamed species (such 
as imported trees) may be incorporated in groups, or be left among 
ungrouped species, new sub-groups may be formed within classes and new 
classes may be established. 
2:ii.b. Use Classes. 
The second system of classification, that of grouping things 
according to similarity of use or function produces a potentially 
unlimited variety of categories. The Yolnu label some of these with 
what Berlin et al.(1973) would consider as primary lexemes, and others 
with descriptive terms which the same authors would categorise as 
secondary lexemes. Still other classes have their foundation in the 
Yolnu discussions of their function, and are simply labelled with a 
description which explains their use. 
In the largest of the use classes, maranhu (food), there is 
repetition of much of the terminology used in labelling the life-form 
classes. This use of them as sub-categories of food causes some alteration 
in their meanings. "Food" is divided into two major sub-classes, gonyil 
(meat foods) and murnya9 (non-meat foods). Each of these is then further 
subdivided into a number of smaller categories. Thus murnyan (non-meat 
foods) as a class, is subdivided into borum (edible fruits), guku (bee 
products)' natha (root foods and the growth centres of palms) and 
manutji ~atha (nuts and edible seeds). Gonyil (meat foods) as a class is 
subdivided into warrakan (animal, bird and land reptile flesh), miyapunu 
(marine turtle, dolphin and dugong flesh), guya (fish), maypal (shellfish), 
maranydjalk (flesh of only those stingrays and sharks considered edible), 
and mapu (eggs). Some of these categories of gonyil (meat foods) are then 
subdivided further with the same categories as discussed under existence 
classes. One important exception to this is that those snakes which 
are considered as edible are included as a sub-category of warrakan, 
that is, warrakan djuryunamirr {those that slide). In diagramatic form, 
the relations between the classes and sub-classes of food can be 
considered to be as shown in figure 5:15. 
A second lexically recognised "use" class, one without any 
sub-classes is man'tjarr. Man'tjarr are small leafy branches of a 
13 
specific group of trees. These are held in a fire until scorching and 
then used to drive away from a living person or an object, the influence 
14 
of a person who has recently died. 
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Primary Secondary Tertiary Item 
Class Sub-class Sub-class Sub-class Classified. 
borum s 
guku s 
urnyaD 
9atha s 
ma~utji ~atha s 
marrtjinyamirr s 
butthunamirr s 
maranhu warrakan 
gal 'yunamirr s 
djuryunamirr s 
. < 9arakamirr s 
m1yapunu 
onyil balawalamirr s 
~ maranydjalk s 
maranydja l k 
• bul'manydji s 
guya s 
maypa l s 
mapu s 
Figure 5: 15. Classifications and sub-classifications within the "use" 
class maranhu (foodJ: 5 
In addition to the traditionally established "use" classes, 
potential exists for the development and lexical recognition of new ones. 
I noted two examples of this, both of which are labelled with terms 
derived from English words. In each case the meaning of the English word 
has been changed with its adaptation to a new use. The first of these, 
guluJ-6 is not used by all Yolnu, but was used by a number of craft workers 
to classify all varieties of adhesives and caulking substances. It 
included the sap of two trees17 and the juice of the dendrobium orchid 
bulb.18 other things included were the dark wax from the native bees, and 
such modern substances as; PVA woodworking glue, two-part epoxy resins, 
caulking compounds, and common liquid gum. 
The second of the newly established "use" classes mi rri tj in l9 
(chemical) appears to include all things which have a useable chemical 
property. It includes all plants used because of their medicinal 
properties, together with those plant and animal materials used as fish 
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poisons. Those Yolnu developing agricultural skills use the class to 
include chemical sprays and fertilizers, and the hygiene workers include 
disinfectants. Sub-classes of mirritjin are developed by using either the 
name of the sickness/injury to be treated with a particular group of 
items, or the purpose for which the item is to be used, with the addition 
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of the suffix -puy. For example, where a particular item is used for 
poisoning/stunning fish, it may be described as; 
muyu~u Dayi, mirritjin guyapuy. 
muyu9u it, chemical fish for the purpose of. 
That is, "It's muyunu, a fish poison. 
While such subdivisions are not lexically marked, they have a definite 
f'unction in the structure of the classificatory system, and are treated 
as definite subclassifications. 
There are many other sets of items established as groups on the 
basis of their common function or use. The Yolnu identify these groupings 
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with descriptive terms. These are developed by adding the suffix -wu, 
(for the purpose of / for) to the name of the thing that the set of items 
is used to produce. For example, a group of tree species which can be 
used in the production of gara (spears)can be classified as garaw (for 
spears, or for making spears). In this way the Yolnu are able to 
establish classes in relation to any purpose at all. Thus while there 
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are a restricted number of lexically recognised "use" classes, the 
potential for establishing such groupings under secondary lexemes is 
23 
almost limitless. 
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Figure· 5: 16. Structures of four "use" classes. 
The structures of the different "use" classes range from the 
relatively simple ones of figure 5:16, to the more complex one of the 
food classes shown in figure 5:17. Of the classes with the simpler 
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Figure 5:17. Structure used in the classifications of foods. 
structures, only one (man'tjarr) appears to have a fixed number of 
species. In all the others it appears that there is potential for ·the 
inclusion of any new or additional items which may be relevant. It 
appears also that some of these "use" classes may function at a level 
other than that of subdivisions of "naturally alive" things, though I 
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have included them in this general discussion. 
2:ii.c. Locality Classes. 
The division of species into groups on the basis of a common 
environmental habitat has been developed into a third and completely 
different system of descriptive classifications. While these divisions 
are descriptive ones, they identify d•:finite classifications. They then 
match the notion of secondary lexemes discussed by Berlin et al 
(1973:218) as I mentioned earlier in relation to life-form 
classifications. 
The names of the locality classifications are developed by adding 
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the suffix -puy (belonging to/ associated with) to the names of the 
localities in which items occur. Thus if a species is perceived as 
characteristically being found in association with gathul (mangroves), 
it would then be described as gathulpuy (belonging to/associated with 
mangroves). By applying the same suffix to each of the other major 
environmental divisions 26there is then established a set of descriptive 
classes and sub-classes to which all "naturally alive" species can be 
allocated. 
The degree of subdivision into categories and sub-categories 
varies from habitat to habitat. It also varies according to the type 
of item being classified. For example, one of t he fishermen, in listing 
off the names of the fish, (guya) did so in locality groups using the 
different classes as memory aids. In this way he divided the species into 
into five classes according to the recognised fish habitats. The 
classifications that he used were; 
garrwarpuy guya: fish that live near the surface, 
ooypuy guya:fish that live near the bottom, 
gundapuy guya:fish that live among rocks and reefs, 
maya9buy guya:fish that live in the rivers, 
and raypinybuy guya:fish that live in fresh water. 
The structure used in this classification is as shown in figure 5:18.b. 
The most intense use of subdivision that I was shown was in the 
groupings of sixty-six different species of maypal (molluscs, 
crustaceans and certain insect larvae). Ten separate localities were 
specified27 and of these three were f'urther sub-divided. These were; 
gundapuy maypal (those associated with rocks and reefs) which were 
divided into four groups, 
munathawuy maypal (those associated with sandy beaches) of which 
there were two sub-groups, and 
gathulpuy maypal (those belonging to the mangroves) which were 
f'urther divided into eight smaller categories. The structure of these 
classifications and their various subdivisions can then be considered 
as outlined in figure 5:18.a. 
The uses of the location classes can be distinguished as being of 
two distinct types. The first type is that shown in figure 5:19, in 
which all different types of species of living things are class 
together according to the environment in which they are habitually 
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Figure 5:18. Structures used in grouping members of a particular 
life-form by means of categories of habitat. 
located. The second type is that shown in figure 5 :18 '~ a and b, where 
particular life-form or food classes are divided into sub-categories 
according to environmental groupings. 
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Figure 5:19. Abbreviated form of structure used in the subdivision of 
the category "Living Things" by environmental habitat. 
2:ii.d. Problems associated with relations between systems. 
There are problems for analysis in the relations between the terms 
used in the life-form and food classes. The first of these relates to 
the fact that while the Yolnu use quite different terms for the 
grouping of plant species into life-form and food categories, there is 
considerable overlap in the terms used for the non-plant species. All 
the items listed as primary classes of meat foods have the same names 
as a number of the life-form classes. It appears at first that they 
should be analysed as belonging either to life-form or to food categories, 
but not to both. However the Yolnu choose to use them in both systems, 
and overlap their usage to such an extent that it is frequently 
difficult for the external observer to differentiate between the 
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alternative meanings. It is in fact the separate terminology used for 
the plant species which gives the most indisputable indication that the 
two systems are distinct. In both systems non-plant terms are treated 
as on the same level as, and contrastive with, the particular terms 
applied to plants. This I take as evidence to support my analysing the 
non-plant terms as being used with different meanings in the two 
domains. That is, in one domain they refer to the animal species, and in 
the other to the meat of the species. 
The second problem for analysis relates to the sub-class level 
categories, and whether they should be assigned as life-form sub-classes 
or food sub-classes or both. Warrakan marrtjinyamirr fanimals having 
upright movement) is a category difficult to ~ssign definitely as a food 
and not as a life-form category.Both dog and horse are included in the 
category while it is known that they can be eaten and that they have 
been in the past, both are considered to be non-food, This would appear 
to give some limited support to an argument in favour of assigning the 
style of movement categories as life-form sub-classifications. 
In contrast to this, the classifications of snakes and snake-like 
things would appear to give support to the opposite argument. All 
snakes are fitted into the life-form class of bMpi (snakes and snake-
-like things) and not the life-form class of warrakan (animals). When 
the same group of species is considered from the aspect of food classes 
a division is formed between edible and inedible species. When this is 
done the inedible species appear to be consistently labelled bMpi, and 
the meaning of the term then changes to "inedible snakes". This 
contrasts with the treatment of the edible species which are then called 
warrakan djuryunamirr (animals that slide). Then we find a movement 
based classification functioning as a food sub-classification. I have 
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chosen simply to indicate that this problem exists rather than 
attempting to conclusively solve it. For the purposes of my analysis of 
the systems of classification and sub-classification, it does not effect 
the results whether these are subclassifications of food or of existence 
classes. What is of significance is the fact that sub-classifications 
are formed within some classes. 
In each of the three different systems used in grouping species, 
the structures used appear to be variations established on a single 
taxonomic framework. That is a framework where separate items are linked 
together in a single category on the basis of perceived similarities. 
This underlying framework facilitates a dynamic system which enables 
variation to the basic structure in three ways. First there appears to 
be no limit to the number of items which can be included in a category, 
except for the limits imposed by the attributes of the category and no 
restriction on new items being added to a category. Secondly there is 
the potential in the underlying framework for the grouping of lower 
level classes into higher level ones, in a continuing process which 
allows for at least five levels of class and sub-class. Thirdly, at all 
levels of the taxonomic hierarchy there is open-endedness as to the 
quantity of items which may be included in a category. 
2: iii. Variation in classifications within the category of 
"Naturally Alive" things. 
Wide variation occurs from person to person in the knowledge of 
and application of the classificatory systems applicable to living things. 
These variations were observed at most levels of the system, from the 
identification and classification of individual species to higher levels 
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of the system, and this extended into variations within the structures 
at the higher levels. It occurred more frequently where the items under 
discussion were not common, or where the categories involved were not of 
significant importance to the particular individuals.28 
A range of factors appears to contribute to the variations at all 
levels.Where possible I attempted to eliminate some of these in the 
original stages of research, but it became apparent that if I was to 
discover the deeper levels of structure, I would have to recognise that 
part of those structures would be the facility to incorporate both 
variation and change. Thus I encountered variation which I considered 
due to differences in experience such as were generated by age 
differences, by the sexual division of labour, and by differences in 
domicile such as the contrast between the coastal people and those from 
the more inland regions of Arnhem Land. 
An example of the types of variation in the classifications made 
at species level comes from attempts to record identifications of the 
different species of shellfish. I used a collection of seashells to 
ask about their identity, first as foods or non-foods, and secondly as 
specifically named items. The women asked were mostly from coastal 
groups and reasonably similar in terms of their experience and of their 
contact with shellfish. While there was enough consistency amongst 
their responses for me to be able to assign names to most of the 
specimens, there was a wide range of variation. There were a number of 
specimens where edibility was claimed by some and denied by others. In 
addition while there were a number of specimens of the more common 
species given the same name by all the women, showing a core of agreement, 
there was a tendency among about a third of them to link several 
morphologically similar species under a single name, often the name of 
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the commonest of the shells in the particular set~9rn this it appeared 
that the naming of particular species was neither of significance or 
interest to some women nor would it detract from their ability to 
gather adequate supplies of shellfish to feed their families.30 
Variations of the above types occurred at species levels in all 
the life-form classes. There was also, as mentioned earlier, variation 
from person to person as to the actual number of life-form classes that 
were recognised. This applied only to what might be called fringe classes 
a~er after the universally acknowledged core of classes had been named. 
Thus it was the inclusion of the fringe classes of "ants","frogs", 
"termites" and "flies" which varied from individual to individual. 
In the sub-classifications of non-meat foods there appeared to be 
an alternative available between two generally accepted structural 
variants. The simplest structure was that which I have outlined in the 
section on food classes, the relevant section of which is shown in 
figure 5:20.a. This contrasts with the alternative structure shown in 
figure 5:20.b. While the variations are only minor they are consistently 
used and serve to illustrate that within the deeper level structures 
Structure a. 
Structure b. 
..... 
.... 
...... borum (fruit) 
.... .... _ - ... guku (bee products) 
..... - -murnya~ ~-=-----_ 
(non-meats)'.......... - -· ~atha (root vegetables) 
..... 
.......... 
'·•ma~utji 9atha (seeds and nuts) 
,,. 
.... •borum (fruit) 
.... 
--·guku (bee products) 
.... --
murnya9 ·~.: _ ,• na tha (root vegetables) (non-meats) - - _ .... "" J 
- ._ -· na tha .-:::: t . . th 
( ;J 1 ---·ma~u Jl na a (seeds vegetab e J and nuts) 
foods) 
Figure 5:20. Comparison of variations in Clas s ifying Non-meat Foods. 
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there is potential for the accommodation of variation in the surface 
level structures and for the acceptance of variation as normal. 
The differences between the two systems are entirely dependent 
on the variations in meaning applied to the word ~atha. In"Structure a" 
of figure 20, the word is used exclusively to apply to all root 
vegetables and only to them. In "Structure b" the word can be contrasted 
with fruit, and with bee products , while including seeds and nuts so 
that its reference is to starchy vegetable foods. The two alternative 
structures do not appear to be consciously distinguished. I have outlined 
them that way to emphasise the potential for variation which is available 
within what is really one system. 
Conclusions. 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, I have discussed three 
distinct classificatory systems,each discernible as such on the basis 
that it has been shown to use a fundamentally different structure from 
the others. One of these systems is concerned with_ th_e organisation of 
items into groups on the basis of perceived similarities. The 
structure employed in this classificatory process, I have discussed as 
being "taxonomic". The second system appears complementary to it in 
that it commences with a single entity and classifies its vari.ous parts 
on the basis of discriminable differences. I have referred to that 
structure as "anatomical". Thirdly there is a system of classification 
applied to different expressions of a single quality or entity. Th_is 
system has been shown to consistently use a three part structure. 
In addition to these three structures th_ere is perceived in each.. 
of the three systems a fourth set of structures concerned with_ relations 
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between pairs of items or qualities. These have taken the structure 
of oppositions, though I will briefly show that these are not all of 
the same kind. Finally it has been shown that the meanings of 
classifications can be influenced by whether the Yolnu are or are 
not consciously applying metaphysical considerations in their use. 
In establishing the category of structures termed "taxonomic", 
I have linked together a variety of structures, whLch appear to be 
founded on a common notion. That is, each structure is composed of a 
nlUilber of items on one level, grouped into one or more higher level 
categories on the basis of some perceived similarity. The notion can 
be demonstrated in the simplest structures such as shown in figure 5:16, 
or in more complex multi-level ones such as shown in figures 5:14 
and 5:17. The structure of the classification of life form categories 
as shown in figure 5:14, 31 would appear to agree with the 
suggestions of Berlin et al. ( 1973: 240) . They claim that "there are at 
least five, perhaps six, taxonomic ethnobiological categories which 
appear to be highly general if not universal in folk biological 
science". However in searching for a cognitive level of taxonomic 
structure, I have had to pursue the analysis of structures to a 
different analytical level. To do this it has been necessary to 
consider more classificatory systems than the one applied to life 
forms and to include both classifications of varying depths and the 
potential for variation within each level of them. 
The classifications of species have the semblance of rigidity 
but as I have shown, they are open to considerable variation. Any new 
item can be fitted into the system, as a nlUilber of exotic plants and 
animals have been. Similarly, whole new classes and categories can be 
added or old categories removed or lost without the system itself 
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failing, as I have shown. The Yolnu attitude to this is very neatly 
summed up by one Yolnu man when speaking of someone's attempt to 
distinguish between two i terns not previously separated. "Well we can 
try, for new generations to get words for these. I think words often 
get le~ out. Yolnu used to speak lots of matha (words) but every 
time some old person dies we lose a lot of words." 
In this statement and the juxtaposition of the thoughts 
expressed, is an indication of the Yolnu metaphysical notion that 
anything"new" is not really new, rather it is the re-expression of 
something that has existence but which may have been for some time 
unexpressed. 
A number of problems are raised by the suggestion of a 
"taxonomic"structure. Firstly, is there such a thing as a fundamental 
taxonomic structure or is it just an artifice of the external 
observer? Secondly, are the various "taxonomic" structures discussed 
variations of this fundamental structure, variations of each other, 
or totally independent? Finally, if there is such a structure,what is 
it, and how is it able to incorporate variation and change? These 
problems will be considered in the next chapter in relation to the 
comparison of structures of the classifications of living and 
existing things with the classifications considered in the three 
preceding chapters. 
The second category of structures that I have established, ~he 
"anatomical" structure is related to the "taxonomic" structure as I 
mentioned earlier in that it appears to be established by a 
complementary process. When the two are illustrated in diagrams, the 
visual pattern gives the impression that they are identical. However 
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the "anatomical" structure (figure 5:10) appears to be developed on 
the basis of the discrimination of differences in contrast to the 
"taxonomic" one which appears to be established on the basis of the 
discernment of similarities. Thus the process of establishing them 
appears to proceed in opposite directions. It is upon this contrast 
that I have relied in distinguishing between them as in each there is 
a relationship between items grouped in ·single categories. 
Meta-physical considerations related to the "anatomical" 
structures enable the perception of particular relations between 
anatomical elements of different entities. The perception of an 
analogous relation between these structural elements of different 
items has been demonstrated in the use of a single term for the 
related parts. While the relation between such items may be treated 
as analogous or even as one being symbolic of the other, it appears 
possible that the Yolnu metaphysic enables a perception in which each 
of the items with the one name is seen to express something of the 
nature of the other. 
The third structure discussed was that consistently made up of 
three evaluative categories which I have simply referred to as the 
"three part" classification. It was shown that this structure can be 
used as a frame for classifying either the quality of life exhibited 
in a range of different things, or the stages of maturity in single 
entities. In each case it was shown that the three classifications 
used were relative, both to each other and to some ideal expression 
of the quality or the entity that they evaluate. The first of the 
three was shown to be equivalent to a pre- or partial expression of 
the ideal, the second, a generalised expression of it, and the third 
to be the ideal itself. These three basic classifications were shown 
to be applied to physical attributes when the ideal was a physical 
quality or entity. 
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When the items being classified were considered from a 
metaphysical, instead of a physical approach, a second three part 
structure was shown to be superimposed over the first. When this was 
done, the "ideal" classification was seen as in some way a spiritual 
transformation of the physical entity or quality. The generalised or 
second classification was then applied to the physical entity or quality, 
and the first classification of the three to any item which can be 
perceived as a pre-existent or an incomplete expression of the ideal. 
The fourth structure, that concerned with the relation between 
pairs of items or qualities has been presented in the data in a 
number of places. In the discussion of life and existence categories, 
there was shown to be a basic dichotomy between things which were 
considered to have physical life and those considered to be without 
that life. Similarly a dichotomy exists between those things having 
physical life and those having spiritual life. 
Throughout the range of paired items certain elements can be 
isolated as common. First there is a basic "binary" opposition in 
which the two elements of a pair are related through the possession 
or non-possession of a particular quality. Secondly in this paired 
relationship the focus is on the quality of one of the paired 
elements. The second element of the pair is then considered as having 
or expressing the contradictory quality to the focal element, Thirdly 
the relationship is considered as being between the attributes or 
qualities themselves and not between the items . 
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When the paired relations are considered from a metaphysical 
approach, it is again the attributes or qualities that are being 
contrasted, but the focus is on spiritual or supernatural attributes 
or qualities. When change is seen to occur, the Yolnu, by using 
this focus, are able to consider the change as occurring in the 
quality being evaluated and not in the item expressing it. In this 
way they are able to consider the item itself as being unchanged • . 
In the discussion of these different systems and structures a 
variety of problems is raised. Some of these were outlined in 
relation to the "taxonomic" structure. There are problems in the 
relations between "taxonomic" and "anatomical" structures and in 
the relations between "physical" and "metaphysical" approaches. 
There are also problems associated with the nature of oppositions 
and their perceptions from the different Yolnu approaches. These 
and other associated issues I will discuss in relation to "cognitive" 
structures in the next chapter. 
NOTES 
1: It is interesting to note that none of the many people who 
discussed these categories mentioned either blood or body juices 
as an indication of life. 
2: Dogs in the camp all have their kin terms, and their relationships 
to one another are known. However it is noted that they do not keep 
the appropriate laws and copulate with their sisters and mothers-
-in-law. This is a source of much hilarity, proof that they don't 
keep laws, and therefore are not in the same class as humans. 
3: One man gave this as the reason that it was right to eat animals 
and plants for food but not right to eat humans. 
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4: I did not obtain statements to the effect that these were "alive" 
but it appears certain that they are considered to embody the 
life of the creative being. 
5: In the contrast between Yolnu categories and English ones, there 
are serious implications for such studies as Nurcombe (1973:109-112). 
The assessments made of children's responses may have been quite 
different in his study if the culturally correct answers had 
been considered. 
6: There is no complete agreement amongst the Yolnu about these two 
names. Some claim them to be two names for one species, others 
that they are definitely distinct. 
7: The original drawings for figures 5:5.a, and 5:5.b, were done 
for me to use as illustrations in a literacy programme. I was 
attempting to obtain the response of the life-form term miyapunu 
(turtle), in response to them. In every case, the older men 
responded to them with the precise species name. Not until I drew 
a composite picture (figure 5:5.c} combining the features of 
several drawings was I able ta get the response I sought. 
8: I was not able to obtain scientific classifications of these 
larvae, but for the purpose of their inclusion in this section, 
this is not significant. 
9: Schebeck (1978:169-177) discusses a wide range of Yolnu names for 
body parts and their alternative uses, with specific reference 
to one of the Dha:JU dialects. Some of these terms differ slightly 
in use in the Elcho Island region. 
10: Two of the three stages of the fruit on the plant were named with 
descriptive terms, while the three stages on the ground were 
lexically marked. The names appear to be known by very few senior 
people. I did not discover whether the names were part of the 
restricted body of ritual terms or whether their use is dying out 
with the replacement of the use of warraga by wheaten flour. 
11: The descriptions I was given of such occurrences were o~en 
ambiguous, and I am not certain whether the Yolnu were making 
a distinction between the two alternatives or not. 
12: The use of a variety of terms for the sub-groups of miyapunu 
lends support to the argument that in spite of the fact that 
these are descriptive terms, they are definite categories as 
far as the Yolnu are concerned. 
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13: Species used for man'tjarr are; gawatjark (Drypetes lasiogyna), 
gaypal (Acacia auriculiformis), gadayka (Eucalyptus tetrodonta), 
and maypiny (Erythrophleum chlorostachys). 
14: By using the scorched leaves in a sweeping action over a person 
or object they are "made free". The action is not considered 
effective unless carried out with the leafy branches of this 
specific group of plants. 
15: In this context, a specimen of the "naturally alive" class which 
is considered as inedible is classified by the term nhM.~ini!J, 
meaning "useless as food" or "not belonging to this class". An 
item classified in this way is considered to have the outward 
appearance of food in a wa;y that is contrary to fact. The term 
thus acts structurally as an opposition to the category "food". 
16: This word has been developed from the English word glue, perhaps 
with the addition of the suffix -WU (for the purpose of) (see 
note 22) 
17: The two trees are mupan (Terminalia carpentariae) and maypiny 
(Erythrophleum chlorostachys). 
18: The orchid is djalkurrk (Dendrobium dicuphum) 
19: Mi rri tj in, a derivative of "medi cin" covers a wider concept than 
the original English word. 
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20: Examples of animal materials are a species of sea slug and 
possibly also soft coral. 
21: There is a range of forms of this suffix as -buy, -puy, -wuy, 
(see Lowe N.D.Lesson 39). 
22: There is also a range of forms for this suffix as -wu, -w, -wa, 
-gu, and -ku, (see Lowe N .D. Lesson 13). 
23: Similar species used as fibres for raki (string) or for bathi 
(baskets) can be grouped in accordance with their use for rakiw 
(used for making string) or bathiw (used for making baskets). 
24: This is based on the fact that certain commercial items of 
unknown origin and some "non-living" items are able to be 
included. 
25: See Note 21 above. 
26: See Rudder 1979:356-357. 
27: See Rudder 1977: Section 2:3.2.4. 
28: c.f. Ellen,R. 1979:340. 
29: It appeared that most of this type of variation was related to 
the degree of personal interest taken by particular women in 
the accumulation of knowledge. 
30: When I attempted to cross-check identifications without 
identifying my sources of particular names, there were two 
common types of response. One was a blunt, "Wrong it's " . . . . ' and 
the other was "I don't know that name. Maybe it 1 s a . . . . name. 
(naming an adjacent linguistic group). On only rare occasions was 
an admission of incomplete knowledge made. 
31: Berlin et al, ( 1973) include intraspecific levels of"variants" 
within species in their hypothesis of a universal depth to 
taxonomy. I have described these separately, but the Yolnu facts 
coincide to a reasonable degree with the hypothesis. 
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CHAPI'ER 6. 
COGNITIVE STRUCTURES. 
In the preceding ethnographic chapters, I have examined various 
aspects of Yo:lnu classifications and evaluations. I have discussed 
the classifications of a wide range of items and properties, and the 
evaluations of these in relation to notions of their id,entities. In 
doing this I have demonstrated that there are a number of structures 
used, both independently and in conjunction with each other, in making 
the classifications and evaluations. At this point I draw together the 
patterns of the various structures discussed and attempt to demonstrate 
that the surface structures as used in the various domains are 
indicative of underlying cognitive structures. 
There have been four kinds of commonly occurring structures in 
the data thus far discussed. These I have labelled as taxonomic 
structures, anatomical structures, three-part structures and the 
structures of paired relations. I discuss each of these separately, 
attempting in doing so, to examine those notions about the world and 
its composition which are relevant to each. 
1: Taxonomic structures. 
In three of the four preceding chapters, I have isolated 
structures in which items were linked together into sets, each of which 
was perceived by the Yolnu, to be formed on the basis of features held 
in common. In Chapter Two I showed that there were a number of domains 
in which there could be identified groups of attributes linked 
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together under a single category. For example, there were shown to be 
sets of similar terms linked together in classes under each of the 
categories, smooth, rough, weak and cold. These terms within each 
category were not synonymous with either the category into which they 
were gathered or with each other. In Chapter Four, it was argued that 
each of the colour terms was treated as if it was on the same 
classificatory level as each of the others. These then were considered 
as being able to be linked under the single category of "colour", again 
demonstrating the grouping of items into sets on the basis of perceived 
similarity. 
In relation to the classifications of living and existing things, 
I showed in Chapter Five how the Yolnu group items at a number of 
different levels of inclusion. These ranged from intraspecific 
classifications of species, ( at the levels of greatest specificity) 
to the grouping of higher level categories ( at the level of greatest 
generalisation) to form the "unique beginner" categories. At each 
level these categories were established by means of perceived si 
similarities in their life form. In addition I have shown that the 
same items can be grouped differently if the basis of perceived 
simi,lari ty is changed from "life form" to "use" or "function". Further, 
that there can be different uses or functions such as food, medicine, 
or ceremonial, each of which forms a different basis for the observation 
of similarity and the establishment of categories. Thus it is possible 
to show that grouping of items into categories on the basis of 
similarity is a feature of Yolnu classifications which is found in a 
wide range of applications. 
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In the preceding chapter I raised the question as to whether the 
"taxonomic structure" actually exists. It .is my premise that the 
possibility of identifying the process of classification which groups 
items on the basis of perceived similarities does in fact indicate its 
existence. That, if the various factors of the different examples of 
classifications of this type are examined, it will be possible to 
isolate the structure as it exists at a cognitive level. 
There are certain minimum constraints on the form which such a 
structure can take. First there must be a minimum of two items having a 
particular feature in common, less than that being a logical 
impossibility. Such minimal sets are spread throughout the material 
presented. For example, the category of "sex" has two members, male 
and female, and the category "plant" has two members, grass and tree. 
Secondly, the cognitive structure must function in other domains than 
that associated with the life-forms of the natural species. I have already 
shown that this is the case in classifications of various types. I have 
also demonstrated that tb.e same principle operates at different 
hierarchical levels of classification. For example, sets of categories 
such as, animals, fish, crustaceans, and plants are linked in a 
higher level classification in that they are all categories of 
"living things". Thus it can be argued that a Yolnu "taxonomic 
structure" exists at different levels and in different domains with a 
minimal number of two items included in a higher category. This 
structure can be illustrated as in figure 6:1. 
Ifb 
Figure 6:1. Minimal taxonomic structure. 
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In this figure "f" represents the common feature in two items, 
lrfaJ and I rfbl . "I" represents any item being classified • "a" and ''b" 
represent features not held in common and which establish the 
separate identities of the two items.~ then represents the 
1 
category "C" formed on the basis of the common feature "f". 
This minimal taxonomic structure is inadequate in that it does 
not have capacity for the inclusion of variation, two types of which 
have been described. Firstly there a quantitative variations in the 
system. That is, the number of items included in different categories 
on any one level is not consistent. For example, there are five 
species linked under the category "marine turtles" ,while there are more 
than fif'ty species grouped in the category, "shellfish" and several 
hundred "flying animals". Similar, though not as di verse, variations 
are found in the classifications of physical matter. 
There are also quantitative variations in the number of 
hierarchical levels of inclusion through which different species are 
gathered into the higher level category of "naturally alive" things. 
For example, there are two intermediate categories in four of the 
life-form classes, five of the classes have one intermediate category, 
and there are some separate species which have no intermediate categories 
and are included directly in the highest level "naturally alive" 
category without even an intermediate life-form class. 
The second type of variation demonstrated is that within single 
categories. I have shown that this type may be due to a range of 
factors but that it is a variation not just between classifications 
made by different individuals but also includes changes in those made 
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by different individuals over a period of time. For example, some 
individuals were shown to identify four colours, others five of six, 
and one identified eight. Similarly different people identified nine, 
ten eleven or even more life-form classes. In addition to being able 
to cater for these variations, the cognitive level structure must be 
open to allow the continuous addition of new items at all levels as 
they are learned from childhood on. 
A further problem exists for the analysis of the cognitive 
level structure. In a number of the categories I have 
shown that there is an "obligatory" minimal set of items. Beyond 
this minimal set there are other items included by some but not 
considered acceptable for inclusion by all. Each person considers 
that the ones he or she includes are correct whether they are 
equivalent to or more than the basic set. That is, there is a notion 
that appears to be held by every Yolnu, that there is a "correct" set 
of items which should be included in each category. 
The mmber of "universally accepted" items varies from category 
to category. In addition to them there is apparently room within the 
structures for the inclusion of items not previously considered. These 
then appear after inclusion, to be treated as Lf they have 
always existed and have simply not been experienced prior 
to the point where they are incorporated into a category. This 
fits with the Yolnu notion that nothing changes. It enables new items 
to be considered as not new, as always there though not experienced, 
as existing in a state of pre-recognition or pre-relevance. In this 
way there is an explanation for the variation from person to person 
in the number of items included. Those recognised by all are relevant 
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to all, whereas those only recognised by some are relevant only to 
them, unless they become more widely accepted. 
The Yolnu taxonomic system thus has the potential to produce 
open-ended classifications, and to enable individuals to vary the 
numbers of items identified in any category (within certain constraints). 
In order to allow for this, the model of the underlying cognitive 
structure must be modified to incorporate both the core distinctions 
and individual extensions or variations over time. 
Figure 6:2. Taxonomic Structure. 
In figure6 :2, I have outlined what appears, on the basis of the 
above constraints and in line with the evidence, to be the shape of 
the Yolnu "taxonomic structure" at cognitive level. This figure 
represents an extension of figure 6:1, to incorporate all forms of 
"obligatory", "optional", "variant" and "potential" requirements. In 
this figure I Ifal represents the first obligatory item, ~ 
represents further items (whether obligatory or optional) to any 
number, and~ represents the potential for extension to include 
any other (varient, optional, or new) item. It is a part of the 
structure which, rather than being a position which can be filled, 
operates as a continually open category through which any item, once 
acknowledged, is automatically transferred to become part of the 
person's ( Ifa 1-1 Ifn I set. In this structure t he item GJ represents 
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any item which may be included in the category ~whether it is an 
individual item or a lower level category functioning as an item for 
inclusion in the next higher category. 
This cognitive level structure is compatible with all of the 
taxonomic structures discussed in earlier chapters. For example, those 
structures represented by figures 4:19, 5:7, 5:14 or 5:17. It is also 
capable of variation in any way without losing its fundamental form. 
Thus it has the potential to be the framework from which any other 
taxonomic structures are or were generated. 
2: Anatomical Structures. 
In the preceding chapter I isolated a system of classification 
which I argued was generated by the notion that an entity could be 
divided into a number of discrete parts. The structure of this system 
I labelled as the "anatomical structure". It was shown to be used in 
the naming of human and animal body parts, and in the discrimination 
of the various parts of plants. It is also possible to find the notion 
operative in the identification of particular features of inanimate 
objects. For example, the edges, outer surfaces, undersides and 
interior of rocks (Rudder 1977:2:3.4.2.4.). In Schebeck (1978:168 - 177), 
the data given indicates that the notion is also to be found in the 
identification of the various elements of the landscape. 
In its most simple form the notion results in a structure which 
may be illustrated as in figure 6:3. Here there is a single entity 
considered as being able to be divided into a number of elements, all 
of which are classified as belonging on one level of discrimination. 
/[ZIS]\ 
elements ~ /;.( ['·.\. 'V I/. _ . __ : ~ ····· .. I 
entity 
Figure 6:3. Single level classification of the parts of an entity. 
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The structure is not limited to use on a single taxomomic level 
but is found in more complex arrangements as, for example, in the 
classification of the parts of the hwnan body. In figure 6:4, a highly 
abbreviated outline of the body shows the potential for a nwnber of 
levels of classification. I have not discovered more than the four 
levels shown here, though there is a much wider use of division within 
the categories than I have indicated. 
In each of the above domains in which the notion of dividing 
an entity into parts is applied, there is variation. For example, not 
all Yolnu use the term "body" to include the head and limbs. Some 
include only the chest and lower trunk. There is also variation in the 
nwnber of terms known and used in each category. These variations 
indicate that the structure is not only flexible in width and depth, 
but flexible in the shape it asswnes in any context. 
T o this point, the examples have all been related to the 
classification of the elements of physical structures. There is a 
second somewhat different area in which the notion is applied. This is 
in the subdivision of categories of ideas. For example, the subdivision 
of the category, "description of an entity" into the "descriptive 
domains" which outline its distinguishing features. Thus any specimen 
(such as a bird or a fish) is described by its features, but the features 
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themselves belong to a set of descriptive categories such as, colour, 
life-form, habitat, voice, movement, and these can be considered as 
subdivisions of the category "description". The structure of the 
classification used in this example is still based on the notion of 
an entity being divisible into its parts, but the entity here is an 
idea, not a concrete object. It is the notion of "description" that 
is being divided. The structure, as illustrated in figure 6:5, appears 
to function on a single level. All the elements here form part of the 
notion, "description". 
-head 
{
-hair 
= ~~~~h { -tongue -teeth 
- chest 
-arm 
body 
_lower{ 
trunk 
- leg 
lungs 
ribs 
- heart 
- stomach 
intestines 
liver 
- thigh 
- knee 
lower leg 
foot 
Figure 6: 4. Partial outline of the classification of the parts of the 
human body. 
colour I life-form I habitat length density 
Figure 6:5. Structure of relations between terms used in the division 
of a description into its components. 
_Assuming that there is a cognitive level structure related 
to the idea of an entity being divisible into a number of parts, 
there are a number of constraints that are imposed on its form. 
First it must have potential for expansion, or it could not be applied 
in any context where the parts of an item are learned over a period of 
time. Secondly it must remain continually open-ended in order to allow 
the discovery or inclusion of previously unrecognised elements. 
Thirdly, it must be capable of including potential for classification 
on one or more levels. Figure 6:6 gives an indication of the shape of 
such a structure, one which will meet all of the above req_uirements. 
Figure 6:6. Cognitive level of the "anatomical structure". 
In this figure,~ represents the individual entity. 0 is then 
the identifiable element within the individual entity, and cathe 
feature by which the first element is discriminated. I Ifal then 
represents one discriminated element,~ represents any number of 
distinguishable features by whichother[ZJelements are able to be 
. 
as contrastive at the same level, and stands for an open 
separated 
space. 
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This represents the potential for the inclusion of additional items 
if they become recognised by features which have not previously been 
distinguished . .Any element~ on one level of division can function as 
an entity which is then able to be divided into its components. 
In diagram form the cognitive level structures of the anatomical 
and taxonomic types appear very similar to each other. There are 
however, definite contrasts in the meanings of the elements of the 
structures, which are related to the notions on which the two 
different structures are founded. 
3: Three-part Structures. 
Through all four of the ethnographic chapters one structure is 
constantly apparent as a framework for evaluation. This is the 
structure consistently made up of three related classifications. As 
I have demonstrated with a variety of different materials and 
situations, each of these classifications is relative to the others 
and to the context of its use. I have also shown that there appears to 
be a recognisable quality constantly perceived in each of the 
classifications in relation to the others with the relation between 
them being qualitatively assessed. 
I have shown that the structure is applied in both pragmatic and 
metaphysical contexts while also identifying contexts where it appears 
to be used in a pragmatic sense without any essential implication of 
the metaphysical. It is my assertion that there is a very strong 
relationship between the three categories and the Yolnu perception of 
the nature of existence, and that it appears that the structure 
is integrated with this perception. 
In the earlier discussion of the evaluation of properties of 
physical matter, I demonstrated that these normally appear to be 
based on the material properties of the things being analysed. I 
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also demonstrated that such evaluations were made using the 
three-part structure, with each of the three parts representing a 
different expression of the quality being evaluated. These were; 
first, a moderate or partial expression of the quality, secondly a 
generalised expression of it, and thirdly a more intense or ideal 
expression of it. The use of this structure was demonstrated in 
relation to the pragmatic evaluation of most of the properties 
considered. For example, an item could be seen to moderately express 
the quality "big", to express the quality "big" in a general way, or 
to express that quality in a very definite or intense way. When 
considered this way it can be seen that it is the physical express'ion 
of a particular quality which is being evaluated, and not the item 
itself. This distinction is critical in understanding the evaluations 
being made. 
The same relationship between categories was also argued for in 
Chapter Three, in the Yolnu approach to the assessment of relationships 
between items in sets or groups. There were shown to be three distinct 
ways of classifying these relationships. There was the classification 
of precise relationships between individual items, of precise 
relationships between sets of items, and non-precise relationships 
as perceived in larger groupings of items. In each of these ways of 
classifying relationships there were three classifications used with 
each of them in a constant relation to the others. The central 
classification in each case was shown to express the general 
characteristics of the quality being evaluated. The first 
classification was shown to identify a partial or pre-expression of 
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that quality and the third to demonstrate a qualitative intensity of 
the relationship type such that it could be seen as the completion 
of, or perfect example of, the type . 
.Again, in relation to colours and their pragmatic evaluations 
a three-part evaluation structure was shown to be used, with each 
colour being evaluated in terms of, a moderate expression of its 
quality, a general expression of it and an intense expression of it. 
Each evaluation of any one colour was shown to be relative to the 
other ones of it and to the context in which it was made. 
Discussion of the classifications of living and existing things 
revealed three different classifications of the quality "physically 
alive". Each of these was shown to be in the same constant relationship 
with the others that has already been already been described. Similarly 
a number of different natural species were recorded as having three 
stages of physical life, notably the emu, four species of marine turtles, 
turtles, and two plants, one a yam, and the other the cycad tree. 
The relation between the structures of the three-part 
classifications as used in different domains cari be illustrated as 
figure 6:7. The constant relation between the categories in each of 
the classifications is also clearly seen. 
In the discussions of the cycad tree and its classifications, a 
second notion associated with the three-part structure was illustrated. 
This was the idea that if a quality increases in intensity in some 
way beyond the intensity of the ideal for a particular classification, 
it can transform in such a way as to enter a different or alternative 
size 
I 
I 
I Partial Expression I 
I_ - - - - _ J 
moderately big 
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I 
General Expression I Ideal/Intense 
____ ___ I ~xpressio~ _ 
big : intensely big 
I 
relationship,...-----------:----------------------. 
:between I solitary item 
items . pair 
It . 1 rio 
I 
:between 
sets solitary set pair :trio 
non-precise 
grouping 
red 
(or any 
other 
colour) 
living 
things 
emu 
turtles 
yam 
I 
: talmost but (relationship) ;{complete or 
: not yet a : intense 
: relationship) 1 : relationship) : 
.. .... -... . ...... .. ..... .. ............. . ........... ............................. . 
moderately 
non-precise 
grouping 
I moderately 
red 
movement and 
power 
emu chicken 
hatchling 
I small leaf 
non-precise 
grouping 
red 
breathing and 
reproducing 
young bird 
young turtle 
large leaf 
I very much 
I non-precise 
I grouping 
1 very red I 
I 
I having and 
I keeping 
I laws 
I 
: mature bird 
l large adult 
I (mature) 
I 
I old leaf 
I 
Figure 6:7. Comparison of three-part classifications made in 
different domains. 
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dimension of that same quality. The tree and its fruit were shown to 
go through three stages in its life cycle of these, two and possibly 
also the third of these stages were shown to go through three 
separate classifications of maturity. In each of the stages or 
transformations the essential nature or quality of "cycad" remained 
unchanged while the expression of that nature was seen to assume a 
different form. 
A comparable type of transformation between dimensions occurs 
in the classification of relationships between items within groups. 
In these a transformation was shown to occur from classification of 
precise relationships between items to classifications of precise 
relationships between sets of things when the size of the group 
went beyond certain limits. Transformation also occurred 
between classifications of precise relationships and those of 
non-precise relationships. Used in this way the transformation at the 
point of greatest intensity enables the Yolnu to have means of 
assessing what could appear as a continuum in such a way that the 
continuum can be broken into units, each of which can be perceived 
as a different expression of a single identity. Thus the continuum 
was shown to be removed by classifying it out of a lineal 
progression into a repetition of existence in different expressions 
of the one quality. The structure of these classifications with their 
relation to transformations is shown in figure 6:8. Whether the 
transformations formed a cyclical pattern or not they appear to be 
trans forms between dimensions which are perceived to be in an analogous 
or potentially analogous relation to each other. 
fruit on 
tree \ 
\ mature (yellow) 
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\ 
' full size \ 
',(green) 
' 
fruit on 
ground 
---
root 
growing 
(seedling 
Figure 6:8.a. Reclassifications of Cycad tree as transformations 
reach classification of maximum intensity. 
solitary item 
solitary set 
moderately 
non-precise 
grouping 
paired items 
paired sets 
non-precise 
grouping 
trio of items 
trio of sets 
very much 
non-precise 
grouping 
Figure 6:8.b. Reclassification of relationships at boundary of 
classifications of maximum inte nsity. 
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In three of the ethnographic chapters (two,four and five) I have 
shown that the Yolnu also superimpose a metaphysical three-part 
evaluation over the pragmatic one. These metaphysical evaluations 
clearly express the notions that entities, properties or qualities 
which exist in the physical dimension also have a spiritual existence, 
that there are transformations from one to the other, and that the 
spiritual existence is both the ultimate reality and the source of 
the physical. 
The quality "big" was shown to be assessed using the metaphysical 
evaluations of "not big" (the non-expression of the quality), "big" (a 
physical expression of it), and "supernaturally big" (beyond naturally 
big). This last classification is both the ideal category of the 
metaphysical evaluation, and a classification of "beyond natural limits" 
of the pragmatic evaluation (see figure 6:9.a.), The perception of a 
transformation into a supernatural quality of size, when an item was 
perceived as bigger than the natural expected limits, was supported 
by later evidence in relation to naturally alive things . .Animals of 
beyond normal size were shown to be thought of as transformations in 
such a wa;y that they still expressed the original nature while 
having entered into a spiritual dimension of that nature. For example, 
a transformed kangaroo or turtle could be perceived as a "spirit being" 
kangaroo or turtle, expressing something of the spiritual in the new 
trans formation. 
The Yolnu have been shown to apply the metaphysical classifications 
to colour and particularly colour in relation to pigments. Thus they 
are able to perceive a pre-existence of red colour in a grey clay which 
was a supernatural transformation of an ancestral stubstance. They 
were then able to produce a physical transformation in that substance 
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as they heated it, such that they obtained a physical manifestation 
of it in "red colour". This in its solid form as pigment was then able 
to be perceived as the transformation into solid colour as a 
supernatural or spiritual substance. 
In each of these cases where the metaphysical classification is 
applied, there is a constant relation between the classifications of 
a pre-expression (in contrast to non-existence), a general expression, 
and then a perfect expression which has a supernatural or spiritual 
form. This metaphysical evaluation is then in an analogous relation 
to the classifications of the physical entity. The relations 
between the pragmatic and metaphysical classifications as revealed 
in different domains are illustrated in figure 6:9.a-d . 
pre-expression physically big supernaturally 
of big big 
not physically moderately big very big not natural 
big big 
a. size 
existence physically turtle supernatural 
before birth turtle 
not turtle but hatchling immature fully beyond natural 
turtle egg rturtle adult size 
b. animal 
pre-expression physically colour supernatural colour 
of colour (pigment) 
not colour moderately colour intense solid colour 
(different colour colour (more than just 
colour) visually colour) 
c. colour 
not expressing with physical life supernaturally 
life alive 
not alive movement breathing keeping beyond physical 
and power reproducing laws life 
d. life-forms 
Figure 6:9. Relations .between metaphysical and physical evaluations. 
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When the four structures illustrated in figure 6:9 are compared, 
the coIIml.on features are able to be isolated as in figure 6:10.The 
upper classifications in both figures representing the metaphysical 
evaluations and the lower ones the pragmatic or physical evaluations. 
pre-existence of physical expression supernatural 
quality of quality expression 
(existing but of quality 
not expressed) 
not expressing moderately general intense beyond 
that quality quality expression expression physical 
of quality of quality Quality 
Figure 6:10.Schematic representation of the relationship between the 
three-part classifications operating on pragmatic and 
metaphysical levels. 
In the comparison of the two levels, it can be seen that there 
is an analogous relation between the evaluations made. The pre-existence 
category of the metaphysical evaluation can be seen as a minimal 
classification of the quality, an identification of the fact that the 
quality is there but not fully revealed. This is comparable to the 
the moderate expression of the physical classification, in that it 
too represents an incomplete or "partially expressed" manifestation of 
the quality. The central category at each level is analogous to the 
the other in that each is a classification of a generalised expression 
of the quality being assessed. The third category of the physical level 
is that of the ideal, perfect, or most intense expression of the quality 
in its physical form. At the metaphysical level, the third category is 
of the spiritual state or expression fully entered. Each then represents 
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an expression of the ultimate or ideal of the state of existence of 
a quality at the particular level of evaluation. 
4: The Structure of Paired Relations. 
Because the structure of paired relations is linked to the 
three-part structure it is found with the same wide distribution as 
it. My reasons for not identifying paired relations as complementary 
terms, as antonyms or even as oppositions will become apparent as 
their structure is discussed. The paired relation is the relation 
that the Yolnu perceive as existing between any pair of terms used 
in evaluation. Each of the terms in a pair is potentially subject 
to evaluation using the three-part structure. Included in the category 
are such pairs of terms as, long and short, or big and little, but 
also any two adjacent colours such as red and yellow, red and black, 
or red and white.The "moderate" and "intense" categories of any 
three-part classification also appear to function as paired relations. 
The difference between Yolnu pragmatic and metaphysical perceptions 
of the paired relations are found, not at the level of classification, 
but at the level of interpretation of classifications made. 
When the relations within this structure are examined from a 
pragmatic approach, they can be equated reasonably well with the 
relations between complements as discussed by Lyons (1977:272). That 
is, in the paired relations established by the Yolnu, there are no 
gradeable items, each member of a pair being contradictory to the 
other, and not contrary to it, to use Lyon's terms. In no situation 
did I find a pair of terms which could be discerned as varying from 
that pattern. Even such pairs as big and small, hot and cold, heavy 
and light followed the contradictory and non-gradeable pattern of 
2 
relations. 
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In figure 6 :11, the structure of the paired relation is 
illustrated. At the general level there is an opposition between 
small and not small, and again between red and not red. The position 
of the contradiction of the term is then filled by the second term 
in the paired relationship. In some situations the contradictory term 
is an automatic choice, but in situations where a choice exists, the 
position could be filled by any of the alternatives, without denying 
a paired relation between them.For example,"not red" could be 
identified with any of the other colour terms. 
not big not small 
~------------------ ------------- --------
small ~ ~ -
---
big 
very small moderately moderately big very 
small small big big 
not yellow not red 
-- ------------- -- --- - - - - - ---------
- - - --
red I - yellow --. 
-
very red moderately moderately yellow very 
red red yellow yellow 
General 
Level. 
Specific 
Level. 
General 
Level. 
Specific 
Level. 
Figure 6:11. Structures associated with terms in paired relations. 
(Paired relations indicated by arrows) 
The relation between the terms used for the two extremes of 
Quality at the specific level is seen to be analogous to the relation 
between the paired classifications on the general level. That is, 
either of the classifications within the pair at the specific level 
eQuates with the position filled by the negative of the other, and 
hence e ach can be seen as the contradiction of the other. This set of 
relations is then as shown in figure 6:12. 
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red 
very red moderately red 
~ ~ , 
red 
not not 
moderately very red 
red 
Figure 6:12. Classifications within the category red. 
It is at this point that the Yolnu metaphysical interpretation of 
the evaluations starts to become apparent. The observation is made 
that within the category "red'', there are two terms which appear to be 
opposed, but which are in fact referring to items which are both red. 
That is, in spite of the outward appearance of contradiction between 
the terms "very red" and "moderately red", the inner reality is that 
they are both expressions of the same quality or identity. This same 
observation is then transferred to the analogous relation between the 
structures at the more general level. The result is that any pair of 
items can be considered as being a pair of different expressions of 
a single identity. They are contradictory expressions at one level 
but are, at a different level of classification or identification, 
found to be the same. For a very few pairs this higher level is 
overtly identified. For example, "shortness" and "longness" are in a 
paired relation, but are identical in that they are both expressions 
of the quality "linearity". Similarly, "red" and "yellow" or "red" 
and "black" are paired relations seen as a pair of expressions of a 
single identity "colour/design". 
This same logic can be seen in a number of other situations. 
Figure 6:13, illustrates with four basic colours the range of paired 
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relations in the domain of colour. In this figure there is 
illustrated the idea that a paired relation can be seen to exist 
between any two colours on a general level of classification. A 
further paired relation exists within each colour at the more specific 
level, with the intense category(inner circle) being contradictory to 
the moderate category (outer circle). At each level, the paired 
relation is seen to be a pairing of expressions of a ~uality which 
at a higher level of classification expresses a unity or singularity 
of identity. 
yellow 
;?' 
red ~ black ~ / 
white 
Figure 6:13. Paired relations in the domain of colour. 
When interpretations are made at a metaphysical level, there is a 
switch from perception of identity as physical, to seeing identity as 
being spiritual. The three part structure with its focus on the third 
classification as the ideal then implies that that which appears 
physical is only an expression of an identity which is in reality 
spiritual, as the physical is only the second of the three categories 
of which the third or ideal is spiritual . 
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When we examine the metaphysical level of the three-part 
classification, we again find a paired relation between the categories 
at the poles of the evaluation. In figure 6:14, the"pre-existent" 
category is in a contradictory relation to the "supernatural" 
category yet they are united in the perception of the totality of the 
of the existence of that which is being classified. That is, the 
pre-existent state can be perceived as equal in identity to the 
supernatural state in that they are both spiritual. 
pre-existent 
expression 
not 
phy~ical : 
physical 
expression 
moderately:physical: very much 
physical 
I 
I I 
: physical 
supernatural 
expression 
beyond 
physical 
Figure 6:14.Schematic representation of paired relations in physical 
and metaphysical levels of three-part classifications. 
Using the same logic it is also possible to see a common identity 
(as I demonstrated in discussing colour evaluations) in red and yellow 
transformations of pigment and in red and yellow colour. These are 
in paired relations in different ways, but following Yolnu qualitative 
logic they are able to be perceived as identical in an inner spiritual 
reality even if different in expression. In each of these paired 
relations, either of the pair can be considered as the non-expression 
of the other. The one considered to be expressing the inner nature 
appears to be able to be established arbitrarily, but once established 
is justified by some perception of the expression of a supernatural 
or spiritual identity~ Thus as I have shown, the non-expression of the 
spiritual nature of a red pigment may be in the form of a greyish 
clay, or a supernatural deposit of yellow ochre may be transformed 
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at the colour level to a non-expression of its inner nature by 
heating it until it turns red. This,which has no contradiction for the 
Yolnu, is a logical structure, being based as it is on a qualitative 
th t . . 4 ra er than a quan i tati ve mode of thought. 
Conclusion. 
There appear then to be four fundamental "structures in the 
mind" used by the Yolnu in framing the structures of their evaluations 
and classifications. Taxonomic structures are used in the perception 
and classification of similarity in diverse elements. In this they 
provide a framework for the perception of unity and harmony in the 
diversity of the world around them. Anatomical structures complement 
the taxonomic ones. They are used in classifying perceptions of the 
variety of elements which make up each unified whole. The question 
remains as to whether these two structures are in fact one, or 
whether, at the level of cognition they are distinct. It is my 
argument that they appear to be distinct, this position being 
supported by the notions on which they are founded and the meaning 
loads which their elements carry. 
The three-part structure evaluates diachronic change and 
synchronic variation in such a way that it can be seen as matching 
qualitatively the assumed three dimensional expression of existence. 
By evaluating the successive stages of an entity as different 
expressions of a single quality across time it also provides support 
for Yolnu perceptions of changelessness. The simple fact that the 
three-part structure is everywhere observable in the physical world 
forms an intellectual justification for the metaphysical assumptions. 
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The relations between the three classifications at all times supports 
the perception of spiritual reality as ultimate. That is, in the 
classifications applied to the categories of life and existence, this 
support is clearly displeyed. The pragmatic classification of the 
world enables the perception of three different categories of the 
quality "life". Superimposed over this the metaphysical classification 
enables the perception of the ultimate reality to be displeyed as 
self evident, supported at all points by the evidence of the 
classifications of the physical world with its identical structure. 
The paired relation seen as a pair of inverse expressions of a 
single reality enables an apparent conflict to be classified out. 
While the elements of these paired terms appear superficially to be 
antonymic, it appears that they function in quite a different way, 
because Yolnu use them as qualitative evaluations whereas antonyms 
as normally described appear to be perceived as quantitative 
oppositions. 
It appears that the four cognitive structures are all ·able to 
be applied to the same entities as the Yolnu see the relevance of 
doing so. The first two of them are used primarily in the classifying 
and ordering of identity, while the last two, each appearing to 
automatically imply the involvement of the other, are used primarily 
in the qualitative evaluation of identities. 
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NOTES 
1: I did not discover any Yolnu classification where more than a single 
connnon feature was essential for its establishment. Thus in 
Needham's (1975) terms, each class was monothetic. 
2: The coinciding of the absence of grading with the absence of 
quantitative evaluation matches very well with a connnent made by 
Sapir (1949:122) that "judgements of quantity in terms of units 
of measure or in terms of number always presuppose, explicitly or 
implicitly, preliminary judgements of grading". 
3: I have not discovered any paired relation where both terms were 
considered simultaneously as transformations of the supernatural. 
Red and yellow could appear to be such a pair, but the two are 
considered separately as they are transformations of different 
ancestral substances. Following Yolnu logic, the second term of 
any pair apparently automatically has the potential for classifying 
the form taken by the pre-existent or non-expressed supernatural 
quality. 
4: 'rt was this type of"contradiction" which Levy-Bruhl in his earlier 
/ writing considered as indicative of the mode of thought which he 
called "prelogical" and which later in his "Notebooks", he refers 
to as "incompatabilities" in which the "primitive" mode of thought 
attaches more importance to the affective meaning of symbols and 
concepts. The perceived relationships within the paired relations 
he (1927:250 - 254) describes as unity-duality. 
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